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Abstract
This thesis interrogates the applicability of the principle of distinction in modern armed 
conflicts. The distinction between combatants and civilians and between civilian objects and 
military objectives has become blurred as a result of the changes that have taken place in 
modern armed conflicts. While the principle of distinction was tailor made to regulate 
traditional, conventional armed conflicts, an evolution in the nature, means and methods of 
warfare has made the application of the principle of distinction challenging.
One of the challenges that arise as a result of the changes that have taken place in modern 
armed conflicts include the difficulty of distinguishing civilians and civilian objects, which 
are entitled to protection under international humanitarian law from combatants and military 
objectives which are legitimate targets. This has compromised the protection that the law 
seeks to offer during armed conflicts since civilians and civilian objects have become 
constant targets. Another challenge is that the involvement of civilian persons in armed 
conflicts has made it difficult to determine the responsibility of these individuals as well as 
the states that hire them for violations of international law during armed conflicts. 
Furthermore, the emergence of new methods of warfare has resulted in many objects and 
facilities that are traditionally regarded as civilian objects becoming military objectives, thus 
losing their protection under international humanitarian law. This thesis will use the examples 
of the involvement of private military and security companies in armed conflicts as well as 
the emergence of drone and cyber warfare to illustrate these challenges.
The study will examine the application of the principle of distinction to the growing practice 
of outsourcing of military services to Private Military and Security Companies. Firstly, the 
study will examine the status of PMSC personnel under the principle of distinction, that is 
whether they qualify as combatants or civilians. The study will then examine the 
consequences of PMSC personnel’s participation in armed conflicts. Importantly, the study 
will explore responsibilities of states that hire private military and security personnel, PMSC 
companies as well as superiors in charge of PMSC personnel for any violation of 
international law committed by contractors during armed conflicts. The study will also 
examine the application of the principle of distinction to drone and cyber warfare. The study
iX
will examine the status of drone and cyber operators under the principle of distinction as well 
as the applicability of the principle of distinction between civilian objects and military 
objectives in drone and cyber warfare. The study will discuss some of the problems that arise 
as result of the introduction of these new methods of warfare, which makes the application of 
the principle of distinction to modern armed conflicts challenging.
The thesis concludes by arguing that while the principle of distinction remains an 
indispensable concept of international humanitarian law, it needs to be adapted for it to be 
applicable to modern armed conflicts. Therefore, suggestions shall be made on how the 
principle can be adapted to ensure that it remains relevant to modern armed conflicts.
X
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Chapter 1: General Introduction
1.1 Description and Context
The principle of distinction is one of the founding principles of international humanitarian 
law.1 In other words, it is the cornerstone upon which humanitarian law is based. This 
principle provides that parties to an armed conflict should always make a distinction between 
civilians and combatants and between civilian objects and military objectives and that all 
military operations should be directed against military objectives.2 Article 51(1) of Additional 
Protocol I provides that “civilian population and individual civilians shall enjoy general 
protection against dangers arising from military operations”.3 Article 51(3) states that 
civilians shall enjoy protection under Article 51 “unless and for such time as they take a 
direct part in hostilities”.4 Accordingly, in exchange for their protection from attacks, 
civilians must desist from directly participating in hostilities. However, if civilians take direct 
part in hostilities, they become legitimate targets of attack for as long as they continue to take 
direct part in hostilities.5 More so, when civilians directly take part in hostilities, they are not 
entitled to prisoner of war (PoW) status if captured and may be prosecuted for crimes 
committed during their involvement in armed conflict.6 On the other hand, those who are
1 International humanitarian law refers to “set of rules which seek, for humanitarian reasons, to limit the effects 
of armed conflict”. Therefore, humanitarian law is only applicable during armed conflicts. See ICRC “Advisory 
Service on International Humanitarian Law” https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/what is ihl.pdf 
(accessed 4 February 2017). Since the principle of distinction is only applicable during armed conflicts, the 
study will not deal with other branches of law such as human rights law and international criminal law. For 
distinction between humanitarian law and other branches of law, see generally R Provost International Human 
Rights and Humanitarian Law (2002) Cambridge University Press: Cambridge.
2Article 48 of Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection 
of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, 8 June 1977 (Additional Protocol I). See also A L Haruna et al 
“Principle of Distinction in Armed Conflict: An Analysis of the Legitimacy of ‘Combatants and Military 
Objectives’ As a Military Target” (2014) 3 International Journal o f  Humanities and Social Science Invention 15 
at 16.
3Additional Protocol I
4Additional Protocol I.
5M Sassoli “Legitimate Target of Attacks Under International Humanitarian Law” Background Paper prepared 
for the Informal High-Level Expert Meeting on the Reaffirmation and Development o f  International 
Humanitarian Law, Cambridge, January 27-29, 2003.
http://www.hpcrresearch.org/sites/default/files/publications/Session1.pdf (accessed 10 March 2015).
6K Watkin “Warriors without rights? Combatants, Unprivileged belligerents and the struggle over legitimacy” 
(Winter 2005) Number 2 Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research Harvard University Occasional Paper 
Series http://www.hpcrresearch.org/sites/default/files/publications/OccasionalPaper2.pdf. (Accessed 27 
February 2015).
1
classified as combatants are legitimate targets of attack during armed conflicts.7 This means 
that international humanitarian law does not protect them from attacks from their adversaries. 
However, these people have the right to take part in armed hostilities and cannot be punished 
for participating in armed conflicts.8 Combatants are also entitled to PoW status if they fall 
under enemy captivity.9 The principle also requires civilian objects to be spared from attacks 
during armed conflicts.10
The principle of distinction dates back from time immemorial, even though it existed in 
unwritten form. Recognition of the principle of distinction at an international level was first 
made in the St. Petersburg Declaration where the preamble states that “the only legitimate 
object which States should endeavour to accomplish during war is to weaken the military 
forces of the enemy”.11 Through state practice, distinction has gained the status of customary 
international law. Rule 1 of the customary international humanitarian law rules provides that 
parties to the armed conflict must at all times distinguish between civilians and combatants 
and that attacks may only be directed against combatants, not civilians.12 Rule 7 states that 
“parties to the conflict must at all times distinguish between civilian objects and military 
objectives” and that attacks “must not be directed against civilian objects”.13
The principle has also been codified in international legal instruments. As already mentioned, 
Article 48 of the Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions (Additional Protocol I) 
provides that “in order to ensure respect for and protection of the civilian population and 
civilian objects, the Parties to the conflict shall at all times distinguish between the civilian 
population and combatants and between civilian objects and military objectives”.14 Article 
51(2) provides that “the civilian population as such, as well as individual civilians, shall not 
be the object of attack”.15 Furthermore, Article 52(1) provides that “civilian objects shall not
7Ibid.
8Ibid.
9A L Haruna et al 2014 International Journal o f  Humanities and Social Science Invention 18.
10Article 52(2) of Additional Protocol I.
"Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Explosive Projectiles Under 400 Grammes Weight, Saint 
Petersburg, 29 November / 11 December 1868.
12J M Henckaerts, L D Beck Customary International Humanitarian Law Vol 1(2005) 3.
13J M Henckaerts, L D Beck Customary International Humanitarian Law 25.
14Additional Protocol I.
15Ibid.
2
be the object of attack or of reprisals”.16 There are no reservations to these provisions, which 
entails that all parties to the armed conflict are obliged to observe this principle.
The principle of distinction is also recognised in many other international legal instruments, 
which include Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions.17 Furthermore, failure to 
observe the principle of distinction during an armed conflict is a war crime under the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court.18 Article 8 (2)(e)(i) states that “intentionally 
directing attacks against civilian population or individual civilians not taking direct part in 
hostilities constitutes a war crime.19 The significance of the principle of distinction was also 
highlighted by the International Court of Justice in Legality o f the Threat or Use o f Nuclear 
Weapons, Advisory Opinion where the Court described distinction as “one of the cardinal 
principles that constitute the fabric of humanitarian law”.20 The principle now applies to both 
international armed conflicts and non-international armed conflicts.21
In order for parties to an armed conflict to fulfil their obligation not to attack civilians or 
civilian objects, there is need for clear criteria which can objectively be used to distinguish 
civilians from combatants and civilian objects from military objectives. Additional Protocol I 
provides a negative definition of civilians. It defines a civilian as “any person who does not 
belong to one of the categories of persons referred to in Article 4A (1), (2), (3) and (6) of the 
Third Convention and in Article 43 of this Protocol”.22 Therefore, a civilian is a person who 
is “neither a prisoner of war, a member of the armed forces, nor a combatant” as provided in 
the above Articles.23 On the other hand, combatants are defined in Article 4A the Geneva 
Conventions, which deals with the prisoner of war status, read together with Article 43 of
16Article 52(1) of Additional Protocol I.
17Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims 
of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II) (hereafter Additional Protocol II). Article 13 provides that 
“the civilian population and individual civilians shall enjoy general protection against the dangers arising from 
military operations”.
18Rome Statute o f the International Criminal Court of 10 November 1998.
19Ibid.
20Threat o f  Use o f Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion [1996] ICJ Rep. 226, paras 78-79.
21K Lannoy Unlawful/unprivileged combatant, armed conflict and international law in the 21st Century: 
Slipping through the loopholes o f  the Geneva Conventions (LLM Thesis, Ghent University, 2010) 
http://lib.ugent.be/fulltxt/RUG01/001/458/336/RUG01-001458336 2011 0001 AC.pdf (accessed 13 March 
2015)
22Article 50.
23D Richemond-Barak “Private Military Contractors and Combatancy Status under International Humanitarian 
Law” Complementing IHL: Exploring the Need for Additional Norms to Govern Contemporary Conflict 
Situations” An International Conference, Jerusalem, 2008
http://law.huii.ac.il/upload/Richmond Barak Private Military Contractors.pdf (accessed 7 March 2015).
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Additional Protocol I.24 According to Article 4A(1) of the Geneva Conventions, the first 
category of people who qualify as combatants are armed forces which belong to a part to the 
conflict as well as members of the militia or volunteer corps forming part of such armed 
forces.25 Combatants also include members of other militia and members of other volunteer 
corps, including those of organized resistance movements, provided that they meet the 
requirements of being commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates,26 of having 
fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance,27 carrying arms openly28 and conducting 
their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war.29 Article 4A of the Geneva 
Conventions also confers combatant status on members of regular armed forces who profess 
allegiance to a government or an authority not recognized by the detaining power30 and 
inhabitants of a non-occupied territory, who on the approach of the enemy spontaneously take 
up arms to resist the invading forces.31 Thus in terms of international humanitarian law, 
where a person does not fulfil the requirements of a combatant, they automatically become 
civilians.
Civilian objects are defined as “all objects which are not military objectives”.32 This means 
that the definition of civilian objects needs to be read together with the definition of military 
objectives. Article 52(2) defines military objectives as limited to “those objects which by 
their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and 
whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the 
time, offers a definite military advantage”.33 Thus, the principle is an indispensable concept 
of international humanitarian law since it defines what is protected and what is not protected 
by the law during armed conflicts. In other words, the protection of civilian population and 
civilian objectives hinges on the principle of distinction.
24Article 43 of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions contains similar requirements to those in 
Article 4A of the Geneva Conventions.
25Article 4A (1).
26Article 4A (2) (a).
27Article 4A (2) (b).
28Article 4A (2) (c).
29Article 4A (2) (d).
30Article 4A (3).
31Article 4A (6).
32Article 52(1) of Additional Protocol I.
33Article 52(1) of Additional Protocol I.
4
1.2 Problem Statement
The provisions dealing with the principle of distinction in the Additional Protocols were 
drafted with the concept of traditional warfare in mind. Traditional war refers to past conflicts 
where armed forces belonging to state actors “would face each other directly, man to man in 
situations of ground battle”.34 According to Schmitt, this positioning of armies “together with 
limited range and mobility of weapons systems rendered civilians relatively immune to direct 
effects of warfare” as they were “either distant from battle field or fled as hostilities drew 
near”.35 Furthermore, civilians played a minimal part in the hostilities. Thus, it was easy to 
draw a clear line between combatants and civilians.
However, the nature of armed conflicts in the 21st Century has drastically changed, as war is 
no longer confined to armed forces belonging to states and traditional battlefields. Modern 
warfare now involves “high-tech long -range strike capability which has resulted in a 
revolution in military affairs”.36 Schmitt argues that in modern armed conflicts, entire 
countries now comprise battle space, as war is no longer confined to battlefields and this has 
resulted in civilians becoming objects of attack.37 More so, there has been a sharp increase in 
urban warfare in modern conflicts. While battles between armies traditionally took place in 
open space several kilometres from cities, urban areas are now considered a strategic area for 
warring parties thus further exposing civilians to attack.38 Furthermore, modern conflicts 
have seen an increase in participation of civilians such as ‘terrorists’, private military 
contractors and mercenaries, among other groups who are taking over the traditional 
responsibilities previously confined to state actors. Most of these groups employ the use of 
guerrilla warfare tactics such as blending with civilians as well as launching attacks from a
34S Oeter “Comment: Is the Principle of Distinction Outdated?” in W Heintschel von Heinneg, V Epping
International Humanitarian Law Facing New Challenges (2007) 53.
35M N Schmitt “Targeting and Humanitarian Law: Current Issues” International Law Studies: Issues in 
International Law and Military Operations https://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/aa0dc109-7b43-4c3b-8874- 
b2dea632b8a2/Targeting-and-Humanitarian-Law--Current-Issues.aspx (accessed 23 March 2014).
36Ibid.
31Ibid.
38A Vautravers “Military operations in urban areas” (2010) Vol 92 Number 878 International Review o f  the Red 
Cross 835.
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civilian environment.39 More so, methods of warfare have shifted from the use of traditional 
kinetic weapons to the use sophisticated methods such as remote warfare. These 
developments have led to what is now referred to as civilianisation of warfare, which means 
that armed conflicts have shifted from being a predominantly military affair to involve 
civilians.40
These developments challenge the application of the principle of distinction. As already 
stated above the principle of distinction envisions the existence of two distinct groups, that is 
combatants and civilians. The involvement of other armed groups who are not traditionally 
regarded as combatants as well as the emergence of new methods of warfare creates 
challenges for the application of the principle of distinction to modern armed conflicts.
This thesis seeks to investigate the challenges created by modern conflicts for the principle of 
distinction, particularly the involvement of groups who do not have a clear legal status under 
international humanitarian law as well as the emergence of new methods of warfare. For 
example, Private Military and Security Companies (hereafter PMSCs) have become very 
influential in armed conflicts in the 21st Century. Private military contractors perform a 
number of functions that range from military to non-military functions.41 Singer has 
categorised these functions into several categories, which include “provider firms supplying 
direct tactical military assistance such as involvement in combat battles, military consulting 
firms that provide strategic advice and training and military support firms that provide 
logistics, maintenance and intelligence services to armed forces”.42 A glance at the definition 
of a civilian and a combatant reveals that many actors in modern conflicts cannot be 
categorised as either civilians or combatants. The question therefore is, what is the status of 
actors such as PMSCs under the principle of distinction and what are their rights and 
obligations under international humanitarian law? Furthermore, what are the responsibilities
39M W Lewis and E Crawford Drones and Distinction: How IHL Encouraged the Rise o f  Drones 
https://www.law. georgetown.edu/academics/law-journals/gjil/recent/upload/zsx00313001127.PDF. (accessed 22 
March 2015).
40A Wenger, S J A Mason “The civilianization o f armed conflict: trends and implications” (2008) 90
International Review o f the Red Cross 835.
41J L Gomez del Prado “The Role of Private Military and Security Companies in Modern Warfare” 11 August 
2012 The Brown Journal o f  World Affairs http://www.globalresearch.ca/the-role-of-private-military-and- 
securitv-companies-in-modern-warfare/32307. Accessed 27 March 2015).
42P Singer, Corporate Warriors: The Rise o f  the Privatized Military Industry (2003).
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of the states that rely on the services of private actors to fight in armed conflicts and what are 
the measures that are in place to ensure accountability of these actors?
International humanitarian law does not recognise the category of quasi combatants hence 
groups such as private military contractors cannot be said to fall in-between combatants and 
civilians.43 This renders classification of these new actors problematic. For example, in the 
case of private military contractors, they cannot be distinguished as combatants given that 
they do not meet the requirements of combatants as set out above.44 On the other hand, 
classifying private military contractors as civilians will have far-reaching consequences for 
the protection of innocent civilians. For instance, this may promote the use of innocent 
civilians as human shields by private military companies to protect themselves from attack.45 
An attempt to classify private military contractors as mercenaries thereby making them 
criminals does not provide an answer since private military contractors do not meet the 
cumulative requirements that must be met in terms of Article 47 of Additional Protocol I for 
one to qualify as a mercenary.46 Therefore, the challenge which this study seeks to tackle is 
the status of the new actors under the principle of distinction.
The failure of international law to clarify the status of these the new participants in modern 
conflicts results in a number of problems. The first problem relates to whether these groups 
are legitimate targets or not. One the one hand, if they are categorised as civilians then they 
are immune from attacks. On the other hand, if they are combatants they become legitimate 
objects of attack. However, at present, there is no answer to this question and this creates 
problems for a party to a conflict that is faced by such groups as adversaries. The second 
problem relates to the protection they should be accorded. It is not clear whether these groups 
should be accorded prisoner of war status or should be treated as criminals and be prosecuted
43S Bosch “Private security contractors and international humanitarian law -  a skirmish for recognition in 
international armed conflicts” African Security Review 16.4 Institute for Security Studies 
http://www.google.co.za/url?sa=t&rct=i&q=&esrc=s&som^ce=web&cd=6&ved=0CDcOFiAF&url=http%3A%2 
F%2Fmercury.ethz.ch%2Fserviceengine%2FFiles%2FISN%2F102201%2Fichaptersection singledocument%2 
F4b56edbf-3688-40bd-b74a-a8316f04192c%2Fen%2F3.pdf&ei=t5AiVcSvLoPtUu-
NhJAI&usg=AFOjCNFameZTSUOUh wyX7g-vEHMMT3XdA&bvm=bv.89947451,d.d24 (accessed 28 
March 2013).
44For example, private military contractors do not have a clearly articulated chain o f command and some of 
them do not have a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance.
45See generally L Cameron “Private military companies: their status under international humanitarian law and 
its impact on their regulation” (2006) 88 International Review o f  the Red Cross 573
46Article 47 provides that a mercenary is a person who is specifically recruited locally or abroad to fight in 
armed conflict, does in fact take direct part in hostilities , is motivated to take part in the hostilities for private 
gain is neither a national of a party to the conflict nor a resident of territory controlled by a party to the conflict , 
is not a member of the armed forces of a party to the conflict and has not been sent by a state which is not party 
to the conflict on official duty as a member of its armed forces. These requirements must be met cumulatively.
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for their involvement in armed conflicts. The third problem relates to accountability for 
violations of international humanitarian law. In other words, the question is who should be 
held accountable for the actions of these groups, as well as ensuring that they adhere to 
international law. For example, in relation to private military companies, Devon points out 
that “private companies and their personnel are not subject to strict regulations that determine 
to whom they are ultimately accountable”.47 Furthermore, some of the private military 
companies may be transnational companies, which may not fall under any specific 
jurisdiction. This therefore raises the question of who should ensure that these armed groups 
comply with international humanitarian law and who should hold them accountable in case of 
violations.
The emergence of new methods of warfare such as cyber warfare has made it difficult to 
apply the distinction between civilian objects and military objectives in modern armed 
conflicts. For example, cyber warfare involves the participation of civilian personnel. More 
so, this method of warfare also uses civilian infrastructure and their targets include purely 
civilian objects or dual use objects. In brief, new methods of warfare that are not capable of 
complying with the principle of distinction between civilian objects and military objectives 
have emerged and these have compromised the protective mandate which international 
humanitarian law seeks to offer during armed conflicts. The question this study will attempt 
to answer is, to what extent does the new means and methods of warfare comply with the 
requirement for distinction between civilians an combatants and between civilian objects and 
military objectives? In other words, the issue is whether international humanitarian law is 
adapted enough to regulate the new developments that have taken place in modern armed 
conflicts.
Therefore, as it stands, there appears to be a legal vacuum in international humanitarian law 
regarding the principle of distinction and this has far-reaching implications for the ability of 
international humanitarian law to regulate the conduct of armed conflicts. This study will 
therefore examine whether the present criteria used to distinguish civilians from combatants 
and civilian objects from military objectives is sufficient to ensure the achievement of the
47DB Devon “The Threat of Private Military Companies” Centre for Research on Globalization 
http://www.globalresearch.ca/the-threat-of-private-military-companies/24896. (accessed 30 March 2015).
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international humanitarian law goal of sparing civilians population as well as civilian objects 
from violence associated with armed conflicts while at the same time ensuring that those who 
take part in hostilities are held accountable for their actions.
1.3 Goals of the research
1. To explore the application of the principle of distinction to modern conflicts with 
particular attention being paid to the changes in the nature of armed conflicts.
2. To demonstrate how the non-regulation of private military contractors under 
international law has resulted in difficulties in the application of the principle of 
distinction.
3. To demonstrate how the emergence of the new methods of warfare in modern armed 
conflicts has compromised the distinction between civilian objects from military 
objectives.
4. To suggest additional criteria to be used for distinguishing civilians from combatants 
and civilian objects from military objectives in order to strengthen the protection 
regime under international humanitarian law.
1.4 Significance of the Study
The principle of distinction between civilians and combatants and between civilian objects 
and military objectives is the cornerstone of international humanitarian law. It forms the basis 
upon which civilian protection is formed. In other words, the determination whether person 
or an object is entitled to protection during an armed conflict or not emanates from the ability 
to distinguish such person or object from legitimate military targets. Therefore, the protection 
that international humanitarian law seeks to offer mainly depends on the effectiveness of the 
principle of distinction. Furthermore, the principle of distinction also imposes limits on the 
category of persons who can take part in armed conflicts. For example, it requires a party to 
the conflict to ensure that persons who fight on their behalf meet the combatant status. This is 
meant to ensure that parties to the conflict remain in control of the people acting on their
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behalf and to ensure that people who take part in armed conflicts can be held accountable for 
any violation of the law.
Despite the importance of the principle of distinction in regulating the conduct of hostilities, 
several developments have taken place that challenge the application of the principle of 
distinction. For instance, the practice of outsourcing of military services to private contractors 
as well as the development of new methods of warfare has resulted in the application of the 
principle distinction becoming very difficult. This has in turn threatened the protection that 
international humanitarian law seeks to offer to civilians during armed conflicts. Although 
these developments continue to take place, the principle of distinction has not been able to 
adapt in order to regulate the changes. These developments leave protected persons and 
objects vulnerable to attack during armed conflicts. This also allows parties to an armed 
conflict, particularly states to take part in armed conflicts without being held responsible for 
the activities of its agents. Therefore, this study will make recommendations on how the 
principle of distinction should be adapted in order to regulate these new developments.
1.5 Limitations of the Study
The challenges facing international humanitarian law in general and the principle of 
distinction in particular are multifaceted. As a result, this study will not be able to deal with 
all the new developments that challenge the principle of distinction. Only a few examples 
have been chosen to illustrate some of the challenges that international humanitarian law is 
facing. Furthermore, the study does not advocate for a complete overhaul of the principle of 
distinction. The study seeks to argue that currently, the principle of distinction is not well 
adapted to regulate some of the developments that have taken place in modern armed 
conflicts. Therefore, the study will advocate for the adaptation of the principle of distinction 
in order to deal with the new developments. Lastly, due to time constraints, the study will 
only focus on the application of the principle of distinction in international armed conflicts. 
The study will not deal with the challenges that the principle of distinction is facing in non­
international armed conflicts.
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1.6 Research Methodology
A doctrinal research methodology shall be used in this research. Doctrinal research asks what 
the law is on a particular issue.48 This methodology shall be used to analyse the current 
position in international law regarding the principle of distinction. The study will make use of 
both primary and secondary sources of law. Various international conventions will be 
analysed which deal with the principle of distinction such as the Geneva Conventions, 
Additional Protocol I, International Customary Law, among other international legal 
instruments. The study will also make use of case law, textbooks, journal articles, non­
binding soft law among other sources. This methodology will be used in order to expose the 
legal vacuum which currently exists in the principle of distinction in that it excludes certain 
people who do not have a legal status thus allowing them to operate without incurring 
obligations. The research will be literature based and will not involve interviews or human 
and animal experiments, hence it will not require ethical clearance from the University.
1.7 Structure of the Research
The research is divided into five distinctive chapters. Chapter 1 contains a general 
introduction to the thesis. It will introduce the research topic, goals to be achieved and the 
methodology to be used. The Chapter will outline the scope and limitations of the research.
Chapter 2 will examine the origins and rationale of the principle of distinction between 
combatants and civilians and between civilian objects and military objectives. The Chapter 
will deal with the history and development of the principle. The Chapter will also discuss the 
current criteria used to distinguish combatants from civilians and civilian objects from 
military objectives in armed conflicts as well as the consequences that arise as a result of this 
distinction.
48Understanding Legal Research in Integration and Dissemination 1924, 20
http://econ.upm.edu.mv/researchbulletin/artikel/Vol%204%20March%202009/1924%20Adilah.pdf. (Accessed 
28 March 2015).
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Chapter 3 will discuss some of the challenges that the principle of distinction is facing in 
modern armed conflicts using the example of private military and security companies 
(hereafter PMSCs). The Chapter will briefly discuss the origins of private military and 
security companies and the role they play in armed conflicts. Thereafter, the status of private 
military and security contractors under the principle of distinction shall be examined. The 
Chapter will analyse some of the consequences that arise as a result of outsourcing of military 
services to PMSCs during armed conflicts.
Chapter 4 will look at other developments that have taken place in armed conflicts that 
challenge the principle of distinction. Drone and cyber warfare shall be used as examples to 
demonstrate how the distinction between combatants and civilians and between civilian 
objects and military objectives has become blurred. The Chapter will also consider some 
efforts that have been made in order to ensure that the principle of distinction remains 
applicable to these developments.
Chapter 5 will begin by providing a summary of the findings in the preceding Chapters. It 
will conclude with recommendations on what can be done to ensure that the principle of 
distinction can be developed to ensure that international humanitarian law protects all parties 
involved in armed conflicts.
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Chapter 2: An Overview of the Principle of Distinction
2.1 Introduction
The main purpose of this chapter is to discuss the principle of distinction between combatants 
and civilians and between civilian objects and military objectives in armed conflicts in 
general. Since the principle of distinction is the central focus of this study, this Chapter seeks 
to discuss the meaning of the principle as well to trace its origins and development over the 
years. This discussion will lay a foundation for the discussion on how the principle of 
distinction is being challenged by developments that have taken place in armed conflicts.
This Chapter will begin with a brief introduction of what the principle of distinction entails. 
Thereafter, it will examine how the principle of distinction was recognised during armed 
conflicts by ancient states. A discussion of the attempts made to recognise the principle of 
distinction at an international level through international legal agreements and how these 
ideas influenced the evolution of laws of armed conflicts will be made. Thereafter, the criteria 
used to distinguish combatants from civilians as well as civilian objects from military 
objectives shall be discussed. The chapter will then conclude with a summary of the 
discussion made as well some of the consequences of the application of the principle of 
distinction to modern armed conflicts.
2.2 What is the principle of distinction?
According to Keck, the principle of distinction is the simplest albeit most fundamental rule of 
international humanitarian law (hereafter IHL).49 Distinction has also been described as “the 
most significant battlefield concept” on which IHL is based.50 The principle of distinction 
provides that parties to an armed conflict must distinguish “between civilian population and
49T A Keck “Not All Civilians Are Created Equal: The Principle of Distinction, the Question of Direct 
Participation in Hostilities and Evolving Restraints on the Use of Force in Warfare” in From the Selected Works 
o f  Trevor Keck http://works.bepress.com/trevor keck/1/. (accessed 23 May 2015).
50G D Solis The Law o f Armed Conflict: International Humanitarian Law in War (2010) 250.
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combatants and between civilian objects and military objectives”.51 The principle further 
provides that civilians must not be subjected to deliberate attacks.52 In other words, there 
should always be a distinction between civilians and combatants and between civilian objects 
and military objectives. In Prosecutor v Galic, it was held that the intentional violation of the 
principle of distinction is never justified even by military necessity.53 Therefore, violation of 
the principle of distinction constitutes a violation of international law and is punishable.54
This distinction between civilians and combatants has far-reaching consequences on the 
conduct of armed hostilities and these shall be dealt with later in this Chapter. It is important 
at this point to discuss the origins of the principle of distinction as well as its development 
over the years to become an important principle of international humanitarian law.
2.3 Origins and Development of the Principle of Distinction
The laws of war are as old as war itself.55 This means that the law regulating conduct of 
hostilities has always been in existence since time immemorial. While some scholars argue 
that ancient armed conflicts were conducted without having regard to civilian lives,56 
Jochnick and Normand argue that this view denies and distorts the historical record as 
“belligerents have throughout history created and recognised war codes”.57 *Among the laws
51Article 48 of Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection 
of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977 hereafter (Additional Protocol I) See also 
M Sassoli “Legitimate Targets of Attacks Under International Humanitarian Law”(January 27-29, 2003) 
Background Paper prepared for the Informal High-Level Expert Meeting on the Reaffirmation and Development 
o f International Humanitarian Law,
Camfrridgehttp://www.hpcrresearch.org/sites/default/files/publications/Session1.pdf (accessed 30 May 2015)
52Article 48 of Additional Protocol I.
53Prosecutor V. Galic, IT-98-29-T, ICTY Trial Chamber Judgment and Opinion (2003), 44. The tribunal further 
stated that the principle of distinction incontrovertibly form the basic foundation of international humanitarian
law.
54For example, Article8 (2)(e)(i) o f Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court of 10 November 1998 
makes deliberate violation o f the principle of distinction a war crime.
55U C Jha International Humanitarian Law: The Laws o f  War (2011) 1.
56For example, J Pictet Humanitarian Law and the Protection o f War Victims (1975) 6 argues that “in the 
earliest human societies, what we call the law of the jungle generally prevailed; the triumph of the strongest or 
most treacherous was followed by monstrous massacres and unspeakable atrocities”.
57C Jochnick, R Normand “The Legitimation of Violence: A Critical History of the Laws o f War” (Winter 1994)
35 Harvard International Law Journal 49 at 59-60 The authors further argue that ancient societies had legal
codes with humanitarian provisions similar to those found in modern laws of war including the requirement that
belligerents should distinguish between combatants and civilians.
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regulating the conduct of hostilities was the recognition of the distinction between 
combatants and civilians during armed conflicts.
Laws of armed conflict were recognised in ancient times. For example, it has been argued 
that “as far as the Old Testament, leaders and societies imposed some limitations on the 
conduct of hostilities and these regulations were directed at reducing the violence visited on 
certain groups, such as women and children, or prisoners”.58 Furthermore, the wars between 
Egypt and Sumeria in the second millennium B.C were governed by set of binding rules.59 
Among these rules were the obligation for belligerents to distinguish “combatants from 
civilians and providing procedures for declaring war, conducting arbitration, and concluding 
peace treaties”.60 Hammurabi, the King of Babylon wrote the Code of Hammurabi, which 
provided for the “protection of the weak against oppression by the strong and release of 
hostages on payment of ransom”.61 Furthermore, the war between Egypt and the Hittites in 
1269 B.C is said to have been ended in terms of the Hittites law, which provided for “a 
declaration of war and for peace to be concluded by a treaty, as well as for respect for the 
inhabitants of an enemy city that has capitulated”.62 Humanitarian law principles were also 
observed during the Greek city-states wars where Greeks “considered each other as having 
equal rights and in the war, respected the life and personal dignity of war victims as a prime 
principle”.63 Protection of civilian and religious objects such as temples, embassies during 
armed conflicts were also observed. The Christian writings of St. Augustine and St. Thomas 
Aquinas also confirmed the existence of “rules of chivalry that prohibited attacks on the sick 
and the wounded, women or children”.64 The Church also enforced the respect for holy 
places, created a right of refuge, or asylum in churches.65
58L R Blank, G S Corn “Losing the Forest for the Trees: Syria, Law, and the Pragmatics of Conflict 
Recognition” (2003) 3 Vanderbilt Journal o f  Transnational Law 693 at 709.
59G P Noone “The History and Evolution of the Law of War Prior to World War II” (2000) 47 Naval Law 
Review 176 at 183.
60D Fleck The Handbook o f  Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflict (1995) 12.
61Ibid.
62D Fleck The Handbook o f  Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflict (1995) 13. King Cyrus 1 of the Persians also 
ordered the wounded Chaldeans to be treated like his own wounded soldiers.
63Ibid.
64Ibid
65Ibid.
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International humanitarian law is not Eurocentric. The principle of distinction in particular 
and laws governing conduct of hostilities have been recognised in other cultures and across 
nations. The principle of distinction is documented in Chinese history as early as 5th BC.66 
For instance, Su Tzu, a Chinese military commander instructed his armies to “treat the 
captives well and care for them and that the best policy is to take a state intact as ruining the 
state will be inferior”.67 Although these rules of engagement do not mention distinction in 
particular, it can be argued that the principle informs the need to take the state intact without 
ruining it, which includes not killing its inhabitants. The Hindu civilization also prescribed a 
set of rules in the Book of Manu, which are similar to those in the Hague Regulation.68 One 
of the rules observed is the prohibition of attacks on civilians.69 Thus, one can argue that even 
though the principle of distinction was not stated in same terms as it is stated today, it was 
nevertheless observed and influenced the conduct of hostilities.
The development of the law of armed conflict was not only influenced by religion. 
Enlightenment scholars also contributed to the development of the law. For example, Grotius 
in De jure Belli ac Pacis Libri Tres argues that “the practice of respecting the principle of 
distinction by states reflected natural law through the reasoned judgment of men”.70 He 
argues that “Although there may be circumstances in which absolute justice will not condemn 
the sacrifice of lives in war, humanity requires greatest precaution to be used against 
involving the innocent in danger, except in cases of extreme urgency and utility”.71 While 
Grotius acknowledges that loss of lives is inevitable during armed conflicts, this should only 
be condoned in extreme cases and all necessary measures should be taken to spare civilian 
innocent lives.72 Grotius further argues that the rationale to spare innocent lives of the 
dangers of war could be found on mercy, if not justice.73 According to Grotius, violation of
66T A Keck “Not All Civilians Are Created Equal: The Principle of Distinction, the Question of Direct 
Participation in Hostilities and Evolving Restraints on the Use of Force in Warfare” in From the Selected Works 
o f  Trevor Keck http://works.bepress.com/trevor keck/1/. (accessed 23 May 2015).
67S B Griffith Sun Tzu: The Art o f  War (1963) 76.
68Jochnick and Normand 1994 Harvard International Law Journal 60.
69Ibid.
70Jochnick and Normand 1994 Harvard International Law Journal 61.
71H Grotius On the Law o f  War and Peace (2001) 321.
72 This implies that there should be a distinction between civilians and combatants. The civilians who are the 
“innocent” should be spared from the dangers of war.
73H Grotius On the Law o f  War and Peace (2001) 321.
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these principles of natural law and equity could not even be justified even by necessity of 
retaliation or striking terror.74
Rousseau argues that the nature of things requires belligerent to distinguish combatants from 
non-combatants and limit attacks to armed enemies.75 Rousseau further argues that:
“Since the aim of war is to subdue a hostile state, a combatant has the right to kill the 
defenders of that state while they are armed but as soon as they lay down their arms and 
surrender, they cease to be either enemies or instruments of the enemy; they become 
simply men once more, and no one has any longer the right to take their lives....”76
Thus besides arguing that civilians should be distinguished from combatants, Rousseau also 
believed that combatants who have fallen under the captivity of the enemy should be treated 
in a humane way and should not be attacked.77 This argument emphasises the notion that only 
those actively taking part in armed conflicts should be the legitimate objects of attack. 
Rousseau agreed with Grotius that these rules regulating the conduct of warfare are based on 
reason.
However, other scholars argue that there were limitations to the application of the law during 
armed conflicts. Cicero argues that “inter arma silent leges” which means that “in times of 
war, the law is silent”.78 Cicero’s view is that during armed conflicts, law is not applicable. 
Franco de Vitoria, a Spanish philosopher argues that while deliberate slaughter of the 
innocent is never lawful, states could lawfully target innocent civilians if necessary to secure 
a military victory.79 This meant that military necessities outweigh the obligation to 
distinguish combatants from civilians.
74H Grotius On the Law o f  War and Peace (2001) 323.
75J Rousseau The Social Contract (1968) (1762) 57.
16Ibid.
77This view is consistent with the current view that combatants who have fallen under the captive of the enemy 
force should be granted prisoner of war status and that civilians can only be targeted when they take direct 
participation in hostilities.
78Jochnick and Normand 1994 Harvard International Law Journal 54.
79F de Vitoria “On the Indies and The Law of War” in L Friedman, The Law o f War: A Documentary History 
(1972) 13.
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Although the rules regulating the conduct of hostilities have been recognised for a long time, 
there was no internationally recognised treaty that codified these rules. Keck argues that until 
the 19th Century, the laws of war were only codified in bilateral treaties and reflected in state 
practice.80 Therefore, the rules such as distinction between combatants and civilians, 
protection of prisoners of war and the prohibition of total destruction of cities could not be 
internationally enforced. As a result, states could choose when to apply these rules during 
armed conflicts. For example, while the Romans spared the lives of their prisoners of war, 
their approach to warfare “varied according to whether their wars were commenced to exact 
vengeance for gross violations of international law, or for deliberate acts of treachery”.81 
Their respect for the rules of war also varied “depending on whether their adversaries were 
regular enemies or uncivilized barbarians and bands of pirates and marauders”.82
Furthermore, the rules of armed conflict were also rendered ineffective by the widespread use 
of mercenaries during the middle ages. The mercenary armies “lacked regular pay, had 
inadequate supplies and were forced to ravage the countryside by living off the land”.83 
Moreover, mercenaries treated war as a profession in which they took part in for private 
gains.84 Therefore, the respect for rules governing the conduct of hostilities was not uniform. 
For example, during the Thirty Years War from 1618-1648, the German-speaking population 
was wiped out due to the failure to respect rules of armed conflict.85 The conduct of 
mercenary armies gave rise to the regular soldiers “who did not have to forage for food and 
shelter”.86 This development resulted in an increase in respect for rules of hostilities, 
particularly the principle of distinction.87 From the discussion above, it can be submitted that 
respect for laws of armed conflict in ancient times was not uniform as states could choose 
whether to comply with the rules or not. States only respected the laws when it suited their 
needs or when it did not threaten their interests. These experiences highlighted the need for
80T A Keck “Not All Civilians Are Created Equal: The Principle of Distinction, the Question of Direct 
Participation in Hostilities and Evolving Restraints on the Use of Force in Warfare” in From the Selected Works 
o f  Trevor Keck http://works.bepress.com/trevor keck/1/. (accessed 23 May 2015).
81L C Green “The Law of War in Historical Perspective” (1996) 72 International Law Studies 39 at 42.
82D Fleck Handbook o f  International Humanitarian Law in Armed conflict 13.
83Noone 2000 Naval Law Review 187.
84Ibid.
85Noone 2000 Naval Law Review 187.
86Ibid.
81Ibid.
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international norms that would ensure uniform and obligatory application of the laws of 
armed conflict.
2.3.1 The birth of humanitarian law: Towards uniform international law
The nineteenth century saw a number of developments taking place in the manner in which 
wars were conducted. The call for respect of laws of armed conflict and prohibition of 
inhumane practices during armed conflicts increased.88 One of the main reasons behind this 
development was the increase in war correspondence.89 For example when the activities of 
the Light Brigade in the Crimean War of 1854-1856 were reported to London from 
Balaklava, the public’s perception of war changed.90 The public became aware of the 
atrocities that take place at the war front as opposed to the “biased reports of bravery and 
heroism made by military commanders”.91
However, one incident that undoubtedly changed the face of international humanitarian law 
came during the Italian War of Unification in 1859. During the Battle of Solferino, Henri 
Dunant, a Swiss businessman witnessed the suffering of 40, 000 Austrian, French and Italian 
men lying wounded in the battlefield with no medical assistance given to them by their 
armies.92 Dunant organized the volunteers to “collect and provide for the wounded despite the 
fact that medical providers were left unprotected from attack or capture”.93 Later on, Dunant 
recorded his experiences in his book, A Memory of Solferino that became popular globally. 
In A Memory of Solferino, Dunant made proposals aimed at preventing a repetition of the 
suffering which he witnessed at Solferino.94 Dunant’s proposal was twofold. Firstly, he 
suggested the creation voluntary relief societies in all countries for caring for the wounded in
88See Generally Noone 2000 Naval Law Review.
89G P Noone “The History and Evolution of the Law of War Prior to World War II” (2000) Naval Law Review 
190.
90A Neier War Crimes: Brutality, Genocide, Terror, and the Struggle for Justice (1998) 13-14
91Ibid.
92F Bugnion “The International Committee of the Red Cross and the Development of International 
Humanitarian Law” (2004-2005) 5 Chicago Journal o f  International Law 191 at 191-192.
93Ibid.
94Noone 2000 Naval Law Review 191.
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wartime.95 Secondly, he suggested the adoption of an international principle sanctioned by a 
convention, which would serve as the basis and support for the relief societies.96 In pursuant 
of this, a committee, which was known as the International Committee of the Red Cross 
(hereafter ICRC), was formed in Geneva in 1863.97 This organisation was to change the face 
of international humanitarian law. Among the ICRC’s major accomplishments was 
convening international conferences that were aimed at establishing binding rules and norms 
that would regulate future armed conflicts.
In 1864, the government of Switzerland together with the ICRC convened a Diplomatic 
Conference in Geneva that was aimed at discussing ways in which the suffering of the 
wounded persons could be reduced during armed conflicts.98 The European nations and 
kingdoms that were represented at the conference signed the Convention for the Amelioration 
of the Condition of the Wounded in Armies in the Field.99 The Convention “defined the status 
of medical personnel and further provided that wounded soldiers should be cared for in the 
same way as members of friendly armed forces”.100 Although the Convention did not say 
anything about the principle of distinction, it paved way for further conferences that led to 
further development of IHL. From the conference also came resolutions, which gave rise to 
the International Red Cross, an organization dedicated to humanitarian work.101
2.3.2 The Lieber Code
As Dunant was busy working on ways that would help alleviate the suffering of people 
during armed conflicts, another important development was taking place in North America 
where the American Civil War was going on.102 There were reports of devastating suffering
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of men involved in the war and this prompted President Lincoln to order for the drafting of a 
code that would be used to regulate the conduct of the Union Army during the conflict.103 
Francis Lieber, a German scholar was appointed the principal draftsman and was tasked to 
draft a document entitled Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in 
the Field, officially known as the General Order No: 100 (hereafter Lieber Code).104 The 
Union Army began to implement the Code in 1863 and it became the first modern codified 
military instrument that regulated the conduct of hostilities. The Code contained a number of 
modern principles of international humanitarian law that were praised as a humanitarian 
milestone for implementing the rule of law in an actual war.105 The principle of distinction 
was laid out in Article 22 of the Code, which provided that:
“Nevertheless, as civilization has advanced during the last centuries, so has likewise 
steadily advanced, especially in war on land, the distinction between the private individual 
belonging to a hostile country and the hostile country itself, with its men in arms. The 
principle has been more and more acknowledged that the unarmed citizen is to be spared 
in person, property, and honour as much as the exigencies of war will admit.”106
The Code recognised that persons who are unarmed (civilians) should be spared from the 
dangers of war.107 This formulation forms the basis of the modern principle of distinction. 
Subsequent international conferences that were aimed at codifying the principles of 
humanitarian law borrowed from the Lieber Code.108
Despite its humanitarian achievements, the Lieber Code has been criticised for subjecting 
humanitarian principles to military necessity. For example, the Code made it permissible 
under military necessity to “direct destruction of life or limb of ‘armed’ enemies, and of other 
persons whose destruction is incidentally ‘unavoidable’ in the armed contests of the war,109 
and “starving of hostile belligerent, armed or unarmed in order to ensure speedier subjection
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of the enemy”.110 The elevation of military necessity and the manner it triumphed 
humanitarian principles resulted in the Code failing to achieve its intended purpose. For 
example, government army generals are said to have committed atrocities such as 
“appropriation and destruction of civilian property, indiscriminate bombardment in populated 
areas, and general spreading of terror” with the justification that this was permissible under 
the Code.111 Jochnick and Normand concur that “the Lieber Code subjected all humanitarian 
provisions to derogation based on an open ended definition of military necessity”.112 
Therefore, despite its provisions providing for the protection of innocent people, the Lieber 
Code was not successful in preventing atrocities from being committed against civilians 
during American Civil War. However, the Code created a useful guide for future attempts 
towards codification of humanitarian rules during armed conflicts as shall be seen later in this 
chapter.
2.3.3 The Saint Petersburg Declaration
The first international conference held in an attempt to codify the international humanitarian 
law rules was called by Czar Alexander II of Russia at Saint Petersburg in 1868.113 The aim 
of the conference was to alleviate as much as possible the calamities of war.114 The 
Conference resulted in the adoption of the Declaration of Saint Petersburg, which mainly 
banned arms that aggravate human suffering such as explosive bullets.115 However, the 
Conference did not do much in as far as protection of civilian life was concerned. The 
Declaration recognised that “the only legitimate object which States should endeavor to 
accomplish during war is to weaken the military forces of the enemy and that to achieve this, 
it is sufficient to disable the greatest possible number of men”.116 The signatories however 
acknowledged that the objective of disabling the greatest number of men “would be exceeded
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by the employment of arms which uselessly aggravate the sufferings of disabled men, or 
render their death inevitable”.1 *17 While the Saint Petersburg Declaration constituted a 
significant step in the development of IHL, it did not attempt in any way to deal with the 
protection of civilians or the principle of distinction. All that was achieved was the banning 
of weapons that would result in the unnecessary suffering of people.
2.3.4 The Brussels Declaration
The next conference was held in Brussels in 1874 and the agenda was to draft a set of “more 
comprehensive regulations for warfare”.118 The Brussels conference made extensive use of 
the Lieber Code119 resulting in the drafting of the Declaration Concerning the Laws and 
Customs of War (hereafter Brussels Declaration).120 Besides affirming the principles of Saint 
Petersburg, the conference also came up with new rules regulating the conduct of warfare.121 
Of importance to the principle of distinction was the prohibition of bombardment of 
unfortified or open town.122 Article 15 of the Brussels Declaration provides that “Fortified 
places are alone liable to be besieged”.123 It further provides that “Open towns, 
agglomerations of dwellings, or villages which are not defended can neither be attacked nor 
bombarded”.124 Although Article 15 does not mention the principle of distinction and 
protection civilians in particular, it can be argued that by protecting an undefended town, it 
indirectly protects civilians in such areas. This can be regarded as a recognition that civilian 
areas are immune from attacks during armed conflicts and that only places where there are 
military objectives can be targeted. However, just like the Saint Petersburg declaration, all the 
rules were subject to the principle of military necessity. This again meant that even though 
there was a prohibition against bombardment of undefended towns, a state could justify 
bombardment of a town based on military necessity. Despite the fact that the declaration did
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not threaten the military necessities of armies, no state ratified the agreement.* 125 Thus, the 
issue of military necessity proved to be an immovable force against acceptance of the laws of 
war as well as limiting their effectiveness.126 This hugely compromised the development of 
the law as well as the protection of civilians.
2.3.5 The First Hague Conference of 1899
The Hague Conferences acquired much popularity for having contained most of the 
principles that influence IHL today. States continued with their efforts in abolishing war 
particularly because of the devastating effects of the Napoleonic Wars. At the First Hague 
Peace Conference in 1899,127 Russia made a proposal for disarmament as well as peaceful 
settlement of disputes, which would result in the eradication of war.128 However, the issue of 
arms reduction was overwhelmingly rejected by nations. States that attended the conference 
were preoccupied with protecting their military interests.129 Thus from the beginning, the 
chances of success of this conference were slim.
The Conference failed to address the issue of military limitations as countries vehemently 
resisted this proposal by the Russian delegation. For example, the Unites States of America 
delegation and Great Britain delegates were under instructions to reject attempts to restrict 
the range of weapons.130 The military delegate for United States of America criticised the 
banning of a weapon for humanitarian reasons before its value is tested on the field.131
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On a positive note, states agreed to prohibit attack or bombardment of towns, villages, 
dwellings, or buildings that are undefended.132 It can be argued that this provision recognises 
the immunity of civilians particularly when they are in an undefended territory. However, this 
means that when an enemy belligerent or military objective was located in a territory mainly 
occupied by civilians, the territory could be attacked out of military necessity without having 
regard to proportionality.133 The Conference was also successful in banning asphyxiating gas, 
expanding bullets and balloon-launched munitions.134
2.3.5.1 Humanitarian achievements: The Martens Clause
Attempts to come up with rules that would ensure protection of civilians at the Conference 
was overshadowed by the decision of participating countries to uphold their military needs at 
the expense of humanitarian needs. Article 22 of the Convention provided that the right of 
belligerents to adopt means of injuring the enemy is limited.135 Furthermore, states agreed to 
ban the employment of “arms, projectiles, or material of a nature to cause superfluous 
injury”.136 However, there was no guidance on how these provisions should be interpreted. 
As a result, states involved in war could interpret these provisions in a manner which would 
suit their military needs.
One notable achievement of the First Hague Conference which has influenced the 
development of the laws of armed conflict was the adoption of the Martens clause.137 The 
clause provides that:
“Until a more complete code of the laws of war is issued, the High Contracting 
Parties think it right to declare that in cases not included in the Regulations 
adopted by them, populations and belligerents remain under the protection and
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empire of the principles of international law, as they result from the usages 
established between civilized nations, from the laws of humanity and the 
requirements of the public conscience.”138
There has been debate as to the meaning, relevance and status of the Martens clause. For 
example, Greenwood opines that the clause is only a reminder that customary international 
law continues to be applied even after nations have adopted a treaty.139 This view suggests 
that the contents of the clause cannot be relied upon as setting up a legal norm. The 
International Court of Justice (hereafter ICJ) also had the opportunity to consider the meaning 
of the Martens Clause in its Advisory Opinion on the Legality o f the threat or Use o f Nuclear 
Weapons.140 The Russian Federation submitted that the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the 
Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions of 1977 were complete codes of the laws of 
war and this made the Martens Clause redundant.141
On the other hand, the United Kingdom interpreted the Martens Clause to mean that in the 
absence of a specific treaty prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons, it does not mean that the 
weapons are capable of lawful use.142 However, the United Kingdom also pointed out that the 
Clause does not establish the illegality of nuclear weapons.143 The ICJ acknowledged that the 
Martens Clause is an effective means of addressing the evolution of military technology.144 
The Court did not try to provide a clear interpretation or clear understanding of the Clause. 
However, Judge Shahabuddeen in a dissenting judgment provides an analysis on how the 
Martens Clause should be interpreted. The learned Judge argued that while it may be 
accepted that the Martens Clause is a rule of customary international law that lays down 
norms for state conduct, it is difficult to determine what norms of state conduct are laid 
down.145 The Judge was of the view that the Clause has normative status in its own right and 
is not simply a reminder of the existence of other norms of international law. The Judge
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further argued that the principles of international law referred to in the Clause are derived 
from one or more of three different sources, which are usages, established between civilized 
nations, the laws of humanity and the requirements of the public conscience.146 Ticehurst 
argues that this means that when determining the full extent of the laws of armed conflicts, 
“the Martens Clause provides authority for looking beyond treaty law and custom to consider 
principles of humanity and the dictates of the public conscience”.147
Despite the different interpretations given to the Clause, it is clear that the clause had 
influence in the development of humanitarian law and hence is the most important 
achievement of The Hague Conference. Although the clause does not specifically refer to the 
principle of distinction, it embodies a general recognition that means and methods used in 
warfare are subject to limits. The clause also acts as an important guide to the future attempts 
to codify the laws of war. For example, the denunciation clause common to the Geneva 
Conventions provides that any contracting party that denounces any of the Conventions shall 
remain bound by its obligations “by virtue of the principles of the law of nations as they 
result from the usages established among civilised peoples, from the laws of humanity and 
the dictates of public conscience”.148 The importance of the Martens Clause is also 
recognised in Article 1(2) of Additional Protocol I, which provides that “in cases not covered 
by this Protocol or by other international agreements, civilians and combatants remain under 
the protection and authority of the principles of international law derived from established 
custom, from the principles of humanity and from the dictates of public conscience”.149 This 
provision highlights the relevance of the Martens Clause to the principle of distinction since it 
clearly points that the principles of international law, established custom, humanity and 
public conscience requires protection of civilians during armed conflicts. Therefore, although 
The Hague Convention failed to come up with sound and binding international norms which 
would ensure protection of civilians due to the delegates’ decision to uphold military 
necessity over humanitarian principles, it gave birth to an important principle which 
positively influenced the future development of humanitarian law.
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2.3.6 Opposition to the development of the law
Despite efforts to formulate rules that would regulate the conduct of hostilities and reduce 
unnecessary suffering, there was enormous resistance to these developments. Deliberate 
disregard of the rules of war was evident as the nature of warfare changed due to 
“technological advancement as well as heightened rivalries between states”.150 This resulted 
in wars becoming unregulated and the requirement to distinguish combatants from civilians 
being ignored. For example, Pictet points out that the advent of Napoleonic Wars brought 
with it an “epoch of unbridled ferocity” and this resulted in existing customary rules 
regulating the conduct of wars being useless.151 The states were more inclined to ignore rules 
of armed conflict to maximise military advantage over their adversaries. The increase in 
technological advancement also resulted in civilians becoming more involved in hostilities, 
even though the involvement was indirect. For example, civilians were employed in 
industries supplying military equipment thus making them vulnerable to attacks.152 O’ Brien 
also argues that the mobilization of populations and industrial bases to support war effort by 
nations resulted in the line between combatants and civilians being blurred thus endangering 
civilian lives.153 This therefore resulted in innocent civilians being exposed to attacks during 
armed conflicts.
One policy that was adopted in disregard of the customary law rules regulating the conduct of 
hostilities was the kreigsraison doctrine, which was propagated by German leaders.154 This 
doctrine was based on the argument that “demands of military necessity should always 
override the obligations of international law”.155 Furthermore, it was argued, “ruthless war 
was quicker and more humane”.156 Other proponents of this doctrine argued that where 
victory in war made it necessary to violate international law, it would be unreasonable to 
prohibit such violations.157 This meant that while German states acknowledged the 
obligations imposed upon them by international law, military necessities would always
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override these international law obligations. For example, German Chancellor Otto von 
Bismarck once stated that a leader should not allow his country to be destroyed because of 
international law.158 Thus when a country’s success was at stake in an armed conflict, it was 
justifiable to disregard the rules of international law. The War Book of German General Staff 
states that “certain severities are indispensable to war, and that humanity was best served by 
the ruthless application of them”.159
The kreigsraison doctrine faced criticism from scholars for its disregard of the attempts to 
cement the principles of humanitarian law.160 After The Hague Conference, Germany came 
up with a military manual that had its influence from the kreigsraison doctrine. The manual 
provided that:
“A war conducted with energy cannot be directed merely against the combatant forces of 
enemy and the positions they occupy, but it will and must be in like manner seek to destroy 
the total intellectual and material resources of the latter.”161
This meant that humanitarian objectives could be achieved through allowing atrocities to 
take place in order for the war to be short. The Germany military manual also stated, 
“Humanitarian claims, such as the protection of men and their goals can only be taken into 
consideration in so far as the nature and object of war permit”.162 By adopting this stance, 
Germany made the application of humanitarian law, particularly the principle of distinction 
an exception rather than a norm.
Although there was widespread condemnation of Germany’s move to frustrate attempts to 
codify laws regulating the conduct of warfare, the kreigsraison reflects states’ conduct during 
armed conflicts at the time. Jochnick and Normand argue that “while the codification of the 
laws of war represented a formal rejection of kreigsraison, it did not signify a substantive 
advance towards the humanitarian goal of restraining war conduct”.163 The learned authors 
further argue that “the distinction paramount in the minds of legal scholars between
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kreigsraison and the laws of war disappears in the actual practice of war”.164 One can 
therefore conclude that there were contradictions between states’ attempts to come up with 
laws governing the conduct of armed conflicts and how their armies conducted themselves 
during armed conflicts.
2.3.7 The Second Hague Conference of 1907
European powers convened another Conference in 1907 in order to discuss the laws of armed 
conflicts. However, there were no positive developments regarding the principle of 
distinction.165 Instead, a naval code that allowed the bombardment of undefended places was 
drafted.166 The participating states chose to elevate military necessity above humanitarian 
needs. Furthermore, attempts to ban aerial bombardment were opposed.167 From this 
discussion, one can conclude that although efforts were made to come up with binding rules 
to regulate the conduct of warfare and ensure protection of civilians, these efforts did not 
have a major effect on the manner in which war was conducted. This was mainly because of 
the desire by states to uphold military necessity at the expense of humanitarian principles.168 
It should be reiterated that although the two Hague Conferences had no immediate impact on 
the protection of civilians, they carried the ideas that would form the core principles of IHL 
into the future.
2.3.8 The Principle of Distinction during World War 1
The success of attempts to regulate the conduct of war, particularly the need to distinguish 
between combatants and civilians was tested during the First World War. During this period,
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there was development of heavy industry specialising in military technology.169 The military 
became more dependent on civilians who worked in military factories. This involvement of 
civilians put them at risk of attacks from enemy forces. Further, the development of military 
industries in civilian towns also exposed the residents of such towns from the dangers of war, 
as the industries became military targets.170 Therefore, civilian environments were turned into 
battlefields. This development brought enormous challenges to the protection of civilians.
Another factor that contributed to the blurring of the line between combatants and civilians 
was the development of weapons that could be launched into civilian habitats. For example, 
the development of warplanes, long range naval and land artillery brought civilian towns and 
villages within the range of military attacks from enemy belligerents.171 O’Brien argues that 
this resulted in the “advent of total war, fought by entire nations wherein all are considered 
combatants without any limitation on the means of injuring the enemy in order that he may be 
so utterly defeated that his entire system of life may be subordinated to the will and the 
system of the victor”.172 Consequently, civilians did not enjoy immunity from attacks during 
the First World War 1.
Another factor which contributed to the endangering of civilian lives was morale bombing. 
This refers to attacks directed against civilians in order for them to become demoralised and 
seize to support the war. These forms of indiscriminate attacks were justified under military 
necessity and were therefore legally justifiable.173 Even though leaders of the belligerent 
states had given assurances that civilians would not be objects of attack and affirmed their 
respect for international law, particularly respect for the prohibition of aerial bombardment of 
undefended towns, these undertakings proved to be rhetorical as there was no compliance 
with the undertakings.174 For example, one German Chief of Staff stated, “I hold the view 
that we should leave no means untried to crush England and that successful air raids on 
London, in view of the already existing nervousness of the people, would prove a valuable 
means to an end”.175 This resulted in indiscriminate attacks being carried out.
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Furthermore, states involved in the war interpreted the existing rules in a way that made it 
possible for them to conduct military operations without hindrances. For example, 
‘undefended town’ in Article 25 of The Hague Regulations, was interpreted by states as 
referring to areas without military objectives.176 This interpretation was made possible by the 
ambiguous way the rule prohibiting bombardment of undefended towns was couched. For 
example, the phrase ‘undefended towns’ was not defined. Thus, belligerents could attack a 
town containing civilians only and justify their actions on grounds that there was a perceived 
military objective in the town. Additionally, since military commanders had agreed that 
“military objectives could be bombed wherever found, regardless of the injury to civilians 
and private property,”177 the presence of a factories in a town rendered the inhabitants of such 
a town vulnerable to attacks even though the town was undefended.
The methods of war used during the First World War also contributed to a large number of 
civilian casualties. For example, use of gas as a weapon further led to the violation of the 
principle of distinction.178 There were further allegations of genocide being committed 
against civilians. For example, the Young Turk government of the Ottoman Empire 
slaughtered thousands of Armenians in the Syrian Desert.179 One can conclude that the 
existing international humanitarian law rules at the time were not sufficient or lacked enough 
force to protect civilian lives and as a result, many civilian lives were lost during the war. 
This was also made possible by lack of precision in the law in its prohibition of killing of 
civilians. The law was so vague that states could interpret it to justify any military tactic, 
which was to their advantage. More so, there was a lack of commitment by states to respect 
the existing law. The catastrophic death of civilians during the war highlighted the need for 
more binding international norms to regulate war. *17
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2.3.9 More attempts to reform the laws of war
The First World War brought untold human suffering and atrocities. The greatest number of 
casualties were civilians whom parties to the conflict had treated as legitimate military 
targets. At the end of the war, a series of conferences were called up in an attempt to come up 
with laws that would regulate armed conflicts and protection of civilian population was one 
of the main objectives of the conferences.180 In 1922, states gathered at the Washington 
Conference and agreed to the Treaty of Washington.181 The Conference sought states’ 
commitment against the use of gas as a weapon during armed conflicts.182 However, the 
negotiated treaty never came into force. The treaty required ratification by all five of the 
drafting States to come into force but France failed to ratify.183
The Washington Conference also attempted to draft laws which would regulate aerial 
bombardment as well as re-establish the line between civilians and combatants.184 The 
conference resulted in rules that purported to place limits on sovereign power of states and 
prohibiting effective use of aircraft in war.185 However, rules such as those that banned the 
bombardment of unfortified towns curtailed the power and ability of states to conduct warfare 
to their advantage and as a result, no one nation adopted the rules.186 The failure of the 
conferences to come up with principles that would regulate the conduct of warfare has been 
attributed to the drafters’ failure to acknowledge the need to balance humanitarian needs with 
military necessities.187 The desire by states to protect their military advantages over their 
adversaries proved more important than humanitarian concerns.
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In 1929, forty-seven states were represented in Geneva where states sought to negotiate and 
draft the Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War as well as to revise the 
1906 Geneva Wounded and Sick Convention.188 The two Conventions were much more 
detailed and technically superior than the preceding conventions.189 The 1929 Convention 
regarding the wounded and the sick replaced the 1899 and the 1906 Conventions between 
states that ratified it while the 1929 Convention on Prisoners of War only complemented its 
predecessors.190
More attempts were made to develop the law of armed conflict prior to the outbreak of the 
Second World War. In 1934, a draft Convention that was intended to regulate sanitary cities 
and localities was negotiated in Monaco.191 The draft Convention dealt with the protection of 
towns and cities that were not involved in armed conflicts.192 Furthermore, the Draft 
International Convention on the Condition and Protection of Civilians of Enemy Nationality 
who were on territory belonging to or occupied by a belligerent was also negotiated in 
Tokyo.193 However, neither of these conventions was ratified. The most important attempt at 
developing the law of armed conflict as far as the principle of distinction and protection of 
civilian population is concerned was made in 1938 when the Draft Convention for the 
Protection of Civilian Populations against New Engines of War was negotiated.194 The main 
objective of this Convention was the protection of the civilian population during armed 
conflict and establishment of safety zones for certain non-combatant classes of the 
population.195 However, this Convention was never ratified and the idea of protecting 
civilians became the first casualty of the Second World War as shall be seen below.
From the above discussion, it is clear that although efforts were made after the end of the 
First World War to develop the laws of armed conflict in order to prevent the future
188The negotiations resulted in the coming into place of the Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the 
Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armies in the Field of 1929 and the 1929 Geneva Convention Relative to 
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occurrence of atrocities, nothing much was done as far as advancing the principle of 
distinction between combatants and civilians was concerned. Consequently, besides the 
prohibition of bombardment of undefended towns, there was no concrete law specifically 
meant to ensure the protection of civilians at the commencement Second World War. 
Furthermore, no clarity had been made regarding how a balance between military necessity 
and humanitarian principles should be made. Efforts to come up with humanitarian principles 
that would ensure protection of the civilian population before the outbreak of the Second 
World War were frustrated by the “Italian bombardment of Abyssinia, German bombardment 
of Durango and Guernica and Japanese indiscriminate air attacks in China”.196 Efforts were 
made at the World Disarmament Conference in Geneva to draft basic principles that would 
guarantee the protection of the civilian population and be observed in the “heat of a battle”.197 
However, despite the participants’ obsession with civilians, their efforts “fell victim to 
competing national states as states fought to preserve military advantages and limit the power 
of adversaries”.198 Therefore, when the Second World War began, states had not managed to 
agree on concrete rules that would have ensured protection of civilian population during the 
war.
2.3.10 The Principle of distinction during the Second World War
When the Second World War commenced, states involved promised to respect the laws of 
war as well as to minimise civilian casualties.199 British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain 
declared that:
“I think we may say that there are, at any rate, three rules of international law ... 
applicable to warfare from the air .... In the first place, it is against international law to 
bomb civilians as such and to make deliberate attacks upon civilian populations. That is 
undoubtedly a violation of international law. In the second place, targets which are aimed 
at from the air must be legitimate military objectives and must be capable of 
identification. In the third place, reasonable care must be taken in attacking these military
196Jochnick and Normand 1994 Harvard International Law Journal 84.
197Ibid.
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199British Prime Minister Chamberlain declared, “Bombardment aimed at demoralising the civilian population to 
be absolutely contrary to international law. President Roosevelt of the United States o f America also called such 
acts “inhuman barbarism which has profoundly shocked the conscience of humanity.
35
objectives so that by carelessness a civilian population in the neighbourhood is not 
bombed.”200
When the war commenced, President Franklin D Roosevelt of the United States of America 
appealed to all the parties involved to affirm their determination that their armed forces shall 
“in no event, and under no circumstances, undertake the bombardment from the air of civilian 
population or unfortified cities”.201 Britain, France and Germany among other states 
responded affirmatively to Roosevelt’s requests and pledged to spare civilian lives during the 
conflict.202 Jochnick and Normand argue that the pledge to respect the laws of war and to 
avoid inflicting civilian casualties bore little relation to one another as respect for the laws of 
war offered few substantive protections to civilians.203 This is because the law as it stood 
immediately before the war did not offer much protection to civilians. Each side discovered 
that they could employ any military tactic and still operate within the confines of the limited 
law.
Civilians suffered horrendous atrocities during the World War II, many of which were a 
result of deliberate morale bombing by both warring parties.204 At the commencement of the 
war, Germany launched direct aerial attacks against the British civilians in the Battle of 
Britain. German commanders argued that international law only prohibited attacks on cities 
for the sole purpose of terrorizing the civilian population and not attacks on the enemy 
population’s will to resist.205 Therefore, commanders believed that attacks should be directed 
against the British population’s will to resist in order to reduce their support for the war.206
As the war progressed, allied powers also became involved in aerial bombardment for the 
purposes of demoralising the Axis powers. For example, the British argued that “all bombs 
that fall on Germans do ‘a useful work’ even if they miss their intended target”.207 Just like
200S J Goda, “The Protection of Civilians from Bombardment by Aircraft: The Ineffectiveness of the 
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the Germans, the British made distinction between useful and gratuitous terror thus 
authorising unlimited discretion to bomb “civilians for useful purpose of breaking their 
morale”.208 Allied aerial bombing on civilian towns and cities intensified in 1943, with the 
Combined Chiefs of Staff of the Allied Command prioritizing “the undermining of the 
morale of the German people to a point where their capacity for armed resistance is fatally 
weakened”.209 Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings by the United States of America in 1945 
are an example of how Allied Powers targeted civilians of enemy states in order to 
demoralise them.
The unrestricted weapons and tactics used during the Second World War worsened civilian 
sufferings. For example, civilian towns, cities and industrial areas were treated as 
battlefields. Civilian morale and the will to fight became an important military target even 
though surveys conducted after the war revealed that “such terror attacks were of dubious 
military value and may have encouraged a spirit of resistance which in turn prolonged the 
war”.210 One can conclude that the laws of armed conflict in general were not sufficient to 
offer protection to vulnerable civilians during the Second World War. Instead, the law 
justified the atrocities directed against civilians. New weapons and tactics together with the 
liberal understanding of the term military objectives as well as the decision to uphold military 
necessity justified terror bombings on civilians.
2.3.11 The aftermath of the World Wars
The shortfalls of IHL, particularly in relation to the principle of distinction during Second 
World War were very clear. The large number of civilian casualties demonstrated that the law 
was not sufficient to provide protection to the civilian population. The law’s failure to protect 
civilians during armed conflicts raised an urgent need for more binding and detailed rules to 
ensure protection of civilians. Before the end of the Second World War, the ICRC 
commenced work on revising and extending the Conventions in the light of experiences 
during the Second World War. Several expert conferences were convened and draft
208Goda 1966 Military Law Review 97-98.
209Ibid.
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Conventions were presented and adopted at the VVII International Red Cross Conference at 
Stockholm in 1948.211 The draft Conventions were presented at the Diplomatic Conference 
organized by the Swiss Federal Council.212 Fifty-nine States were represented and four 
observers were present.213 The Conference was successful in revising the previous Geneva 
Conventions that were already in force.214 Of important significance to this thesis was the 
birth of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War 
in 1949.215 The Convention covered new ground such as protection of civilian hospitals and 
safety zones, legal status of foreigners on the territory of a party to a conflict and the 
treatment of civilian internees and populations of occupied territories. This was a clear 
indication of the international community’s new commitment to the protection of civilians 
during armed conflicts. Two Additional Protocols were adopted at the Diplomatic Conference 
on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in 
Armed Conflicts in 1977 and these contain the core of the principle of distinction.216 *
Unlike previous international agreements, the Conventions and the protocols specifically 
refer to the principle of distinction and affirms in clear terms, the protection of civilians 
during armed conflicts. Distinction has also become part of customary international 
humanitarian law as shall be discussed later in this Chapter.
2.4 The modern formulation of the principle of distinction
The principle of distinction is established in Article 48 of the Additional Protocol I, which 
states that:
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“In order to ensure respect for and protection of the civilian population and civilian 
objects, the Parties to the conflict shall at all times distinguish between the civilian 
population and combatants and between civilian objects and military objectives and 
accordingly shall direct their operations only against military objectives.”217
The principle of distinction is an important concept under IHL. It goes a long way in 
determining the legal status of the two groups it creates, that is civilians and combatants. 
Firstly, the principle of distinction determines the primary status of persons during an armed 
conflict, which is whether they are civilians or combatants.218 The primary status determines 
the secondary status.219 Firstly, primary status determines whether a person has the combat 
privilege or not. This means that it determines whether a person is legally entitled to take part 
in armed conflicts or not.220 Secondly, primary status determines the protection afforded to 
an individual under international humanitarian law. In other words, it determines whether a 
person can be a lawful target of attack.221 Lastly, primary status determines what happens 
when a person who has been involved in the armed conflict falls into the hands of the enemy 
and the consequences that come about because of an individual’s conduct during armed 
conflict, particularly concerning the violation of international law.222
The distinction between civilians and combatants applies to both international armed 
conflicts and non-international armed conflicts. The principle is made applicable to 
international armed conflicts through Additional Protocol I and the customary international 
humanitarian law rules. On the other hand, distinction between combatants and civilians is 
made applicable to non-international armed conflicts through Article 13(2) of Additional 
Protocol II, which prohibits the making of civilian population as well as individual civilians 
the object of attack.223 The principle of distinction has also been recognised in other
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international legal instruments such as the Ottawa Convention Banning Anti-Personnel 
Landmines.224 The Statute of the International Criminal Court also makes intentionally 
directing attacks against civilians a war crime.225 It should be noted that international law 
does not recognise combatant status in non-international armed conflicts.226 Thus while the 
term combatants may be used as a generic term to refer to persons who have the right to take 
part in armed conflicts in non-international armed conflicts, this does not suggest “combatant 
status or prisoner of- war status, as applicable in international armed conflicts”.227
Protection of civilians and civilian objects during armed conflicts is entirely depended on the 
distinction between combatants and civilians. In other words, parties to an armed conflict will 
only be able spare civilians and civilian objects from attacks when they are able to distinguish 
them from combatants and military objects. Therefore, it is imperative to discuss in detail the 
criteria of distinguishing combatants from civilians and civilian objects from military 
objectives. This discussion will help in demonstrating how the binary distinction does not fit 
well with developments that have taken place in modern warfare. This Chapter will now turn 
to discuss the definition of combatants as well as the criteria for meeting combatant status. 
The Chapter will then discuss the definition of civilians as well as the consequences that 
come with the civilian status. The distinction between civilian objects and military objects 
will then be discussed. Customary International Humanitarian Law relating to the principle of 
distinction will also be discussed.
2.4.1 Combatants
Combatants are defined as “members of the armed forces of a party to the conflict other than 
medical personnel and chaplains and they have the right to participate directly in 
hostilities”.228 This means that for one to able to participate in armed conflicts legally, they 
should qualify as combatants. Fleck argues that the requirement of a combatant to belong to
224United Nations, Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti­
Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction, 18 September 1997
225Article (8)(e)(i).
226J Henckaerts, L Doswald-Beck Customary International Humanitarian Law Volume I: Rules (2005)
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armed forces of a party to the conflict is consistent with the tenet of international law that a 
party to the conflict being a subject of international law exercises the force of arms against 
another party to the conflict through the organ of its armed forces.229 Therefore, only armed 
forces authorised by a party to the conflict that is subject of international law can take part in 
hostilities.
2.4.1.1 Criteria for determining combatant status
Given that combatants have wide rights it is important that the criteria of determining 
combatant status be clear in order to ensure that those who are granted the right to take part in 
hostilities can be clearly identified. In other words, the criteria for determining combatant 
status should not leave any room for unlawful belligerents to take part in hostilities. An 
ambiguous criterion is subject to manipulation. Therefore, it is necessary to discuss the 
criteria of determining combatant status in this study.
The definition of combatants is provided for in the Third Geneva Conventions230 and the 
Additional Protocol I.231 In terms of these two instruments, a person can qualify as a 
combatant in two ways. Firstly, a person can qualify as a combatant in terms of Article 43 of 
Additional Protocol I. Article 43(2) provides that “members of the armed forces of a party to 
a conflict are combatants, that is to say they have the right to participate directly in 
hostilities”.232 The definition of armed forces is provided for in Article 43(1) which states 
that “armed forces of a party to a conflict consist of organized armed forces, groups and units 
under a command responsible to that Party for the conduct of its subordinates... ”233 This is 
the most straightforward way in which a person can qualify as combatant. For example, 
members of a national defence force of a state will qualify as combatants under this 
definition. Fleck points out that this provision recognise that “only states or other parties
229D Fleck The Handbook o f International Humanitarian Law 80.
230Article 4 A.
231Article 43 of Additional Protocol I.
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recognised as subjects of international law can be parties to an armed conflict” and these can 
act through its organs, including armed forces.234
According to Article 43(1), armed forces must comply with the requirements of being “under 
a command responsible for the conduct of its subordinates”,235 “subject to an internal 
disciplinary system” and “complying with international law applicable in armed conflicts”.236 
Fleck points out that a party to the conflict recognised as a subject of international law has a 
duty under international law to comply with the law and a breach of international law by its 
organ will lead to that party being held responsible.237 Therefore, a party to the conflict has 
direct interest in how its armed forces conduct themselves during an armed conflict. 
Consequently, the requirements in Article 43(1) are intended to ensure that states retain 
control over their armed forces.
The definition in terms of Article 43(2) is precise and rules out the possibility of other people 
who are not members of the armed forces claiming combatant status under this provision. 
Pilloud et al concurs that Article 43(2) “dispense with the concept of quasi-combatants, part­
time status or semi-civilian”.238 The definition of combatant is not conduct-based.239 This 
means that a person’s duty within the armed forces does not determine whether he is a 
combatant or not. For example, a member of the armed forces who assigned to catering duties 
remains a combatant and therefore has the same rights and responsibility as an infantryman 
who engage in combat duties. Therefore, in brief, members of the armed forces of a party to 
the conflict qualify as combatants.
A second way through which one can become a combatant is through Article 4A of the Third 
Geneva Conventions, which deals with persons who are entitled to prisoner of war status.240 
It states that “Members of other militias and members of other volunteer corps, including
234D Fleck The Handbook o f International Humanitarian Law 85.
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those of organized resistance movements, belonging to a Party to the conflict and operating in 
or outside their own territory, even if this territory is occupied” will qualify as combatants 
provided that they meet the certain requirements.241 The first requirement that must be met is 
that of “being commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates”.242 This means that 
the group must have a leader who is responsible for overseeing the conduct of the group. 
According to the de Preux et al, this requirement is meant to guarantee discipline among 
volunteer corps.243 However, the requirement does not mean that the chain of command must 
be similar to the one in the regular armed forces.244 Furthermore, the person in charge of the 
subordinates can be either civilian or a combatant.245
The second requirement is that of having a fixed distinctive sign recognisable at a distance.246 
This requirement is to ensure easy identification.247 According to Solis, while for regular 
armed forces, a distinctive sign refer to uniform, for partisans, a distinctive sign refers to any 
emblem recognisable at a reasonable distance and this can refer to a sash, coat, badge or 
emblem.248 De Preux et al argue that in order for the sign to be distinctive, it must be the 
same for all members of any one organisation.249
The third requirement that must be satisfied is that of carrying arms openly.250 de Preux et al, 
cautions that one should not confuse between carrying arms openly and carrying them 
visibly.251 The requirement of carrying arms openly entails that the “enemy must be able to 
recognize partisans as combatants in the same way as members of regular armed forces, 
whatever their weapons”.252 Dinstein argues that this requirement prohibits a lawful
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combatant from “creating a false impression that he is an innocent civilian”.253 The 
requirements of wearing fixed distinctive sign and that of carrying arms openly have been 
qualified by Article 44(3) of Additional Protocol I which provides that there are certain 
situations in armed conflicts where “due to the nature of the hostilities,”254 an armed 
combatant cannot distinguish himself. In such situations, Article 44(3) provides that the 
combatant shall retain the combatant status if “he carries his arms openly during each military 
engagement,”255 and during such time as “he is visible to the adversary while he is engaged in 
a military deployment preceding the launching of an attack in which he is to participate”.256 
Article 44(3) therefore has the effect of relaxing the two requirements even though it does not 
get rid of them entirely.
The last requirement that partisans must fulfil in order to qualify as combatants is that of 
“conducting their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war”.257 According 
to the de Preux et al, this requirement embraces the other three requirements.258 Furthermore, 
the partisans must also respect the Geneva Conventions as well as other international legal 
instruments that prohibit certain conduct during armed conflict.259 Members of the group 
must meet each of the four requirements to qualify as combatants.260
In conclusion, it can be argued that the combatant status is restricted to members who are 
acting on behalf of a party to the conflict and this usually refers to a state. Fleck argues that 
the construction of Article 43 of Additional Protocol I and Article 4(A) of the Third 
Convention reflects that only subjects of international law, that is states or parties can be 
parties to an international armed conflict and they can only act through their organs, which 
are armed forces.261 Furthermore, if a person does not qualify as a combatant, they 
automatically become civilians. Consequently, the argument that a third category of persons
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exists under the principle of distinction, namely that of unlawful or quasi-combatants is not 
supported by international humanitarian law instruments.
2.4.1.3 The rights and duties of combatants
In order for the distinction between combatants and civilians to be meaningful, international 
humanitarian law requires combatants to distinguish themselves from civilians.262 Article 
44(3) provides that “in order to promote the protection of the civilian population from the 
effects of hostilities, combatants are obliged to distinguish themselves from the civilian 
population while they are engaged in an attack or in a military operation preparatory to an 
attack”.263 The provision does not specify in what manner combatants should distinguish 
themselves. However, guidance can be found in Article 44(7), which refers to the accepted 
practice of wearing uniform by combatants of a Party to the conflict.264 This view is 
supported by Fleck who argues that the requirement that combatants should wear uniform for 
the purposes of distinction had already become part of international customary law in the 19th 
Century.265
However, as stated above, Article 44(3) of Additional Protocol I relaxes the requirement for 
combatants to distinguish themselves all the time.266 This provision recognises the use of 
specialised military units such as commandos whose operational needs may require them not 
to distinguish themselves. Article 43(7) however reiterates that the relaxation of the 
requirement for combatants to distinguish themselves at all times is not intended to change 
the accepted practice of states with respect to the wearing of the uniform by combatants of a 
party to the conflict.267
Failure to comply with the requirements for combatant status may result in two consequences 
depending on the nature of the failure. Firstly, if a combatant falls into the power of the
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264Additional Protocol I. See also discussion on the requirement for members of the militia or volunteer corps to 
have a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance in Section 2.4.2 above.
265D Fleck The Handbook o f International Humanitarian Law 90.
266Article 44(3). See discussion on 2.4.2.
267Article 43(7).
45
opposing belligerents “while failing to meet the requirements of distinguishing “himself from 
the civilian population while he is engaged in an attack”,268 he forfeits his right to be prisoner 
of war.269 The captured person may also be tried of perfidy.270 However, if a combatant is 
captured while not distinguishing himself and is not conducting a military attack, he shall 
retain his prisoner of war status.271 On the other hand, if combatants violate the rules of 
international law applicable in armed conflict, they should not be deprived of their right to be 
a combatant or prisoner of war if they fall into the power of an adverse party.272
Combatants have the right to take part in hostilities.273 This means that they can kill or harm 
their adversaries during armed conflicts. Combatants cannot be punished for their 
participation in a conflict.274 However, the right to participate in armed conflicts has to be 
exercised within the confines of international law governing armed conflicts.275 In other 
words, combatants must conduct war within the parameters set by IHL. The primary 
responsibility to punish combatants who violate the law falls on the party responsible for the 
combatants.276 If the combatants who have breached international law fall in the power of 
their adversary, they can be punished under the criminal law of the detaining power.277 
Furthermore, combatants are entitled to prisoner of war (PoW) status if they fall into the 
power of their adversary.278 Combatants can be attacked during an armed conflict. This 
means that they are a legitimate military target and can be attacked unless they have 
surrendered.279
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2.4.2 Non-combatants
Although the right to take part in hostilities is reserved for combatants, international 
humanitarian law acknowledges that armed conflicts may involve other persons who may 
accompany armed forces but are not necessarily combatants.280 Article 4A (4) provides that 
“Persons who accompany armed forces without actually being members thereof, such as 
civilian members of military aircraft crews, war correspondents, supply contractors, members 
of labour units” are entitled to PoW status “provided that they have received authorization 
from the armed forces which they accompany”.281 However, this category of persons does not 
qualify as combatants as already seen from the definition of combatants. Therefore, they 
cannot lawfully take direct part in hostilities. On the other hand, the definition of civilians 
excludes this group from being treated as civilians.282 Therefore, civilians who accompany 
the armed forces to war without being members of the armed forces do not qualify as 
civilians for the purpose of PoW status. These non-combatants therefore are not immune 
from attacks during armed conflicts.283 Furthermore, their presence in a military facility, 
which is a military objective, does not require the opposing belligerents to take precaution 
when attacking such a facility. 284
2.4.3 Civilians
One of the main objective of the principle of distinction is to ensure that civilians are 
protected from the dangers of war. This therefore requires one to have a clear definition of 
civilians in order to differentiate them from combatants. Neither the Additional Protocols nor 
the Geneva Convention creates an obligation on the civilian to distinguish himself/herself. 
This therefore means that their immunity from attacks is not dependent upon their ability to
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distinguish themselves since the duty is on the combatants to distinguish themselves from
civilians.285
2.4.3.1 Definition of civilians
Additional Protocol I adopts a negative definition of civilians. The definition of civilians is 
juxtaposed with the one for combatants. A civilian is defined as “any person who does not 
belong to one of the categories of persons referred to in Article 4A (1), (2), (3) and (6) of the 
Third Convention and in Article 43 of Additional Protocol F’.286 This means that civilians are 
people who are not combatants or non-combatants who accompany armed forces to war. 
According to Fleck, the negative construction of the definition of civilians, which is linked to 
that of members of the armed forces, has the advantage of being conclusive since 
traditionally, it used clear in war who was a member of the opposing armed forces and who 
was not.287 de Preux et al argue that the negative definition was adopted as a “satisfactory 
solution to the lack in precision of the previous definitions of civilians”.288 Nations had 
different understandings of the term civilians and the various categories of civilians made 
defining each category difficult.289 However, under Additional Protocol I, anyone who is not 
covered under the definition of combatants is considered a civilian. Furthermore, Article 
50(2) defines a civilian population as comprising of “all persons who are civilians”.290 Again, 
this means that all the persons who are excluded in the above-mentioned provisions are 
civilians.
2.4.3.2 Rights and Obligations of Civilians
Civilians are entitled to general protection during armed conflicts. Article 51(1) provides that 
“civilian population and individual civilians shall enjoy general protection against dangers
285D Fleck The Handbook o f International Humanitarian Law 239.
286Article 50. See also Rule 5 of Customary International Humanitarian Rules.
281D Fleck The Handbook o f International Humanitarian Law 238.
288C Pilloud et al Commentary on the Additional Protocols (1987) 610.
289Ibid.
290Additional Protocol I.
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arising from military operations”.291 This paragraph reiterates the main purpose of the 
principle of distinction, which is to protect civilians from harm that arise during armed 
conflicts. Article 51(2) prohibits attacks on civilians as well as “acts or threats of violence 
aimed at spreading terror among civilian population”.292 Article 27 of the Geneva Convention 
also imposes a positive duty on parties to the conflict to ensure protection of civilians. It 
provides that parties to the conflict may take measures of control and security concerning 
protected persons as may be necessary because of the war.293
Article 51(3) contains a key principle regarding the protection of civilians in armed conflicts. 
It provides that “civilians shall enjoy the protection afforded by this section, unless and for 
such time as they take a direct part in hostilities”.294 As pointed out above, only combatants 
have the right to take part in armed conflicts. Civilians do not have the right to take direct 
part in hostilities and their non-participation in hostilities is a pre-condition for their 
protection under IHL. Civilians lose their immunity from attacks if when they take direct part 
in hostilities.295 This loss of immunity will occur for as long as they continue to take direct 
part in hostilities. Therefore, civilians remain legitimate targets for the duration of their direct 
participation in hostilities. More so, civilians who take part in hostilities are not entitled to 
PoW status upon their capture by their enemy belligerents.296 This means that they are not 
entitled to the treatment accorded to prisoners of war by the Geneva Conventions. More so, 
by participating in armed conflicts, civilians become liable to criminal prosecution under the 
laws of the holding power’s criminal justice. This is because they do not have the right to 
take part in hostilities.297
291Article 51(1). See also Rule 2 of Customary International Law Rules.
292Additional Protocol I.
293Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War. Geneva, 12 August 1949 
(Third Geneva Conventions).
294Article 51(3) of Additional Protocol I.
295Fleck The Handbook o f International Humanitarian Law 238.
296Fleck The Handbook o f International Humanitarian Law 238.
291M Bothe “Direct Participation in Hostilities in Non-International Armed Conflict” ICRC Second Expert 
Meeting on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities The Hague, 25 / 26 October 2004 
https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/2004-05-expert-paper-dph-icrc.pdf (accessed 10 June 2015).
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2.4.4. Levee en masse
It has been argued that the law regulating the conduct of war only grants persons who fall 
under the definition of combatants the right to fight in armed conflicts. This means that 
anyone who is not a combatant but nevertheless involves themselves in armed conflicts will 
be violating IHL and is liable to punishment as demonstrated above.298 The only exception to 
this rule is found in Article 4A (6) of the Geneva Conventions, which deals with levee en 
masse2"  Article 4A (6) provides that “inhabitants of a non-occupied territory, who on the 
approach of the enemy spontaneously take up arms to resist the invading forces, without 
having had time to form themselves into regular armed unit forces shall be entitled to 
combatant status”.300
This exception is a recognition of the right of the inhabitants of an area to self-defence. 
However, in order for them to attain this status, they should meet the requirement of carrying 
arms openly and respect the laws and customs of war.301 An unoccupied territory refers to a 
territory that is not yet under “factual control of the enemy”.302 Furthermore, the resistance 
must be spontaneous in the sense that civilians must initiate the resistance without any 
organisation or planning in advance.303 The requirement that the resistance should be 
spontaneous is intended to separate levee en masse from militia or volunteer corps since these 
latter groups require authorisation from a party to the conflict. Therefore, in order to ensure 
that private persons without the authorisation of a party to the conflict do not take part in 
hostilities under the guise of levee en masse, the Geneva Convention requires the resistance 
to be spontaneous. In the event of capture by the enemy belligerents, levee en masse is 
entitled to prisoner of war status. In short, they have the same rights and privileges as 
combatants.
298See Consequences of civilian participation in hostilities at 2.4.5.2 above.
299Third Geneva Conventions.
300Article 6(6).
301 Ibid.
302D Fleck The Handbook o f International Humanitarian Law 93.
303Article 4A (6).
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2.5 Distinction between civilian objects and military objectives
As mentioned above, Article 48 of Additional Protocol I requires parties to the conflict to 
make a distinction between civilian objects and military objectives and operations to be 
directed only against military objectives.304 This means the principle of distinction also 
protects civilian objects from attacks. This position is affirmed in Article 52(1), which states 
that “civilian objects shall not be the object of attack or of reprisals”.305 Article 52(2) also 
provides that attacks shall be limited strictly to military objectives.306 This means that during 
an armed conflict, it is impermissible to direct attacks against civilian objectives. This also 
means that parties to a conflict must be able to distinguish civilian objects from military 
objectives in order to be able to direct their operations against legitimate military objectives. 
In order to be able investigate how the principle of distinction between civilian objects and 
military objectives has come under challenge in modern conflicts, it is important to discuss 
the criteria that is used to distinguish the two.
2.5.1 Civilian objects
Article 51(1) defines civilian objects as all objects which are not military objectives as 
defined in Article 51(2).307 The reason for the adoption of the negative definition is that there 
are far more civilian objects than military objectives and this makes defining all civilian 
objects difficult.308 This means that the definition of civilian objects has to be read together 
with the definition of military objectives.309 In Prosecutor v Tihomir Blaskic, the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia defined civilian property as any 
property that cannot be legitimately be regarded as military objectives.310 Therefore, it is 
important to consider the definition of military objectives.
304See section 2.4 above.
305Article 52(1).
306Article 52(2).
301Article 51(1).
308C Pilloud et al Commentary on the Additional Protocols o f  8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions o f  12 
August 1949 (1987) 634.
309Haruna et al 2014 International Journal o f  Humanities and Social Science Invention 21.
310Prosecutor Vs Tihomir Blaskic, IT-95-14-T, ICTY, Trial Chamber I, Judgment of 3rd March 2000, para 180.
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2.5.2 Military Objectives
Military objects are defined as “limited to those objects which by their nature, location, 
purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial 
destruction, capture or neutralization offers a definite military advantage”.311 There are two 
requirements that must be fulfilled simultaneously for an object to be considered a military 
object.312 Firstly, the nature, location, purpose or use of such an objective must enable it to 
make an effective contribution to military action.313 Pilloud et al argues that this requirement 
covers all “objects directly used by the armed forces such as weapons, equipment, transports, 
fortifications, buildings occupied by armed forces, communication centres and staff 
headquarters”.314 The second requirement is that “the total or partial destruction, capture or 
neutralization of such a military objective must offer a definite military advantage”.315 
According to Pilloud et al, the destruction, capture or neutralisation of the object must offer 
military advantage in the “circumstances ruling at the time” when the military operation is 
carried out.316 Therefore, if one of these elements is not met, the object concerned is not a 
military objective and should be protected from attacks. Sassoli argues that the requirement 
for the object to make ‘effective’ contribution and for its destruction to offer ‘definite’ 
military advantage is meant to avoid a broad definition of military objectives.317 In other 
words, the use of the words effective and definite is intended to ensure that objects that offer 
indirect contributions and whose destruction, capture or neutralisation may offer possible 
military advantages are excluded from the definition of military objectives.
Lastly, Article 51(3) provides that “in case of doubt whether an object which is normally 
dedicated to civilian purposes, such as a place of worship, a house or other dwelling or a
311Article 52(2). Conversely, civilian objects are those objects which, by their nature, location, purpose or use do 
not make an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or 
neutralization does not offer definite military advantage. See Haruna et al 2014 International Journal o f  
Humanities and Social Science Invention 21.
312C Pilloud et al Commentary on the Additional Protocols 635.
313 Article 52(2).
314C Pilloud et al Commentary on the Additional Protocols 635.
315Article 52(2).
316C Pilloud et al Commentary on the Additional Protocols 636.
311M Sassoli “Legitimate Targets of Attacks under International Humanitarian Law” Background Paper 
prepared for the Informal High-Level Expert Meeting on the Reaffirmation and Development o f  International 
Humanitarian Law, Cambridge, January 27-29, 2003
http://www.hpcrresearch.ors/sites/default/files/publications/Sessionl.pd1 (accessed 10 August 2016).
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school, is being used to make an effective contribution to military action, it shall be presumed 
not to be so used”.318 This presumption demonstrate that the priority of the drafters was to 
ensure that civilian objects receive as much protection from attacks as possible. This guards 
against “shoot first and ask questions later” approach that may be used by belligerents in
armed conflicts.319
2.6. Customary International Humanitarian Law and the Principle of Distinction
The principle of distinction has become part of customary international humanitarian law. In 
a study of customary international humanitarian law done by the ICRC, the principle of 
distinction is among some of the rules that are considered as having developed into 
customary international humanitarian law. This means that states that have not signed or 
ratified the Additional Protocol I remain bound by the principle of distinction since it is 
considered part of customary international humanitarian law. The contents of these rules on 
the principle of distinction are similar to what is contained in the Additional Protocols.320
Rule 1 of customary international humanitarian law rules provides that “the parties to the 
conflict must at all times distinguish between civilians and combatants and that attacks may 
only be directed against combatants not against civilians”.321 Furthermore, Rule 6 provides 
that “civilians are protected against attack unless and for such time as they take a direct part 
in hostilities”.322 The principle of distinction is established by state practice as a norm of 
customary international law applicable in both international and non-international armed 
conflicts.323 The customary status of the principle of distinction was confirmed at the 
diplomatic conference leading to the adoption of the Additional Protocols where the United
318Article 51(3).
319C Pilloud et al Commentary on the Additional Protocols 637.
320Therefore, in order to avoid repetition, these will not be discussed in detail. A discussion of these rules here is 
only to demonstrate that the principle of distinction is entrenched as an international norm.
321J M Henckaerts, L Doswald-Beck Customary International Humanitarian Law Vol 1: Rules (2005) 3.
322Rule 6 of Customary International Humanitarian Law.
323Ibid.
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Kingdom stated that Article 51(2) was a “valuable reaffirmation of an existing rule of 
customary international law”.324
Various international tribunals have also confirmed the customary law status of the principle 
of distinction. In Prosecutor v Blaskic, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia Appeals Chamber emphasised that there is an absolute prohibition on the 
targeting of civilians under customary international law and this cannot be justified even by 
military necessity.325 In the case of Juan Carlos Abella v Argentina, the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights stated that “customary law principles applicable to all armed 
conflicts require the contending parties to refrain from directly attacking the civilian 
population and individual civilians and to distinguish in their targeting between civilians and 
combatants and other lawful military objectives”.326
2.6.1 Distinction between Civilian Objects and Military Objectives
The principle of distinction between civilian objects and military objectives has also 
developed into customary international humanitarian law. Rule 7 provides “parties to the 
conflict must at all times distinguish between civilian objects and military objectives and that 
attacks may only be directed against military objectives not against civilian objects”.327 The 
obligation to distinguish civilian objects from military objectives is also observed in state 
practice. For example, Sweden’s International Humanitarian Manual identifies Article 48 of 
Additional Protocol I (which contains the obligation to distinguish between combatants and 
civilians) as customary international law.328 The definition of civilian objects and military 
objectives under customary international humanitarian law is similar to the one adopted in 
Additional Protocol I hence it shall not be necessary to discuss this in detail. It is clear 
therefore that the principle of distinction has become part of customary international
324Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck Customary International Humanitarian Law Vol 1 25.
325Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blaskic (Appeal Judgement), IT-95-14-A, International Criminal Tribunal for the 
former Yugoslavia (ICTY), 29 July 2004 para 109.
326Juan Carlos Abella v. Argentina, Case 11.137, Report N° 55/97, Inter-Am. C.H.R., OEA/Ser.L/V/II.95 Doc. 7 
rev. at 271 (1997) para 177.
321Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck Customary International Humanitarian Law Vol 1: Rules 25.
328Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck Customary International Humanitarian Law Vol 1: Rules 26.
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humanitarian law. Therefore, states that ratified the Additional Protocol I and those that have 
not ratified are all obliged to observe the principle of distinction during armed conflicts.
2.7 Conclusion
From the discussion above, it can be concluded that the principle of distinction is a long 
established principle. Even though the principle did not exist in a codified form, ancient states 
observed that civilians should always be spared from the dangers of war. It has also been 
demonstrated that the idea of distinction faced resistance from time to time mainly due to 
states’ unwillingness to compromise their strategies of warfare in favour of humanitarian 
principles. The principle of distinction as understood today creates two categories of people 
during armed conflicts, which are combatants and civilians.329 As argued above, the principle 
of distinction determines a number of things during an armed conflict. In short, it determines 
the rights and obligations of both civilians and combatants during an armed conflict. More so, 
state responsibility for the conduct of its armed forces during an armed conflict is also 
grounded in the principle of distinction. The principle of distinction has far-reaching effects 
for parties to the conflict, hence the argument that it forms the cornerstone of IHL. 
Furthermore, the principle of distinction also enables parties involved in an armed conflict to 
determine which objects can be lawfully targeted and which ones are protected. Since the 
protection of civilians is based upon the principle of distinction, it can be submitted that there 
is need for a clear line that distinguishes civilians from combatants and civilian objects from 
military objectives. The blurring of the line between this distinction may result in IHL failing 
to fulfil its obligations. This study will move on to consider some of the new developments in 
modern armed conflicts that challenge the application of the principle of distinction.
329There have been academic debates surrounding the existence of a third category of unlawful combatants 
under the principle of distinction. This term has been used by the United States of America and Israeli 
governments to refer to members of “terrorists” organisations such as Al Qaeda and Taliban. However, the 
Geneva Conventions and the Additional Protocols does not make reference to unlawful combatants. The study 
will not go into academic debates surrounding the existence of a third since category since this is not vital to the 
study. Therefore the study will limit itself to discussing the criteria of distinction as it is agreed by states in the 
Geneva Conventions and the Additional Protocols. See C A Bradley “The United States, Israel & Unlawful 
Combatants” http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2760&context=faculty scholarship 
(accessed 3 February 2017.
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Chapter 3: Private Military and Security Companies and the Principle of Distinction
3.1 Introduction
Chapter 2 dealt with general background of the principle of distinction and its development 
over the years. It has been argued that the principle of distinction forms the cornerstone of 
IHL. The main objective of IHL, which is alleviating human suffering during armed conflicts, 
particularly the protection of civilians and civilian objects can be achieved through the 
application of the principle of distinction. However, there are developments that pose 
challenges to the application of the principle of distinction in modern armed conflicts. This 
has in turn affected the extent to which civilians and civilian objects are protected. The 
developments have also resulted in individuals, groups and states getting involved in armed 
conflicts without being held accountable for violations of international law. These 
developments include the introduction of technologically advanced military weapons such as 
drones, increase of urban warfare and the involvement of civilians or persons who were 
traditionally not identified as combatants.330 These developments also include the use of 
PMSCs, unmanned aerial vehicles and the emergence of cyber warfare.
This chapter seeks to demonstrate how the developments that have taken place in armed 
conflicts challenge the principle of distinction through the example of Private Military and 
Security Companies (PMSCs).331 The Chapter will begin by defining what PMSCs are as 
well as tracing the history behind their emergence and involvement in armed conflicts. 
Thereafter, the chapter will outline some of the reasons behind the tremendous increase in 
state reliance on PMSCs to fight in armed conflicts. Importantly, it will discuss various 
functions performed by PMSCs, which result in them posing challenges to the principle of 
distinction. It should be admitted from the onset that not all activities performed by PMSCs 
challenge the principle of distinction. The discussion will only focus on PMSC activities that
330Haruna et al 2014 International Journal o f  Humanities and Social Science Invention 21. The authors refer to 
these developments as “civilianization” of modern armed conflicts due to the large involvement of civilians as 
well as civilian objects in armed conflicts.
331The term Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs) shall be used in his thesis to refer to Private 
Military Companies and Private Security Companies that are contracted to offer military services that bring 
them under the regulation for international humanitarian law. See sections 3.3, 3.3.1 and 3.3.2 below.
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bring the companies within the ambit of international humanitarian law.332 The chapter will 
then move on to discuss how the involvement of PMSCs pose problems for the principle of 
distinction. The study will demonstrate that PMSC employees do not meet the status of either 
civilians or combatants as provided for under the principle of distinction. Additionally, the 
recent attempts that have been made in order to clarify the status of PMCs under IHL will be 
dealt with. The effectiveness of soft law and guidelines developed to clarify the status and 
responsibilities of PMCs shall be discussed.
3.2 Background: Why focus on Private Military and Security Companies?
There has been an ongoing debate regarding how PMSCs should be characterised.333 While 
some have argued that these should be regarded as mercenaries, others have contended that 
there is a fundamental difference between PMSCs and mercenaries and as such, they should 
be viewed and treated differently.334 However, the increased use of PMSCs in armed conflicts 
by states has resulted in more controversy arising regarding their status under the principle of 
distinction.
3.2.1 Historical background
Although the involvement of PMSCs in armed conflicts became an international concern at 
the turn of the millennium, this involvement begun earlier than that. At the end of the Cold 
War, millions of soldiers who had been assembled in anticipation of war became 
redundant.335 As states began to disengage from conflict zones, there was a reduced demand 
for large standing armies.336 Furthermore, maintaining these large armies proved too costly
332This means that the study will focus on situations where PMSCs get involved directly in armed conflicts or 
when they perform activities that amount to direct participation in hostilities on behalf of states.
333 See S Percy “Regulating the Private Security Industry: A Story of Regulating the Last War” (Autumn 2012)
94 International Review o f  the Red Cross 941.
334United Nations Special Rapporteur for mercenaries maintained throughout his term that PMSCs are 
mercenaries. See Percy 2012 International Review o f the Red Cross 941. However, scholars such as Percy argue 
that treating private security industry as mercenary is inaccurate and problematic.
335C Osakwe “Private Military Contractors, War Crimes and International Humanitarian Law” (2014) 42 
Scientia Militaria South African Journal o f  Military Studies 64 at 64.
336Ibid.
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for states. Consequently, professional soldiers who were being laid off from service found 
themselves jobless.337 This created fertile grounds for the rise of PMSCs who incorporated 
laid off professional soldiers into their companies. Zarate argues that the rise of PMSCs was 
propelled by the end of inter-state wars which were replaced by “low-intensity, internal 
conflicts which world powers were not willing to get directly involved in”.338 This resulted in 
a power vacuum that led to the rise of sophisticated military professionals who “created the 
modern private international security companies” which provide “a wide range military and 
security services traditionally reserved for official militaries”.339
The increased reliance on PMSCs services by states has been a result of the need to cut 
general spending towards supporting the military. For example, maintenance of large standing 
armies means that states would have to direct a significant amount of their budget towards 
training and remuneration of their personnel. In order to cut costs, states have resorted to 
outsourcing defence and security services to civilian contractors.340 Growth of the PMSC 
industry was also influenced by the expansion in globalisation, which expanded opportunities 
for transnational business.341 The expansion of markets for civilian contractors enabled 
PMSCs to acquire large clientele, thus making them reliable source of military force. For 
example, Gillard argues that governments, international organisations and multinational 
companies increasingly began to rely on PMSCs to perform services that were traditionally 
responsibilities of state armed forces.342
Moreover, as business entities, PMSCs tend to be very efficient in performing their services. 
They often have advanced military capabilities, which enable them to provide required 
military strength.343 This is because its employees mainly constitute specially trained soldiers 
who may have served in the armed forces of a state, most of whom will possess experience of
337P W Singer Corporate Warrior: The Rise o f  the Privatized Military Industry (2008) 53.
338J C Zarate “The Emergence of a New Dog of War: Private International Security Companies, International 
Law, and the New World Disorder” (1998) 75 Stanford Journal o f  International Law 75 at 79.
339Ibid.
340 Ibid.
341P.W. Singer Corporate Warriors Corporate warriors: The rise o f  the privatised military industry (2003) 66.
342E C Gillard “Business goes to war: Private/Security Companies and International Humanitarian Law” (2006) 
88 International Review o f  the Red Cross 525 at 526.
343E. L. Gaston “Mercenarism 2.0? The Rise of the Modern Private Security Industry and Its Implications for 
International Humanitarian Law Enforcement” (2008) 49 Harvard International Law Journal 221 at 235.
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fighting in armed conflicts.344 These reasons may also influence states to outsource military 
services to PMSCs. Furthermore, since PMSCs specialise only in rendering military 
assistance, they have abundant resources that makes them more capable militarily than state 
armed forces.345 For example, they use advanced military technologies that state armed forces 
do not possess. This makes them attractive even to powerful states whose spending on 
modern military technology will be limited by their national budgets. Therefore, one can 
conclude that the abilities of PMCs to offer advanced military capabilities has resulted in 
states outsourcing military services to PMSCs rather than relying on their armed forces.346
State reliance on PMSC services during armed conflicts may also have increased due to the 
ability of PMSCs to operate independently of the hiring state, which enables states to make 
use of force while getting around domestic political constraints.347 Through using PMSCs, 
states can acquire additional manpower and military capabilities while avoiding political 
obstacles such as obtaining legislative checks and approval on budgets and deployments, 
which they will encounter when using state armed forces.348 Furthermore, the use of PMSC 
employees will help governments to avoid military call-ups, which will have political and 
economic implications. Moreover, the participation of PMSCs employees in conflict zones 
does not attract public attention in the same way state armed forces will do.349 Gaston argues 
that death of PMSC employees during military operation does not attract media attention in 
the same way death of members of armed forces would do.350 This therefore means that 
governments can avoid bureaucratic obstacles that are encountered when states try to acquire 
parliamentary authorisation for deployment of armed forces.
States may also employ services of PMSCs in order to avoid incurring responsibility under 
IHL. As already pointed out in the previous chapter, states are liable for the conduct of their
344 For example, some of the employees of private military firms in Iraq were former members of the elite 
United States Navy Seals and the South African apartheid army.
345See generally Gaston 2008 Harvard International Law Journal 235-236.
346Ibid.
347Gaston 2008 Harvard International Law Journal 235.
348For example, Gaston points out that the Clinton Administration had to use PMSCs in its involvement in the 
Colombian anti-narcotic campaigns in order to avoid congressional troop ceilings. Furthermore, the Bush 
Administration used large number of PMCs in Iraq and this enabled it to avoid Congressional approval for more 
increased manpower in Iraq. See Gaston 2008 Harvard International Law Journal 235-236.
349Gaston 2008 Harvard International Law Journal 235.
350Ibid.
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armed forces during armed conflicts.351 More so, international law imposes an obligation on 
states to prevent violation of international law by its armed forces during conflicts.352 
However, given the presence of a lacunae in international law regarding the status and 
responsibilities of PMSCs when they participate in armed conflicts, states can escape liability 
for violation of IHL through contracting the services of PMSCs. This view is supported by 
Gaston who argues that the use of PMSCs by states enables such states to “carry out 
controversial activities which would attract legal and political implications if carried out by a 
state’s armed forces”.353 *It is submitted that states may resort to the use of PMSCs in order to 
avoid rigorous accountability and oversight measures that the law requires them to exercise 
over their armed forces in order to prevent violations of law.
In conclusion, it is submitted that there are many factors that influence states’ decision to 
outsource military services to civilian contractors. Regardless of the justification for this 
trend, it can be argued that any use of PMSCs by states in armed conflicts should fall within 
the boundaries of the principle of distinction. In other words, the use of PMSCs in armed 
conflicts should not be in violation of the principle of distinction. This study will therefore 
investigate whether the use of PMSCs complies with the principle of distinction.
3.3 The definitional conundrum: Private Military Companies, Private Security 
Companies or Mercenaries
One issue of contention surrounding the discussion on private military and security industry 
has been how to categorise or define them. There has been an ongoing debate on whether to 
view PMSCs as a new form of mercenary force prohibited under international law or as new
351See Chapter 2, section 2.7
352See Common Article 1 to the Geneva Conventions. Furthermore, Articles on Responsibilities of States for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts further provides that states are responsible for the wrongful conduct o f its organs 
or persons appointed to carry out certain activities on its behalf. This will be dealt with later in this this chapter.
353Gaston 2008 Harvard International Law Journal 222. For example, J D. Michaels, “Beyond Accountability:
The Constitutional, Democratic, and Strategic Problems with Privatizing War” (2004) 82 Washington University 
Law Quarterly 1001 at 1028 argues that when the Unites States of America hired Military Professional 
Resources Incorporated (MPRI) to train Croatian forces during the conflict in Bosnia, MPRI reportedly provided
direct planning, assistance and a military engagement on behalf o f Croatia which later resulted in charged being
raised against the Croat commanders. Therefore, instead of the United States of America being directly involved 
in controversial military activities, it hired civilian contractors to carry out such operations.
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actors who operate within the confines of law. Confusion has also risen regarding the use of 
terms private military companies (PMCs) and private security companies (PSCs). While these 
terms may refer to different groups of private actors, it shall be argued that their functions are 
not mutually exclusive. Before discussing how private actors providing military force raise 
problems for the principle of distinction in IHL, it is important to deal with these definitional 
issues and the functions carried by each group. This is because not all activities of PMSCs are 
subject to IHL. In order to deal with the definitional issues, it is important to put the 
discussion in historical context and examine how the private military and security industry 
has evolved.
As already been alluded to, modern PMSCs began to emerge after the end of the Cold War 
and it is important to refer to some of the major events which highlighted the arrival of new 
actors on the international spectrum. In 1967, Sir David Stirling founded WatchGuard 
International with the aim of “training militaries of the sultanates of the Persian Gulf as well 
as providing support for their operations against rebel movements and dissidents”.354 The 
Company also provided Military Advisory Training Teams to foreign governments, 
particularly in the Middle East, Africa, Latin America and East Asia.355 According to O’ 
Brien, WatchGuard became “the model for all future PMCs”.356
In the 1990s, the Angolan government was under siege from the National Union for the Total 
Independence of Angola (UNITA), a rebel movement led by Jonas Savimbi.357 The 
government hired the services of Executive Outcomes, a private military company founded in 
1989 by Eeben Barlow.358 The company provided general security services, military training, 
infantry troops and air support.359 Employees of Executive Outcomes were mainly former 
members of the South African Defence Force who were battle hardened professional
354K O’ Brien “PMCs, Myths and Mercenaries: The Debate on Private Military Companies” (2000) The RUSI 
Journal http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/03071840008446490 (accessed 10 February 2016).
355K O’ Brien “PMCs, Myths and Mercenaries: The Debate on Private Military Companies” (2000) The RUSI 
Journal http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/03071840008446490 (accessed 10 February 2016).
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soldiers.360 Executive Outcomes also provided military services such as “infrared capabilities, 
which allowed night fighting, reconnaissance, fuel air bombs and advanced air power such as 
Mi-8, Mi-17 and Mi-24 helicopter gunships to the Angolan government troops”.361 Although 
the company insisted that its services were limited to training government forces and only 
engaged in defensive strikes, it has been claimed that the company’s fighters were also 
involved in offensive operations, which ultimately led to the defeat of UNITA rebels.
After a successful campaign in Angola, Executive Outcomes was hired by the Sierra Leone 
government, which was battling the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), a rebel group that 
had unleashed a reign of terror on the public and seized valuable mineral deposits.362 The 
company agreed to offer assistance in repealing the RUF and it is widely reported that the 
government offered mining concessions to the company in return of the military assistance.363 
Military instructors were sent to Sierra Leone and advanced military weapons were deployed. 
Company employees were also involved in air support operations. The company was also 
said to have been involved in supporting humanitarian work such as coordinating the return 
of children and teachers to school as well as preventing illicit diamond trading.364 However, 
there were also reports of indiscriminate shooting of civilians as they pursued the rebels. 
More so, Executive Outcomes was accused of having hidden interests in the diamond mining 
activities that resulted in them being referred to as the “Diamond Dogs of War”.365 
Elsewhere, PMSCs were also involved in the Balkans after the collapse of Soviet Union.366 
For example, Military Professional Resources Inc. (MPRI) assisted the Croatian Army in its 
fight for independence as well as in reclaiming its national territory from the Serb 
occupation.367 The company had offered services of top-ranked retired generals as expert 
advisers.368
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The practice of outsourcing of military services attracted public attention and scrutiny at the 
turn of the millennium when PMSCs were hired on a massive scale to participate in the 
United States of America led invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan. As Singer points out the 
“events in Iraq and Afghanistan dragged PMSCs into the public limelight”.369 PMSCs were 
contracted to provide the much-needed manpower in the invasion and occupation campaign. 
Singer asserts that the numbers of PMSCs alone outnumbered the number of troops deployed 
by other members of the coalition except the USA.370 These developments have raised debate 
regarding the status of PMSCs under the principle of distinction. While some scholars argue 
that PMSCs are a reincarnation of traditional mercenaries whose activities had been outlawed 
and were dressed in a corporate veil, others contended that PMSCs were a new phenomenon 
different from mercenaries and such were not outlawed by international law.371 One person 
who maintained that PMSCs are mercenaries is Enrique Bernales Ballesteros, the United 
Nations Special Rapporteur for mercenaries who maintained that there “was absolutely no 
difference between mercenaries of the type operating in Africa during decolonization and 
PMCs”.372
However, the debate on whether PMSCs forms part of mercenaries seems to have been 
settled. There appears to be consensus among scholars that PMSCs are former mercenaries 
who transformed themselves as well as their methods of operating in order to evade the bad 
perceptions publicity associated with mercenaries.373 This transformation could also have 
been influenced by the development of anti-mercenary laws. Osakwe argues that PMCs 
transformed themselves into “properly structured corporate entities with the term PMCs 
increasingly coming into use and replacing the word mercenary”.374 Percy concurs that 
private military companies took advantages of the loopholes in the definition of mercenaries 
which still allowed private use of force and transformed themselves into corporations, which 
are different from mercenaries.375 Therefore, it is submitted that the debate whether private
369P W Singer “The Private Military Industry and Iraq: What Have We Learned and Where to Next?” (2004) 
Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control o f  Armed Forces Policy Paper 
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military contractors are a modern form of mercenaries is now over and PMSCs cannot be 
treated as mercenaries.
The involvement of PMSCs in armed conflicts however raises problems for IHL in general 
and the principle of distinction in particular as shall be argued later in this Chapter. As has 
been noted above, there is a developing trend in terms of which states outsource military 
functions to private military and security providers, service which involve direct participation 
in hostilities. This raises the question of whether private military and security companies 
personnel are civilians or combatants or not. Before dealing with this issue, it is important to 
deal with the terminology used to refer to PMSCs.
3.3.1 Private Military Contractors
The terms private military companies (PMCs) and private security companies (PSCs) have 
been used in the media interchangeably to refer companies that offer military and security 
services to governments, inter-government organisations or to big corporations. This has 
created confusion regarding whether these terms refer to similar groups of people or not. 
Therefore, it is important to deal with the definitional issues.376
There is no internationally recognised definition of PMCs. Existing treaties and international 
conventions do not refer to private military companies.377 Goddard defines a PMC as:
“A registered civilian company that specializes in the provision of contract military 
training (instruction and simulation programs), military support operations (logistic 
support), operational capabilities (special forces advisors and command and control,
376The determination of whether a given company is a private military company or private security company has 
been based on the functions that it performs. This approach will be used in this study.
377F Schreier, M Caparini “Privatising Security: Law, Practice and Governance of Private Military and Security 
Companies” (2005) Occasional Paper No. 6 Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control o f  Armed Forces 
(DCAF)
https://scholar.google.co.za/scholar?a=Privatising+Security0/ o3A+Law0/ o2C+Practice+and+Govemance+of+Priv 
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communications and intelligence (functions) and or military equipment, to legitimate 
domestic and foreign entities.”378
The Center for Public Integrity also defines a PMC as “a company that provides for a 
profit, services that were previously carried out by national military force, including 
military training, intelligence, logistics, and offensive combat, as well as security in 
conflict”.379 Singer defines PMCs as “business providers of professional services that 
are intricately linked to warfare”.380 From these definitions, it can be safely submitted 
that PMCs specialise in services that are closely related to combat activities, including 
fighting in armed conflicts. Therefore, PMCs have assumed functions that are 
traditionally reserved for armed forces.
PMCs’ clientele includes states, multinational companies and inter-governmental 
organisations such as the United Nations.381 The companies range from “small 
consulting firms to large transnational corporations that provide logistics support or 
lease out combat helicopters, fighter jets, companies, commandos or battalions”.382 
Furthermore, while some companies are corporate business entities that exist 
permanently, others are “virtual companies which may not maintain standing forces and 
may even be small businesses with names which are designed to tell as little as possible 
about what the company does”.383 *
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PMCs offer wide ranging services which vary “from company to company according to 
the degree of their specialisation”.384 Some PMCs provide combat force and support. 
For example in Operation Iraq Freedom and Afghanistan conflict, private military 
companies operated Unmanned Aerial Vehicles.385 The United States of America forces 
also relied on civilians to run computer systems that generated the tactical air picture 
for the Combined Air Operations Centre.386 More so, the United States Navy relied on 
civilian contractors for the operation of guided missile defence systems on its ships.387 
Other PMCs provide logistics and supply forces to armed forces such as building, 
operating and guarding camps.388
PMCs have also been involved in military operations or in providing services closely 
related to the war effort. For example, during the Ethiopian-Eritrea conflict, both sides 
made use of PMC services. Ethiopia contracted the services of Sukhoi, a Russian firm 
which provided fighter jets, and provided the service of 250 pilots, mechanics and 
ground personnel who operated and maintained the planes.389 Singer points out that in 
Iraq, several thousands of PMCs were directly involved in fighting the insurgents in 
order to supplement the over-stretched coalition forces even though these were carried 
out under the pretext of security.390
Other services offered by PMCs include consulting, training, logistics support and 
maintenance operations. While it is admitted that some PMCs provide services that are 
far removed from the war effort, it is safe to conclude that the bulk of them are 
involved in providing services that directly contribute towards the war efforts and this 
makes their participation subject to IHL principles, particularly the principle of 
distinction. As Singer correctly points out, given that PMCs carry out these security
384F Schreier, M Caparini “Privatising Security: Law, Practice and Governance of Private Military and Security 
Companies” 22.
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operations in a warzone, and facing military threats, “they are clearly a far cry from 
security guards at the local shopping mall, no matter what they call themselves”.391
3.3.2 Private Security Companies
The term PSC, just like PMC does not exist in international conventions.392 Goddard 
defines a private security company as “a registered civilian company that specialises in 
providing contract commercial services to domestic and foreign entities with the intent 
to protect personnel, humanitarian and industrial assets within the rule of applicable 
domestic law”.393 According to Schreier and Caparini, PSCs have been in existence for 
a lot longer than PMCs.394 This is also supported by O’Brien who points out that PSCs 
began to emerge on the world stage as long ago as the 16th century when rival 
commercial businesses hired security against each other to control businesses.395 PSCs 
were also used during the colonisation period and continued to evolve over the years.396
PSCs can be divided into two categories.397 On the one hand, there are small companies 
concerned with “crime prevention and ensuring public order, providing security and 
private guard services domestically”.398 These PSCs fall into different sectors such as 
the guarding sector, electronic security, sensor and surveillance sector and investigation 
and risk management sector.399 Since these operate in a domestic setting devoid of 
armed hostilities, their activities are not likely to come within the regulation of IHL but 
human rights law. Therefore, this thesis will not deal with PSCs that provide services 
within a domestic setting during peace times. On the other hand, there are PSCs that
391 Ibid.
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are organized into large companies “sharing the same corporate attributes and 
command structures as PMCs”.400 These companies provide services at an international 
level and their clients include multinational corporations, governments, United Nations 
Institutions and Non-Governmental Organisation.401 Examples of such private security 
companies include consulting (US DynCorp, Group4Securicor), training police, 
security and paramilitary forces (DynCorp was contracted to train new Iraq police), 
intelligence gathering, (UK Rubicon International in Iraq), securing key locations and 
headquarters (US Diligence LLC in Iraq among others).402
From the discussion above, it can be submitted that theoretically, PMCs and PSCs are 
separate entities, which provide different services. However, the question is whether 
there is a watertight separation between these companies in terms of the activities they 
perform in practice. For example, most PSCs claim that they do not get involved in 
combat activities.403 However, history has shown that some companies that call 
themselves security companies actually get involved in the theatre of war performing 
combat operation. For example, between 2004 and 2007, Blackwater, which claimed to 
be a security company, was involved in a number of incidents in which they performed 
functions that are combat in nature. The company was involved in the shooting of 
civilians in market places, killing several of them.404 Blackwater employees were also 
involved in an intense battle with insurgents who were attacking the Coalition 
Provisional Authority headquarters at Najaf in April 2003.405 The company helicopters 
were also used to provide supplies during the battle.406
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Further, Executive Outcomes, which claimed to be providing non-military services in 
Sierra Leone, was also reported to have been involved in combat operations. More so, 
even though PSCs do get involved in combat activities, some companies perform 
services that are closely associated with combat operations. For example, some 
companies that classify themselves as specialising in security services during the Iraq 
conflict performed tasks such as maintaining and loading weapons of sophisticated 
weapons system like B-25 stealth bomber and the Apache helicopter.407 These activities 
by their nature are controversial since they can amount to direct participation in 
hostilities as shall be discussed later on.
In light of this discussion, it can be submitted that in practice, there is no clear line that 
separates some PSCs from PMCs. Schreier and Caparini argue that the distinction 
between PMCs and PSCs is blurred and artificial especially given the fact that the same 
companies perform multiple functions and offer both security and military services.408 
Moreover, some companies take offence to the term military thus preferring to be called 
private security firm.409 In light of this conclusion, this Chapter shall proceed on two 
premises. The first premise is that PMCs provide combat services during armed 
conflicts and this raises the question of their status under the principle of distinction. 
The second premise is that some but not all PSCs get involved in fighting during armed 
conflicts, even though they claim to be security companies. Therefore, in order to 
accommodate both PMCs and PSCs which get involved in combat operations in the 
discussion, the term Private Military and Security Company (PMSCs) has been adopted 
in this thesis in order to discuss how the involvement of these groups create challenges 
for the principle of distinction.
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3.4 Status of Private Military and Security Companies under International 
Humanitarian Law
The discussion above dealt with the terminology that is used when dealing with private 
companies that provide military and security services in situations of armed conflicts. It was 
argued that the involvement PMSCs in armed conflict where they perform combat related 
activities makes them subjects of IHL and in particular the principle of distinction. In other 
words, the status of PMSCs needs to be ascertained. Although the involvement of PMSCs in 
armed conflicts has been on the increase, the law has not provided answers regarding their 
status under the principle of distinction. This has resulted in PMSCs operating in a vacuum 
where their rights and responsibilities under IHL are unclear. Therefore, this Chapter needs 
to examine the status of PMSCs under the principle of distinction.
3.4.1 Combatants
The first enquiry is whether PMSCs employees contracted by states to perform military 
activities can be classified as combatants. This determination will help to answer four 
important questions. Firstly, this will enable one to determine whether contractors can 
lawfully take direct part in hostilities. Secondly, this will assist in answering the question 
whether such PMSCs are legitimate targets or not. Thirdly, the enquiry will answer the 
question regarding the consequences that must follow when contractors take part in armed 
conflicts. Lastly, this will assist in understanding the responsibilities of state for the conduct 
of PMSCs. Given the importance of these questions to IHL, it is crucial to determine whether 
PMSCs are combatants or not.
PMSC employees can acquire combatant status in two ways.410 Firstly, they can acquire 
combatant status by meeting the requirements of Article 43 of Additional Protocol I to the 
Geneva Conventions, which defines combatant status.411 In terms of this provision, a person
410Cameron 2006 International Review o f  the Red Cross 583.
411Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims 
of International Armed Conflicts. See Chapter 2, section 2.4.2
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qualifies as a combatant if they form part of the armed forces of a party to the conflict.412 
Thus, if PMSCs can prove that they are incorporated into the armed forces, are under a 
command responsible to the party for the conduct of its members and are subject to an 
internal disciplinary system, which enforces compliance with international law, then they can 
be accorded combatant status.413 The second way in which PMSCs can acquire combatant 
status under IHL will be under Article 4A of the Third Geneva Convention.414 In order to do 
so, they will have to demonstrate that they meet all the four requirements set in that
415provision.415
Article 43 is couched in such a way that any group which has been incorporated into the 
armed forces of a Party to the conflict including civilians can qualify as combatants. 
However, the provision does not provide criteria for determining whether a person forms part 
of a state’s armed forces.416 Gillard suggests various factors that may be taken into 
consideration to determine whether a person qualifies as a regular member of the armed 
forces of a party to the conflict.417 These factors include whether there has been “compliance 
with national procedures for enlistment or conscription, where they exist, whether they are 
employees of the department of defence but bearing in mind that such departments employ 
civilians, whether they are subject to military discipline and justice....”418 Other factors to 
consider include whether they form part of and are subject to the military chain of command 
and control, whether they form part of the military hierarchy, whether they have been issued 
with the identity cards envisaged by the Third Geneva Convention or other forms of 
identification similar to those of ‘‘ordinary’’ members of the armed forces; and whether they 
wear uniforms.419 Article 43(3) further imposes the requirement that whenever a party to a 
conflict incorporates a paramilitary or armed law enforcement agency into its armed forces it 
shall notify other parties to the conflict.420
412See Chapter 2, section 2.4.2
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The question therefore is whether PMSCs are regular members of the armed forces of a party 
to the conflict or whether they are incorporated into the armed forces of a party to the 
conflict. In answering this question, one needs to consider whether states comply with 
national procedures for enlisting or conscription procedures when they contract PMCS.421 
This means that for a person to qualify as a member of the armed forces, they will have to 
comply with these enlisting or conscription procedures.422 Practice of states that have used 
PMSC services does not suggest that PMSCs are conscripted into these states’ armed forces. 
For example, the United States of America has been acquiring services of PMSCs through 
contracts.423 This means that management of the PMSC will enter into a contract of service in 
terms of which fully trained soldiers will render their services to the government. The PMSC 
personnel do not become employees of the department of defence. They remain employees of 
the PMSCs. On the other hand, United States Army does not recruit via contracts. Instead, it 
recruits civilians who are then trained and become employees of the department of defence.
Current practice does not support the idea that PMSCs may be integrated into the armed 
forces through a contract.424 While states may use the contract to hire services of PMSCs to 
conduct operations that are normally carried out by its armed forces, it is argued that the 
contracts do not integrate PMSCs into the armed forces. This argument is supported by 
Schmitt who argues that there is need for a “more formal affiliation rather than a mere 
contractual relationship for these PMSCs to be members of armed forces”.425 However, when 
the Unites States of American contracted PMSCs in Iraq and Afghanistan, the there was no 
indication of formal affiliation of PMSCs to the United States Army. For example, sometimes 
PMSCs operations were detrimental to the United States Army operations.426 *Thus, the 
modus operandi of the PMSCs vis-a-vis US Army did not suggest any form of integration or 
at least coordination. This argument is supported by Schmitt who argues that “it would be 
incongruent to suggest that a group with a clearly distinct civilian identity could somehow
421Schmitt 2004-2005 Chicago Journal o f  International Law 524.
422Ibid.
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transmogrify into an element of the armed services merely because of the function it 
performs”.427
Furthermore, the argument that states that are making use of PMSC services incorporate 
PMSCs personnel into their armed forces, goes against the idea behind outsourcing of 
military services to private contractors.428 As stated earlier in this chapter, one of the reasons 
behind outsourcing of security services is to reduce spending directed at maintaining large 
standing armies as well as to finance their operations.429 Therefore, it is very unlikely that 
states would incorporate PMSCs into its armed forces to the extent that they can be granted 
combatant status under IHL since this will defeat the logic behind outsourcing. 430
Lastly, the United States of America government has refused to prosecute PMSC personnel 
accused of committing torture and war crimes in terms of its military laws on the grounds 
they are civilians, not members of the armed forces.431 This demonstrates that countries that 
use PMSCs themselves do not regard them as members of their armed forces. One can 
therefore conclude that while it is possible for PMSCs to be incorporated into the armed 
forces of a party to the conflict in terms of Article 43 of Additional Protocol I and therefore 
be treated as combatants, current practice demonstrates that this is not being done. 
Consequently, most PMSC personnel do not qualify as combatants through being members of 
the armed forces through this way.
The next question is whether PMSC personnel qualify as combatants in terms of Article 4A 
(2) of the Third Geneva Convention. Article 4 A (2) grants combatant status to “members of 
other militias and other volunteer corps, including those of resistance movements, belonging 
to a Party to the conflict..”432 It further provides that such groups should fulfil the
427Schmitt 2004-2005 Chicago Journal o f  International Law 525.
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429Ibid.
430Ibid.
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conditions of “being commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates,433 having 
fixed distinctive sign recognisable at a distance434, carrying arms openly435 and conducting 
their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war.436 The question therefore is 
whether PMSCs can meet these requirements to qualify as combatants. In order to qualify as 
combatants, PMSC personnel should meet all the requirements in Article 4A (2) of the Third 
Geneva Conventions as a group.437 Therefore, one would have to determine whether each 
private military company meets these requirements on a case-by-case basis.
The first question is whether PMSC personnel meet the requirement of having a responsible 
command, which is responsible for its subordinates.438As pointed out in Chapter 2 the 
requirement for a command is to ensure that there is discipline within the group.439 Dinstein 
concurs that “lawful combatants must act within a hierarchic framework, embedded in 
discipline, and subject to supervision by upper echelons of what is being done by subordinate 
units in the field”.440 The Geneva Conventions do not require a military chain of command.441 
Instead, the issue is whether the person in charge has the necessary authority to ensure 
accountability.442 It can be submitted that some PMSCs are capable of meeting this 
requirement since they are large corporations, which have a hierarchy. Schmitt concurs that 
“most PMSCs are organized and controlled along military lines, an unsurprising fact given 
that so many of their employees are ex-military”.443
However, it is not definite that all PMSCs contracted by states will meet the first requirement. 
One problem that may arise is that the organisational structure of some PMSCs may be 
unknown to the outside world. This may make it difficult to ascertain whether there is a 
person responsible for the conduct of PMSC personnel. This argument can be supported by 
the Iraq and Afghanistan experience where the private military companies did not reveal any
433Article 4A (2)(a).
434Article 4A (2)(b).
435Article 4A (2)(c).
436Article 4A (2)(c).
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command structure that was responsible for the discipline of the PMSC personnel. Therefore, 
it can be concluded that while it is possible for PMSC personnel to meet these requirements, 
the actual existence of a command responsible for the conduct of PMSCs employees may 
remain a secret to the company and its employees.
The next question is whether PMSC personnel can meet the requirements of having fixed 
distinctive sign recognizable at a distance and carrying guns openly.444 If one is to rely on the 
PMSCs’ practice in Iraq and Afghanistan, most PMSCs will have problems in meeting this 
requirement. There were dozens of PMSCs operating in these two countries and performing 
wide-ranging functions.445 One complaint that was raised during the course of war was that 
PMSC staff was difficult to identify since some “wore uniforms which were military-like 
uniforms while others operated in civilian clothing”.446 Schmitt concurs that “many private 
US Armies that work there wear a bewildering and amusing hodgepodge of ‘tough guy’ 
a ttire ..”447 This made it difficult to distinguish between armed forces of the Allies powers 
and combatants. Gillard argues that this also resulted in confusion, as civilians could not 
clearly distinguish between employees of different companies thus affecting their ability to 
file complaints against PMSC employees.448 Once again, while it possible for PMSCs to 
meet these requirements, current practice demonstrates that most PMSCs do not comply with 
this requirement.
The next question is whether PMSCs personnel as a group will conduct their operations in 
accordance with the laws and customs of war.449 In order to acquire combatant status, PMSCs 
must respect the laws and customs of war including complying with the previous three 
requirements discussed above. Although this does not appear to be a difficult requirement to
444As discussed in Chapter 2, section 2.4.2, this requirement is intended for identification purposes
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comply with, current practice indicates that some PMSCs do not comply with international 
law. A number of incidents have painted an inimical picture regarding the ability of PMSCs to 
comply with the requirement of conducting their operations in terms of international law. For 
example, Executive Outcomes in Sierra Leone became notorious for the indiscriminate 
killing of civilians.450 Furthermore, cases of the wanton shooting, killing and torture of 
civilians by PMSCs in Iraq were reported.451 Therefore, it can be concluded that even though 
it is possible for PMSCs to conduct their operations in terms of international law, practice so 
far has proved to the contrary.
From the above arguments, one can conclude that generally, most PMSC personnel do not 
qualify as volunteer corps or militia as stated in the Geneva Conventions. Schmitt concurs 
that it is highly unlikely that private contractors qualify as combatants in terms of Article 4A 
(2) of the Third Geneva Conventions.452 Gillard adds that although not impossible, “it is 
likely to be only a small minority of PMC/PSC staff who could be considered combatants on 
the basis of Article 4A (2) of the Third Geneva Convention”.453 It can be concluded that most 
PMSCs are not combatants and therefore do not have the combat privileges.
3.4.2 Civilians accompanying Armed Forces
As pointed out in Chapter 2, the Third Geneva Conventions recognises that civilians may 
accompany armed forces to a conflict.454 Such civilians may include civilian members of 
military aircraft crews, war correspondents, supply contractors, members of labour units or of 
services responsible for the welfare of the armed forces”.455 However in order to be 
accommodated under Article 4A (4), such civilians must have “received authorisation from
450Zarate 1998 Stanford Journal o f  International Law 105.
451 See generally W Singer “Can’t Win Without ‘Em’, Can’t Go to War Without ‘Em’: Private Military 
Contractors and Counterinsurgency” Foreign Policy at Brookings Policy Paper Number 4, September 2007 
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/0927militarycontractors.pdf. The learned author cites 
the incident of deliberate shooting the body guard to the Iraq Vice President in the Green zone by a Blackwater 
employee, two reported shootings of Iraqi civilians by the Blackwater contractors, including of an Interior 
Ministry employee and the Abu Ghraib torture incidents among others as examples.
452 2004-2005 Chicago Journal o f  International Law 531.
453Gillard 2006 International Review o f  the Red Cross 535.
454See Chapter 2, section 2.4.4.
455Article 4A (4) of Third Geneva Conventions.
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the armed forces which they accompany, who shall provide them for that purpose with an 
identity card....”456 The provision does not give an exhaustive list of service providers who 
are covered by this provision. As Gillard points out, the list in Article 4A (4) is indicative and 
not exhaustive and “neither the travauxpre 'paratoires for this provision nor the Commentary 
shed light on the limits of the activities that may be carried out by this category of 
persons”.457
It is possible that some PMSC personnel will qualify for prisoner of war status under this 
provision. For example, those contractors who supply services such as catering and laundry 
services would arguably qualify under this provision. This will solve the problem regarding 
the status of contractors who perform these services since the provision is clear that these are 
civilians who are entitled to POW status. However, this provision does not provide a 
permanent solution regarding the status of PMSCs. Since the persons covered by Article 4A 
(4) are civilians and not members of the armed forces, it follows that these persons are 
prohibited from taking part in hostilities.458 This is supported by Gillard who argues that “the 
non-combatant status of civilians accompanying armed forces and the nature of the activities 
listed with the exception of civilian members of military aircraft seem to indicate that the 
drafters intended this category not to include persons carrying out activities that amount to 
taking a direct part in hostilities”.459 This reasoning leads to a conclusion that the provision 
does not cover PMSCs that are hired to take direct part in hostilities or those who perform 
services that are closely related to combat activities. For instance, PMSCs who are involved 
in loading bombs, maintaining tanks, operating missile defence systems and operated 
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles in Iraq would not be considered as civilians under Article 4A (4).
In light of the above discussion, it can be concluded that while it is possible that a few private 
military contractors will gain combatant status through Article 4A (4) depending on the 
services they provide, most PMSCs will not qualify as civilians accompanying armed 
conflicts due to their involvement in combat activities.
456Ibid.
^Gillard 2006 International Review o f  the Red Cross 237.
458Ibid.
459Gillard 2006 International Review o f  the Red Cross 538.
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3.4.3 Civilians
The next question that needs to be addressed is whether PMSC employees qualify as civilians 
as defined under the Additional Protocol I. Determining whether PMSC employees are 
civilians helps in answering several questions. Firstly, this will answer the question whether 
PMSC employees are protected persons under the laws of armed conflict. If it is found that 
PMSC employees are civilians, then they cannot be objects of attack unless and for such time 
as they take direct part in hostilities. Secondly, determining the status of PMSC employees 
will also answer the question of whether employees who take part in hostilities should be 
punished for their involvement in hostilities. As already mentioned above, civilians can be 
prosecuted for crimes committed during the time they take direct part in hostilities. Most 
importantly, the determination whether PMSCs employees are civilians will lead to another 
important question regarding the basis upon which states rely on the services of civilians to 
fight in armed conflicts since this is a violation of their obligations under the principle of 
distinction. More so, it will lead to another question regarding the rights and responsibilities 
of individuals, companies and states that are involved in the armed conflicts.
PMSCs such as Executive Outcomes and Sandline have argued that “they do not provide 
combat services and would only use force defensively”.460 Since PMSCs consider themselves 
to be offering non-combat services, this means that they allege their personnel to be civilians. 
This claim is also supported by the position that has been adopted by states that rely on the 
services of PMSCs, particularly the United States of America, which has asserted that PMSC 
personnel are civilians.461 For instance, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) in Iraq 
required PMSCs to comply with human rights law, “which would be solely inadequate if the 
United States, as occupying power, knew or believed that they were part of its armed 
forces”.462 Moreover, while the United States Army court-martialled soldiers who were 
involved in the Abu Ghraib torture incident, contractors who were involved were not court- 
martialled and this leaves an impression that the United States government treats PMSC 
personnel as civilians. Therefore, it is important to determine whether a conclusion that 
PMSC personnel are civilians is tenable under the principle of distinction.
460See Percy 2012 International Review o f the Red Cross 941.
461See Cameron 2006 International Review o f  the Red Cross 573.
462Cameron 2006 International Review o f  the Red Cross 578.
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Civilians are defined under Article 50 of the Additional Protocol I as “any person who does 
not belong to one of the categories of persons referred to in Article 4A (1), (2), (3) and (6) of 
the Third Convention and in Article 43 of this Protocol”.463 In theory, Article 50 resolves the 
problem regarding the status of PMSCs since anyone who does not qualify as a combatant 
automatically becomes a civilian. This means that private military and security personnel 
who do not qualify as combatants are civilians and therefore are protected persons. On the 
other hand, this means that they do not have the right to take direct part in hostilities.
The conclusion that PMSC employees are civilians will have far-reaching consequences that 
may affect the effectiveness of the principle of distinction. As has been pointed out in 
Chapter 2, civilians are immune from attacks unless and for such time as they take direct part 
in hostilities.464 Furthermore, civilians who take direct part in hostilities do not benefit from 
the PoW status.465 Lastly, civilians who take direct part in hostilities may be criminally 
prosecuted for the acts they commit during their participation.466
3.5 Private Military and Security Companies and the Concept of Direct Participation in 
Hostilities
A conclusion that PMSC employees are civilians will have far-reaching consequences for 
IHL. These consequences may have the effect of rendering the principle of distinction 
redundant. As pointed out above, civilians can only lose their protection during an armed 
conflict if they take direct part in hostilities. Therefore, it becomes important to determine the 
consequences that arise when PMSC employees that take direct part in hostilities are treated
463Article 50 of Additional Protocol I. See Chapter 2, section 2.4.5 for detailed discussion.
464See Chapter 2, section 2.4.5.
465Article 4A of the Third Geneva Conventions.
466For example, in David Hicks, an Australian detainee at Guantanamo Bay was tried for attempted murder by 
the Guantanamo Military Commission for attempted to murder American and Other Coalition forces. See 
Military Commission Charges, United States V. David Matthew Hicks (June 2004) 
https://www.lawcouncil.asn.au/lawcouncil/images/LCA-PDF/a-z-docs/Hicks first report.pdf (accessed 12 
August 2016).
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as civilians. In order to discuss these consequences, it is important to deal with the concept of 
direct participation in hostilities first.
3.5.1 Direct Participation in Hostilities under International Humanitarian Law
The concept of direct participation in hostilities (hereafter DPH) is one of the most 
controversial concepts in IHL. This is because the concept of direct participation in hostilities 
is fluid and dynamic and this makes it difficult to determine with certainty the type of 
activities that constitute direct participation in hostilities.467 Direct participation in hostilities 
is mentioned in Article 51(3) of Additional Protocol I which provides that civilians shall 
enjoy the protection afforded in Article 51 “unless and for such time as they take a direct part 
in hostilities”.468 The Commentary on the Additional Protocols defines direct participation as 
“acts of war which by their nature or purpose are likely to cause actual harm to the personnel 
and equipment of armed forces”.469 The Commentary also cautions that there must be a clear 
distinction between “direct participation in hostilities and participation in the war effort”.470 
Civilians may only lose their protection and become legitimate objects of attack when they 
take direct part in hostilities.471 This means that civilians may not lose protection for 
contributing towards war effort by providing catering and construction of maintenance of 
bases.472 Cameron also points out that “careful lines must be drawn with a view to how such 
categorizations may affect all non-combatants”.473
One issue that has caused disagreement among scholars is the criteria of determining acts that 
amount to direct participation in hostilities. There is no list of activities that are regarded as 
amounting to direct participation in hostilities. Furthermore, treaties do not provide guidance 
regarding what constitutes direct participation in hostilities. The ICRC has come up with an
467Cameron 2006 International Review o f  the Red Cross 588.
468Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions.
469C Pilloud et al Commentary on the Additional Protocols (1987) 619
410Ibid.
471 Ibid.
472Cameron 2006 International Review o f  the Red Cross 588. Therefore, it will be admitted that PMSCs who 
offer services which are far removed from the battlefield such as laundry and catering do not directly participate 
in hostilities.
473Cameron 2006 International Review o f  the Red Cross 588.
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initiative which is intended to provide guidance regarding the concept of direct participation 
in hostilities.474 Melzer suggests three factors that must be considered in order to determine 
whether an activity amounts to direct participation in hostilities.475 These factors are that: (i) 
the act must be likely to adversely affect the military operations or military capacity of a 
party to an armed conflict or alternatively inflict death, injury, or destruction on persons or 
objects protected against direct attack(threshold of harm); (ii) there must be a causal link 
between the act and the harm likely to result either from that act, or from a coordinated 
military operation of which that act constitutes an integral part (direct causation) and (iii) the 
act must be specifically designed to directly cause the required threshold of harm in support 
of a party to the conflict and to the detriment of another (belligerent nexus)”.476 *
Without going into detail regarding the three factors suggested by the ICRC, it can be argued 
that most PMSCs take direct participation in hostilities.417 For example, the maintenance of 
highly sophisticated weapons, supplying ammunition to the armed forces in the battlefield, 
search and rescue operations, intelligence gathering among other activities which are 
increasingly being outsourced to PMSCs may qualify as direct participation in hostilities.478 
Furthermore, in some instances, PMSC are directly involved in firing weapons in the 
battlefield.479 If PMSC employees are regarded as civilians, this means that they can only lose 
their immunity when they take direct part in hostilities. However, it is important to examine 
some of the problems that arise if this position is considered correct.
474N Melzer “Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities under International 
Humanitarian Law” International Committee o f  the Red Cross https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/icrc- 
002-0990.pdf (accessed 25 February 2016). It should be noted that the ICRC guidance is a long document 
which cannot be discussed in detail in this study. Therefore, the brief discussion is for illustrative purposes.
475N Melzer “Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities under International 
Humanitarian Law” International Committee o f  the Red Cross 46.
416Ibid.
^Schm itt 2004-2005 Chicago Journal o f  International Law 534.
478See generally Schmitt 2004-2005 Chicago Journal o f  International Law 536-545.
479For instance, Blackwater employees “engaged in an intense battle with insurgents who were attacking the 
CPA headquarters April at Najaf in April 2003”. The company’s helicopters were also used to provide supplies 
during the battle. See Schmitt 2004-2005 Chicago Journal o f  International Law 514.
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3.5.2 The Challenges of relying on the concept of direct participation in hostilities to 
determine the rights and responsibilities of PMSCs
In light of the discussion of the concept of direct participation in hostilities above, the next 
step will be to discuss the challenges that arise if direct participation in hostilities is relied 
upon to determine the rights and obligations of PMSCs.
3.5.2.1 The challenge of determining PMSCs activities that amount to Direct 
Participation in Hostilities
The first problem that is encountered when determining what conduct amounts to direct 
participation in hostilities in relation to PMSCs is that the companies perform many activities, 
which range from purely civilian to military activities. Schmitt points out that many activities 
lie between these two extremes.480 The question then is how to determine with certainty the 
type of activities that amount to direct participation in hostilities. Melzer argues that the 
concept of direct participation in hostilities must be interpreted in accordance with the object 
and purpose of IHL, which is to ensure protection of civilian population.481 This suggests that 
one should adopt a narrow interpretation of direct participation in hostilities. This approach is 
supported by Cameron, who argues that direct “participation cannot be understood so broadly 
as to include any acts that could be construed as helping one side or another”.482 On the other 
hand, Schmitt favours a liberal interpretation of direct participation in hostilities when 
dealing with activities that fall in the grey area. He argues that when dealing with an area that 
falls in the grey area, ones should find in favour of direct participation.483 According to the 
learned author, “an interpretation that allows civilians to retain their immunity even though 
inextricably involved in the conduct of ongoing hostilities will engender disrespect for the 
law on the part of combatants endangered by the activities of the civilians concerned”.484
480Schmitt 2004-2005 Chicago Journal o f  International Law 534.
481 N Melzer “Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities under International 
Humanitarian Law” 45.
482Cameron 2006 International Review o f  the Red Cross 588.
483Schmitt 2004-2005 Chicago Journal o f  International Law 535.
484Ibid.
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Schmitt further argues that a liberal interpretation provides an incentive for civilians to 
remain as distant from the conflict as possible for fear of losing their protection.485
It is submitted that in determining whether an act by PMSC personnel amounts to direct 
participation in hostilities, a balance needs to be struck between not having too narrow or too 
wide interpretation. An interpretation that is too wide endangers civilians. Traditionally, 
civilians have always been found in a conflict zone, supporting the war effort directly or 
indirectly. If too wide a definition is chosen, a large number of civilian contractors will lose 
their immunity even though the nature of the service is purely civilian.486 On the other hand, 
if a too narrow interpretation is used this may shield PMSCs who actively participate in 
hostilities from being held accountable. States are increasingly relying on PMSCs to perform 
various services in armed conflicts and an interpretation that is too narrow will shield these 
contractors from attacks thus making them immune. This may in turn frustrate opposing 
parties who are faced with an army of civilian contractors that are immune from attack most 
of the time. It is clear from the discussion that treating PMSC employees as civilians who can 
only be targeted when they take direct part in hostilities creates uncertainties regarding when 
they lose their protection. Consequently, states may adopt their own interpretation of direct 
participation in hostilities thus causing inconsistencies in the application of the law.
Another problem that arises if direct participation in hostilities is relied upon to determine 
whether PMSC employees are civilians is that the concept of direct participation does not 
make a distinction between defensive and offensive operations as both acts constitute direct 
participation in hostilities.487 This creates problems for PMSCs who are contracted to provide 
genuinely non-combat services such as guarding oil refineries, oil pipelines water and 
electricity supply facilities among other facilities in a conflict zone such as Iraq. If these 
contractors are attacked by a party to the conflict, any exercise of self-defence amounts to 
direct participation in hostilities since a defensive act also constitutes direct participation. 
This means that PMSC personnel who are employed to provide bona fide non-military
485Ibid.
486This is especially the case in Iraq where proliferation of PMSCs made it difficult to identify one company 
from the other or ordinary civilians from PMSCs personnel.
487Cameron 2006 International Review o f  the Red Cross 589. Article 49(1) of Additional Protocol I defines 
attacks as “acts of violence against the adversary, whether in offence or in defence”.
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activities can lose their protection as civilians by merely exercising their right to self­
preservation. Therefore, direct participation in hostilities by civilian contractors does not 
depend on whether a person intended to do so since circumstances may force them to take 
direct part in hostilities. This position may result in many civilian contractors becoming 
legitimate targets thus exposing them to harm even though they are genuinely contracted to 
perform civilian activities. Consequently, this compromises the protection IHL seeks to 
provide for civilians.
3.5.2.2 Private Military and Security Companies and the Problem of ‘Revolving Door’
Reliance on the concept of direct participation in hostilities to determine the rights and 
responsibilities of PMSC employees also raises the problem of the revolving door. In terms 
of Article 51(3) of Additional Protocol I, civilians lose protection for “such time as they take 
a direct part in hostilities”.488 This means that when civilians cease to take direct participation 
in hostilities, they regain their civilian status and therefore become immune from attacks 
again.489 This requirement however is very difficult to apply in relation to PMSCs. If PMSCs 
are regarded as civilians, this means that even those companies contracted to perform combat 
operations are generally immune from attacks and can only be attacked when and for such 
time as they take direct part in hostilities. This means a party to the conflict that is fighting 
against an army of civilian contractors will be limited in terms of when they can launch 
military operations since they can only lawfully attack civilian contractors when they are 
taking direct part in hostilities. This situation will encourage states to rely on civilians in the 
knowledge that they can only be attacked during the time when they take direct participation 
in hostilities as compared to combatants who can be attacked at any given time and location. 
Schmitt argues that “a military force that faces attacks from civilians who can acquire 
sanctuary by returning home will soon conclude that their survival dictates ignoring the 
purported revolving door”.490 He further argues that this “may invite disrespect” for 
international law in general.491 Therefore, it is submitted that relying on direct participation to
488Additional Protocol I.
489C Pilloud et al Commentary on the Additional Protocols (1987) 619.
490Schmitt 2004-2005 Chicago Journal o f  International Law 536.
491Ibid.
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deal with PMSCs who get involved in hostilities may breed contempt for international 
humanitarian law.
Another problem that may arise if the concept of direct participation is used to determine 
whether PMSC personnel can be attacked is that one company may provide wide-ranging 
services during the same armed conflicts.492 For instance, a company may employ weapon 
experts, cooks and drivers who deliver ammunition at the war front. The question is whether 
a cook who works for that company can be targeted on the basis that the company he/she 
works for also provide services that amount to direct part participation in hostilities. Schmitt 
argues that generally, such a person should not be attacked for merely being an employee of a 
particular company.493 It is admitted that if one adopts a straight forward application of the 
concept of direct participation, such an employee cannot be attacked unless he/she takes 
direct participation in hostilities. However, this position ignores the reality of an armed 
conflict situation. It imposes an undue burden on the opposing forces that are required to 
ascertain all the factual issues before carrying out attacks.494 Moreover, it may be difficult to 
ascertain all these facts in the heat of a battle. The position creates two undesirable 
consequences. Firstly, it disadvantages a party that is facing enemy belligerents made up of 
PMSCs since that part will have to go through a rigorous process to distinguish personnel 
who are employed to take direct participation from those who are performing purely civilian 
activities. This may in turn encourage such a party to completely ignore IHL. Secondly, this 
can also put individuals who are genuinely civilian contractors performing civilian functions 
in harm’s way thus further compromising civilian protection and the principle of distinction.
3.5.2.3 Direct Participation in Hostilities and the Doctrine of Human Shields
Another problem that may arise if the concept of direct participation in hostilities is used to 
deal with PMSCs relates to military objectives. The treaties do not provide a list of objectives 
that are considered military objectives and “an object can become a military objective
492Ibid.
493Ibid.
494For example, a party to the conflict which is facing an army of civilian contractors will have to make an effort 
to distinguish contractors who are employed to perform civilian tasks from those who take direct part in 
hostilities. This however may be made difficult given that many PMSCs do not wear anything that makes it 
possible to identify them.
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according to their nature, location and purpose”.495 Some PMSCs are contracted to provide 
guarding services in an armed conflict. Even though these PMSCs are hired to protect civilian 
objects, these may turn into military objectives depending on what they are being used for. 
Cameron gives an example of PMSCs responsible for guarding a building that is used 
ordinarily for civilian purpose but which, unbeknownst to the PMSC personnel is temporarily 
housing combatants.496 The issue that arises is whether, a civilian who continues to guard an 
object that has become a military objective is taking direct part in hostilities. Given that direct 
participation in hostilities may occur through both offensive and defensive action and that the 
object which the contractor is protecting is a military objective, one will conclude that 
PMSCs responsible for guarding a military object are directly participating in hostilities. 
However, another problem that may arise in this scenario relates to the doctrine of human 
shields. The doctrine of human shield does not make a distinction between voluntary and 
involuntary human shields.497 All civilians who are close to a military objectives remain 
protected persons and “any possible injury to them must be taken into account when 
assessing the proportionality of an attack on a military objective”.498 The difficulty that arises 
for the commanders of the party that intends to attack the military objective is whether they 
should consider the civilian personnel guarding the building voluntary or involuntary 
civilians. This determination will require a great deal of intelligence gathering and imposes 
an onerous burden on the opposing parties which are faced by such a scenario. The overall 
consequence is that ordinary civilians going about their normal lives are put in danger since 
they may be confused for PMSCs employees.
Cameron further adds that the problem is also made even more difficult when the civilian 
object that has become a military objective reverts to being a civilian object.499 This change 
in circumstances will be difficult for the opposing forces to detect and they may continue 
directing attacks against the civilian contractors even though they are no longer taking direct 
part in hostilities. This has serious ramifications for ordinary civilians since the extent of their
495 Cameron 2006 International Review o f  the Red Cross 590.
496Ibid.
497 Ibid.
498Cameron 2006 International Review o f  the Red Cross 591.
499W Singer “Can’t Win Without ‘Em’, Can’t Go to War Without ‘Em’: Private Military Contractors and 
Counterinsurgency” Foreign Policy at Brookings Policy Paper Number 4, September 2007 
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/0927militarycontractors.pdf.
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protection is similar to that given to persons some of who are employed to take direct 
participation in hostilities.
Furthermore, IHL, just like any national laws requires some degree of certainty. The principle 
of distinction is meant to ensure that parties to the conflict can know with certainty the type 
of persons as well as objects that can be attacked during an armed conflict. As has been 
argued throughout this chapter, states are increasingly outsourcing military services to 
PMSCs thus creating an army of civilian contractors. However, equating civilian contractors 
who perform military activities to ordinary civilians creates confusion for the opposing 
parties. As Cameron argues, “international humanitarian law must be applied in such a way 
as to make it reasonably possible for combatants to comply with it”.500 Cameron further adds 
that “if it becomes impossible for opposing forces to know which PMC employees are 
accurately perceived as having combatant status (and therefore as legitimate military 
objectives), and which PMC employees are civilians and possibly even protected persons (the 
shooting of whom could constitute a grave breach of the Geneva Conventions), the resulting 
confusion could discourage any attempt to comply with humanitarian law”.501 It submitted 
that treating PMSC personnel as ordinary civilians would render the principle of distinction 
obsolete since states will no longer have an incentive to respect it.
Lastly, the argument that private military contractors are civilians has serious consequences 
on the contractors themselves. Since PMSC employees are not combatants, they are not 
supposed to take direct part in hostilities. However, as has been argued above, contractors 
often take direct part in hostilities. This makes them liable to punishment for such 
involvement in hostilities. In other words, they can be treated like mercenaries or ordinary 
civilians and be punished through the criminal justice system. More so, if these contractors do 
not qualify as civilians under Article 4A (4) of the Third Geneva Conventions, they may also 
be denied PoW status. Cameron argues that such position may not be known to the 
contractors at the time of hiring.502 Furthermore, even if the contractors are aware that they
500Cameron 2006 International Review o f  the Red Cross 584.
501Ibid.
502Ibid.
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are liable to punishment for participating in hostilities, such knowledge may discourage them 
from observing IHL rules since they do not have an incentive to do so.503
3.5.3 Conclusion
In light of the above discussion, it is clear that treating all PMSC employees as civilians has 
serious ramifications for the protection of civilian population as well as the conduct of 
hostilities. The use of PMSCs cause inconveniences for states that are fighting against an 
army of civilian contractors who may be discouraged from observing the law. Furthermore, 
giving PMSCs personnel the same status as ordinary civilians appears to blur the definition of 
civilians thus making the application of the principle of distinction difficult. Therefore, it is 
concluded that treating PMSC employees as civilian compromises the protection which IHL 
seeks to offer to civilian population. This study will turn to discuss the regulatory 
mechanisms that can be used to deal with PMSCs.
3.6 Responsibility for Private Military and Security Companies during Armed Conflicts
As discussed in Chapter 2, the requirement that only combatants belonging to a party to the 
conflict have the right to take direct part in hostilities is also meant to ensure that states retain 
responsibilities for the conduct of its personnel during an armed conflict.504 This requirement 
also ensures that states will take primary responsibility of punishing members of the armed 
forces who violate IHL during an armed conflict. Since it has been concluded that most 
PMSC employees are not combatants, it is important to investigate whether states can be held 
responsible under IHL or in any other way for the conduct of PMSC personnel in the same 
way they can be held responsible for the conduct of their armed forces. This enquiry is 
particularly important if it is accepted that PMSC personnel are civilians. It becomes 
important to ascertain whether there are measures in place to ensure that PMSC personnel 
conduct themselves in terms of the law of armed conflict as well as be held accountable for 
any violation of the law of armed conflict.
503Ibid.
504See Chapter 2, section 2.4.3 and 2.7.
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3.6.1 State Responsibility
Scholars have argued that states that hire PMSCs are responsible for the actions of PMSCs 
since IHL requires them to take responsibility for any violations of law done by persons 
acting on their behalf.505 Article 3 of the Hague Convention provides that a belligerent party 
shall be responsible for the acts committed by persons forming part of its armed forces.506 
Article 91 of Additional Protocol I states that a party to the conflict is “responsible for all acts 
committed by persons forming part of its armed forces”.507 This provision is stated more 
clearly in Rule 149 of customary international humanitarian law rules which provides that “A 
State is responsible for violations of international humanitarian law attributable to it, 
including: violations committed by its organs, including its armed forces;508 violations 
committed by persons or entities it empowered to exercise elements of governmental 
authority;509 violations committed by persons or groups acting in fact on its instructions, or 
under its direction or control;510 and violations committed by private persons or groups which 
it acknowledges and adopts as its own conduct”.511
The Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (hereafter 
ARSIWA) contains provisions similar to those in Rule 149.512 The Articles seeks to remind 
states of their responsibility for the wrongful acts they commit or those committed by organs 
acting on their behalf.513 There are three possible provisions of ARSIWA that can be used to
505See for example L Doswald-Beck “Private military companies under international humanitarian law” in S 
Chesterman, C Lehnardt From Mercenaries to Market: The Rise and Regulation o f Private Military Companies 
(2007). J Williamson “Private Security Companies and Private Military Companies Under International 
Humanitarian Law” in S Gumedze, Private Security in Africa: Manifestation, Challenges and Regulation 
(2007)Monograph Series No 139 http://www.gsdrc.org/document-librarv/private-securitv-companies-and- 
private-military-companies-under-international-humanitarian-law/ (accessed 3 March 2016).
506 Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its annex: Regulations concerning 
the Laws and Customs o f War on Land. The Hague, 18 October 1907. The same statement is repeated in Article 
91 of Additional Protocol I.
507Additional Protocol I.
508J Henckaerts, L Doswald-Beck Customary International Humanitarian Law Volume I: Rules (2005) Rule 149 
(a).
509Rule (149 (b).
510Rule 149 (c).
511Rule 149 (d).
512International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Responsibility o f  States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, 
November 2001.
513Article 1 of Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts. While ARSIWA does not deal with 
international humanitarian law per se, its discussion is meant to explore other avenues that can be used to hold 
states accountable for violation of international law by PMSC personnel acting on states’ behalf.
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hold states accountable for the actions of PMSC personnel they hire. Article 4 provides that 
“the conduct of any State organ shall be considered an act of that State under international 
law, whether the organ exercises legislative, executive, judicial or any other functions”.514 
Article 5 provides that “the conduct of a person or entity which is not an organ of the State 
under Article 4 but which is empowered by the law of that State to exercise elements of the 
governmental authority shall be considered an act of the State under international law”.515 
Lastly, Article 8 provides that states will be held responsible for the conduct of a person if the 
person or group of persons “is in fact acting on the instructions of, or under the direction or 
control of that State in carrying out the conduct”.516 Is it important to consider whether these 
provisions are applicable to the practice of outsourcing of military services to PMSCs by 
states.
3.6.1.1 State responsibility for violation of International Humanitarian Law by Private 
Military and Security Companies
Faite argues that the provisions discussed above can be used to hold states that hire PMSCs 
accountable for any violation international law.517 According to Faite, this will include 
instances where a party to the conflict hires private contractors to run its prison services.518 
Article 1 Common to the Geneva Conventions, provides that “the High Contracting Parties 
undertake to respect and to ensure respect for the present Convention in all 
circumstances”.519 In other words, states should take positive steps to ensure that armed 
forces or organs carry out military operations on its behalf do not violate the law. Doswald- 
Beck argues that some of the obligations that states should fulfil include “ensuring that 
PMSCs are properly trained and that their contract contains clear rules of engagement”.520
514Article 4.
515Article 5.
516Article 8.
517A Faite “Involvement of Private Contractors in Armed Conflict: Implications under International 
Humanitarian Law” International Committee o f  the Red Cross
https://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/article/other/pmc-article-310804.htm (accessed 29 February 
2015).
518Ibid. The party to the conflict that hires private contractors to conduct such actors will be liable for violations 
that take place during the arrests, interrogation and detentions of prisoners by the contractors.
519Common Article 1 to the Geneva Conventions. Article 1 common to the Geneva Conventions is now 
considered customary international law.
520L Doswald-Beck “Private Military Companies under International Humanitarian Law” 18.
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Faite further argues that if states “omit to act or do not exercise due diligence in preventing 
or punishing violations committed by private persons or entities that are operating within its 
jurisdiction and territorial control”, they can be held responsible.521
Therefore, it is important to consider whether states can be held responsible for the conduct 
of PMSCs under the Article 91 of Additional Protocol I read together with Rule 149 of 
Customary International Law Rules and Articles on Responsibility of States for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts.522 The first enquiry is whether states can be held responsible 
for conduct of PMSCs under Rule 149 (a) which deals with violations committed by state 
organs or armed forces.523 It is submitted that PMSCs are not organs of states. Furthermore, 
most PMSCs do not qualify as armed forces of the state unless they meet the requirements 
set in the Additional Protocols and the Geneva Conventions.524 Therefore, it is highly 
unlikely for states to be held responsible for the conduct of PMSCs under this provision 
since PMSCs are not an organ of the state.
The most probable provision that can be used to hold states responsible for the conduct of 
PMSCs is Rule 149 (b) which provides that “a state is responsible for violations committed 
by persons or entities empowered to exercise elements of governmental authority”.525 PMSCs 
perform a number of activities that may amount to exercise of governmental authority and 
these include fighting in the armed conflict, support services and detention of prisoners.526 
However, for a state to be held responsible under this provision, the person or entities must 
have been empowered under the state’s internal law, to exercise elements of governmental 
authority.527 This requirement creates an obstacle, which prevents states from being held 
accountable for the conduct of PMSCs. The relationship between states and PMSCs so far
521A Faite “Involvement of Private Contractors in Armed Conflict: Implications under International 
Humanitarian Law”.
522Since the provisions of Rule 149 and Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts 
are similar, they shall be discussed together.
523This provision corresponds with Article 4 of Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful 
Acts.
524See discussion in section 3.4.1 above.
525Article 149(b) of Customary International Humanitarian Law. This provision corresponds with Article 5 of 
Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts.
526See Gillard 2006 International Review o f  the Red Cross 525.
527Ibid. Article 5 of Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts provides that states 
will be held responsible only for acts empowered by the law of that State.
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have been established through contracts.528 The question therefore is whether a contract of 
service between a state and PMSCs can be regarded as internal law that authorises PMSCs to 
act on behalf of states. Gillard argues that the existence of a contract between the state and 
the company is not sufficient to bring PMSCs within the scope of this provision.529 The 
provision does not specify the manner through which the law should empower a person or 
entity to exercise government authority.530 More so, it does not specify whether such 
authority can be delegated to another person, for example in the case of sub-contracting or 
whether the internal law should specifically identify the person empowered to exercise 
government authority.531 It can be can be submitted in their current state, these provisions are 
not fully capable of holding states responsible for the conduct of PMSCs. Alternatively, it can 
be argued that this provision is not clear enough to provide guidance on how states can be 
held responsible for the conduct of PMSCs.
The last provision that can be relied upon to hold a state responsible for the conduct of 
PMSCs is Article 149(c) which states that a state will be held responsible for “violations 
committed by persons or groups acting in fact on its instructions, or under its direction or 
control”.532 In Nicaragua v United States o f America (Merits Case), it was held that for the 
United States of America to be responsible for the violations of international human rights 
and humanitarian law committed by the Contras in Nicaragua, it should have had “effective 
control over the military or paramilitary operations in the course of which the violations 
occurred”.533 However, in the Tadic case, it was held that “the extent of the requisite State 
control varies”.534 The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (hereafter 
ICTY) further stated that “the conduct of a single private individual or a group that is not 
militarily organized is attributable to the state only if specific instructions concerning that 
conduct were given”.535 On the other hand, “conduct of subordinate armed forces, militias or
528For instance, the relationship between Executive Outcomes and Angolan and Sierra was based on contracts 
not internal law. See Section 3.3 above. Furthermore, United States relationship with PMSCs during Iraq and 
Afghanistan conflicts was based on contracts.
529Gillard 2006 International Review o f  the Red Cross 532.
530Ibid.
531Ibid.
532Rule 149 (c).
533Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States 
o f  America); Merits, International Court o f Justice (ICJ), 27 June 1986 at 61.
534Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic (Appeal Judgement), IT-94-1-A, International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY), 15 July 1999 at 63.
535Ibid.
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paramilitary units is attributable to a State which has control of an overall character”.536 
Moreover, “such control would exist where a state has a role in organizing, coordinating or 
planning the military actions of the military group, in addition to financing, training and 
equipping or providing operational support to that group”.537
The question that needs to be answered is whether PMSCs can be said to be acting under 
instructions or control of the state. It is possible that a contract of service will create a form of 
control by state over PMSCs. However, events involving PMSCs so far do not suggest that 
states have control or give instructions to PMSCs. For instance, PMSCs such as Blackwater 
in Iraq ran operations parallel and sometimes detrimental to the United States and Coalition 
operations. Additionally, while the Coalition tried to win the hearts of Iraqis in the fight 
against insurgents, PMSCs in their performance of duties “went out intimidating and 
offending locals, making enemies” thus hurting counterinsurgency efforts.538 Therefore, it 
can be argued that the PMSCs were clearly not acting on instructions from the Unites States. 
Gillard further adds that “Article 8 of Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts requires that the instruction, direction or control by the state be related to the 
conduct which is said to have amounted to an internationally wrongful act”.539 The learned 
author adds that responsibility under Article 8 only arises if the state directed the company to 
commit violations of IHL.540 Therefore, the ambit of Article 8 is too narrow to ensure that 
states are held responsible for the conduct of PMSCs.
3.6.1.2 Conclusion
In conclusion, it is submitted that while it may be possible in certain instances for states to be 
held responsible for the violation of international humanitarian law by PMSCs under the 
Additional Protocol I or Customary International Law Rules and Articles on Responsibility of
536Ibid.
537Ibid.
538W Singer “Can’t Win Without ‘Em’, Can’t Go to War Without ‘Em’: Private Military Contractors and 
Counterinsurgency” Foreign Policy at Brookings Policy Paper Number 4, September 2007 
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/0927militarycontractors.pdf.
539Gillard 2006 International Review o f  the Red Cross 825.
540Ibid.
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States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, the current provisions dealing with state 
responsibility are too narrow and vague to deal with all the cases where states outsource 
military services to PMSCs. More so, the law has many loopholes which states can take 
advantage of to escape responsibility. Therefore, it is concluded that the law dealing with 
state responsibility is not clear enough to ensure that states are held responsible for the 
conduct of PMSCs. As a result, it is most likely that states will be able to escape 
responsibility for the conduct of PMSCs.
3.6.2 Individual Responsibility
Other scholars have argued that PMSC personnel can be held individually responsible for 
crimes committed during their involvement in armed conflicts.541 International law, including 
IHL provides for the prosecution of individuals who commit crimes during armed conflicts. 
Rule 157 of Customary International Humanitarian Law Rules creates universal jurisdiction 
for war crimes, also referred to as grave breaches.542 Grave breaches are defined as “crimes 
involving any of the following acts, if committed against persons or property protected by the 
Convention”.543 These include “wilful killing, torture or inhuman treatment, including 
biological experiments, wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health, 
and extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not justified by military necessity 
and carried out unlawfully and wantonly”.544 The Geneva Conventions and Additional 
Protocols require state parties to enact national legislation that prohibits and punishes grave 
breaches, either through adopting a separate law or by amending existing laws as well as well 
as to prosecute or to extradite alleged perpetrators.545
541J Williamson “Private Security Companies and Private Military Companies Under International Humanitarian 
Law” in S Gumedze Private Security in Africa: Manifestation, Challenges and Regulation (2007) Institute for 
Security Studies Monograph Series No 139 http://www.gsdrc.org/document-librarv/private-securitv-companies- 
and-private-military-companies-under-international-humanitarian-law/ (accessed 3 March 2016).
542J Henckaerts, L Doswald-Beck Customary International Humanitarian Law Volume I: Rules (2005) Rule 157 
Universal jurisdiction is also created in Article 85 of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions.
543Article 50 of Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed 
Forces in the Field of 12 August 1949 (hereafter First Geneva Conventions).
544Article 50 of the First Geneva Conventions.
545See also J Williamson “Private Security Companies and Private Military Companies under International 
Humanitarian Law” 95.
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3.6.2.1 Challenges of holding PMSC personnel individually responsible for violation of
International Humanitarian Law
The first obstacle is that there is no clear mechanism to hold individual PMSCs personnel 
accountable. As discussed under state responsibility above, whereas members of a state’s 
armed forces can be prosecuted in national courts, military tribunals and International 
Criminal Court, such avenues are not readily available for prosecuting PMSCs. This is made 
worse by the fact that a country’s justice system may be reluctant to prosecute PMSCs 
especially where the crimes were committed abroad. Furthermore, the justice system in the 
country hosting private PMSCs could have collapsed due to the intensity of the armed 
conflict to such as extent that it is unable to investigate and prosecute individuals for 
violations of law.
Another problem that may arise in relation to holding PMSCs personnel individually 
accountable for violation of the law is that states acquiring services of PMSCs may take 
active steps to ensure that PMSC personnel are not held accountable for their conduct. In 
other words, states may put in place measures that will frustrate any attempt to prosecute 
PMSCs employees. The most famous and unfortunate example is the promulgation of the 
Order 17 by the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) in 2003.546 Order 17 was promulgated 
two days before the CPA was dissolved and it granted immunity to a number of PMSCs who 
were actively involved in providing certain services in Iraq from prosecution under Iraqi 
laws. This resulted in the Iraqi justice system not being able to prosecute PMSC personnel 
individually for the violation of the law. Singer argues that PMSCs “saw themselves as above 
the law” because of the immunity the CPA gave them.547 The CPA effectively protected 
civilian contractors as very few and isolated cases were prosecuted after its promulgation. For 
instance, after a shooting incident involving Blackwater contractors that killed 20 Iraqi 
civilians in Mansour district, Baghdad, it was announced that Blackwater’s license to operate 
in Iraq was going to be cancelled and that any contractors found to have been involved in the
546Coalition Provisional Authority Order Number 17 Status of the Coalition, Foreign Liaison Missions, their 
Personnel and Contractors CPA/ORD/26 June 2003/17
http://www.usace.army.mil/Portals/2/docs/COALITION PROVISIONAL.pdf (accessed 3 March 2016).
547W Singer “Can’t Win Without ‘Em’, Can’t Go to War Without ‘Em’: Private Military Contractors and 
Counterinsurgency” Foreign Policy at Brookings Policy Paper Number 4 , September 2007 
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/0927militarycontractors.pdf.
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shooting would be prosecuted.548 However, one of the reasons why the prosecutions did not 
go on is that Blackwater was believed to be exempt from Iraq law under the Order 17.549 
Therefore, the CPA prohibited Iraqi government from holding civilian contractors 
accountable for violation of the law.
Another problem that may prevent employees of PMSCs from being held individually 
responsible is the fact that the companies hire their personnel from all over the world. For 
example, United States of America companies operating in Iraq employed personnel from 
different countries including South Africa, Fiji, Chile and Iraq itself.550 After completing their 
mission, such personnel return to their countries. Even if the United States government was 
willing to prosecute private contractors for violating the law in Iraq, only those who are 
United States of America citizens would likely be prosecuted resulting in many other 
contractors escaping prosecution.
Even if a country whose citizens committed grave breaches want to punish them, this may not 
be possible without cooperation from the company that employed the personnel, the country 
that was receiving services and the country where operations were being carried out. For 
example, thousands of South African citizens were hired by PMSCs during the Iraq war. 
South Africa has legislation that criminalise the involvement of South African citizens in 
foreign military operations.551 Although South Africa was willing to prosecute the individuals 
who took part in the Iraq conflict as contractors,552 such prosecutions were not possible 
without cooperation from United States of America. or Iraqi authorities.553 Gaston argues that 
“without coordinated efforts, the home states and client countries cannot hope to constrain the 
misconduct of businesses that operate thousands of miles away in zones of weak legal 
accountability”.554 Further, countries whose citizens get involved in foreign military
548Ibid.
549Ibid.
550Guns for Hire: Private Military Companies and their Status under International Humanitarian Law 
Professional Overseas Contractors http://www.vour-poc.com/guns-for-hire-private-militarv-companies-and- 
their-status-under-international-humanitarian-law/ (accessed 7 March 2016).
551 Regulation of Foreign Military Assistance Act 15 of 1998.
552Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN) “South Africa: Authorities Target Alleged Mercenaries” 
Feb. 4, 2004 http://www.irinnews.org/fr/node/216281 (accessed 12 August 2016).
553Gaston 2008 Harvard International Law Journal 241.
554Ibid.
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operations may not have the necessary resources to investigate violations of law in another 
country or bring witnesses for the purposes of punishing its citizens.
It can thus be submitted that as it stands, it is difficult for PMSC personnel to be prosecuted 
individually for grave breaches due to the different attitude which states have taken with 
regards to PMSCs as well as the manner in which the private security industry operates.
3.6.3 Superior/ Company Responsibility
Some scholars have argued that commanders or superiors of PMSCs can be held accountable 
for any violation of the law committed by their employees during armed conflicts.555 
Criminal responsibility of commanders for violation of IHL by their subordinates is provided 
for in Article 86(2) of Additional Protocol I which states that “the fact that a breach of the 
Conventions or of this Protocol was committed by a subordinate does not absolve his 
superiors from penal or disciplinary responsibility”.556 It further provides that in order for 
commanders to be liable, they should have had, or actually “had information which should 
have enabled them to conclude in the circumstances at the time, that a breach was being 
committed or was about to be committed”.557 Lastly, for commanders to be held responsible, 
they should have failed to take all “feasible measures within their power to prevent or repress 
the breach”.558 Commanders or superiors does not only refer to military command but also to 
civilians command and superiors. Responsibility of commanders and other superiors is also 
affirmed in Article 28 of the Statute of the International Criminal Court.559
555Jamie Williamson “Private Security Companies and Private Military Companies under International 
Humanitarian Law”.
556Article 86(2) of Additional Protocol I.
557Ibid.
558Article 86(2) of Additional Protocol I. This rule forms part of Customary International Law. Rule 153 of
Customary International Humanitarian Law Rules provides “Commanders and other superiors are criminally 
responsible for war crimes committed by their subordinates if they knew, or had reason to know, that the 
subordinates were about to commit or were committing such crimes and did not take all necessary and 
reasonable measures in their power to prevent their commission, or if such crimes had been committed, to 
punish the persons responsible”. The only difference is that under Customary International Humanitarian Law 
Rules, commanders can also be punished for failure to take steps to punish persons responsible for violations. 
559Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.
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3.6.3.1 Challenges of holding Superiors/Companies responsible for violation of
International Humanitarian Law by PMSC personnel
Applying these provisions to PMSCs, it is submitted that commanders of the armed forces of 
a party to the conflict cannot be held liable for the actions of PMSC employees unless such 
employees fall under the armed forces of a party to the conflict. Therefore, the only 
alternative will be to hold senior employees of PMSCs accountable. However, the first 
difficulty in holding PMSC commanders or superiors accountable is that unlike armed forces, 
PMSCs lack transparency on how they operate. The organisational set up of most PMSCs is 
not known to the outside world. As Schreier and Caparini argue, “the military and security 
industry’s standard policy of confidentiality precludes transparency”.560 Doswald-Beck 
concurs that the problem with PMSC command or superiors is to ascertain the identity of the 
person within the organization would be considered to be such a commander.561 Therefore, in 
the absence of information on the organisational structure of a PMSC, it is difficult to 
ascertain the identity of commanders or superiors. Consequently, this makes it difficult to 
hold anyone accountable if the PMSC concerned does not reveal its command structure.562
To exacerbate the problem discussed above, the owners of the company who may be known 
to the outside world may not be in a position to control the day-to-day activities of PMSC 
employees such that their control over the company employees may not be sufficient to 
impose liability for violation of international law on them. Gillard argues that the range of 
superiors covered under the command responsibility may be very limited.563 This is because 
responsibility is “limited to direct superiors who have a personal responsibility for the 
subordinates within their control”.564 Moreover, the absence of monitoring mechanism in 
most situations where PMSCs are operating or the ineffectiveness thereof makes it difficult to 
hold commanders or superiors responsible for the conduct of their subordinates since some of 
the incidents involving violations of international law may be covered up by the PMSCs
560F Schreier, M Caparini “Privatising Security: Law, Practice and Governance of Private Military and Security 
Companies” 67.
561L Doswald-Beck “Private Military Companies under International Humanitarian Law”. 23.
562This problem could be resolved if  international humanitarian law could recognise the practice of outsourcing. 
Such a recognition could encourage transparency. This will be dealt with in the concluding chapter.
563Gillard 2006 International Review o f  the Red Cross 545.
564Ibid.
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themselves. One can conclude that although it is not entirely impossible to hold PMSC 
commanders or superiors responsible for the conduct of their subordinates, current practice 
demonstrates that the current international legal regime is not adapted enough to deal with 
these issues. Therefore, it is very difficult to hold PMSCs superiors accountable.
Lastly, the manner in which PMSCs operate also makes it difficult to hold the company 
responsible for the conduct or violation of the law by its personnel. Schreier and Caparini 
argue that PMSCs, like transnational companies “do not confine their activities within the 
borders of any single state and if a nation puts too much pressure on a firm, it can simply 
‘shop around’ for alternative , more permissive environment in which to base itself’.565 For 
example, when South Africa came up with mechanisms to regulate the conduct of PMSCs in 
its territory, Executive Outcomes migrated out of the country to escape oversight from the 
government.566 This means that national laws alone may not be able to adequately regulate 
the activities of PMSCs. More so, states have had different approaches and attitudes to 
PMSCs. For instance, while South African has attempted to ban them, other countries such as 
Britain and United States of America have moved from prohibition to regulation.567 
Consequently, PMSCs may easily migrate to countries where the legal regime is more 
accommodative thus escaping liability. Therefore, it can be concluded that the nature of 
PMSCs, together with the contrasting approaches taken by states in relation to dealing with 
PMSCs makes it difficult to hold companies responsible for its employees’ actions.
3.6.3.2 Conclusion
From the discussion above, it can be concluded that the law regarding individual state and 
superior responsibility for violation of the law during armed conflicts is not is not well suited 
to apply to PMSC activities during armed conflicts. This is also made difficult by the unclear 
relationship between states and PMSCs. Furthermore, the manner in which PMSCs operate 
makes it difficult to hold commanders of the companies or companies themselves responsible
565F Schreier, M Caparini “Privatising Security: Law, Practice and Governance of Private Military and Security 
Companies” Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control o f  Armed Forces (DCAF) Occasional Paper 66.
566P W Singer Corporate Warriors: The Privatized Military Industry (2008) 118.
567Gaston 2008 Harvard International Law Journal 241.
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for the conduct of their employees. It can therefore be concluded that while it is not entirely 
impossible to rely on states, individual or company responsibilities to deal with violation of 
the law by PMSCs, these mechanisms are only applicable in few instances and do not cover 
all PMSCs. Thus, there is need for a well-adapted legal regime to deal with the practice of 
outsourcing of military services by states.
3.7 Recent developments of Law Regarding Private Military and Security Companies
In an attempt to deal with the loopholes in IHL regarding the status, rights and 
responsibilities of PMSCs in armed conflicts, various steps have been taken at company level 
and state level to come up with the rules that will ensure proper regulation of PMSC activities 
during armed conflicts. These attempts have been made in response to the bad publicity 
which PMSCs have received as a result of the uncontrollable behaviour of their personnel in 
Iraq, particularly the wilful and wanton killing of civilians and the resultant failure by the 
states, notably the United States of America to prevent or punish violations of the law. These 
efforts have culminated in the adoption two non-binding documents namely the Montreux 
Document568 and the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers 
(hereafter ICoC).569 Although these documents are not legally binding, it is important to 
examine the extent to which they resolve the problems regarding the status of PMSCs under 
the principle of distinction as well as state responsibilities for hiring PMSCs.
3.7.1 Montreux Document
The Montreux Document (hereafter the Document) is a product of the efforts by the ICRC, 
Government of Switzerland and other countries who came together to discuss legal means of 
regulating activities of PMSCs.570 It is directed at states and it seeks to ensure increased
568The Montreux document - on pertinent international legal obligations and good practices for States related to 
operations of private military and security companies during armed conflict Montreux, 17 September 2008 
https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/icrc 002 0996.pdf (accessed 27 February 2016) (hereafter Montreux 
Document)
569International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers, August 2013 http://www.geneva- 
academy.ch/docs/publications/briefing4 web final.pdf (accessed 27 February 2016).
570Montreux Document.
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control over PMSCs as well as to ensure that there is accountability for PMSC activities.571 
The Document defines PMSCs as “private business entities that provide military and/or 
security services, irrespective of how they describe themselves”.572 According to the 
Document, military and security services include “ the guarding and protection of persons 
and objects, such as convoys, buildings and other places, maintenance and operation of 
weapon systems; prisoner detention; and advice to or training of local forces and security 
personnel”.573 The Document claims that it should not be construed as endorsing the use of 
PMSCs but seeks to recall legal obligations and to recommend good practice if the decision 
has been made to contract PMSCs.574
The Montreux Document consists of two parts. Part one deals with international legal 
obligations relating to PMSCs.575 It seeks to acknowledge and affirm existing rules of 
international law, including IHL that regulates the relationship between states and PMSCs. 
It also imposes various obligations on contracting states,576 territorial states577 and home 
states.578 The obligations in Part one are a restatement of the existing binding rules on states. 
Therefore, it does not create any new obligations. Since the obligations are almost similar for 
the three groups of states, they shall be discussed at the same time for brevity.
States are required to retain their obligations under international law, even if they contract 
PMSCs to perform certain activities.579 This means that states are prohibited from using 
PMSCs to escape liability under IHL. States are also not required to contract PMSCs to carry 
out activities that are explicitly assigned to state agents or authority, for example “exercising
571See generally Percy 2012 International Review o f  the Red Cross 941.
572See paragraph 9 (a) of Preface of the Montreux Document 9.
573Ibid.
574Montreux Document 9.
575See generally Montreux Document.
576See Paragraph 9 (c) of Preface of the Montreux Document. Contracting states are defined as states “that 
directly contract for the services of PMSCs, including, as appropriate, where such PMSC subcontracts with 
another PMSC”.
577Paragraph 9 (d) of Preface of the Montreux Document. Territorial States are defined as “states on whose 
territory PMSCs operate”.
578Paragraph 9 (e) of the Preface of the Montreux Document. Home states are “states of nationality o f PMSC 
that is where a PMSC is registered or incorporated; if  the state where the PMSC is incorporated is not the one 
where it has its principal place of management, then the state where the PMSC has its principal place of 
management in the home state”.
579Paragraph 1 of Part One, Montreux Document 11.
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the power of the responsible officer over prisoner-of-war camps or places of internment of 
civilians in accordance with the Geneva Conventions”.580 Other states obligations include 
ensuring that the PMSCs they contract respect IHL. These include the obligation to “ensure 
that contracted PMSCs are aware of their obligations and trained accordingly, not to 
encourage or assist in, any violations of IHL by personnel of PMSCs and to take measures to 
suppress violations of IHL committed by PMSC personnel”.581 These measures may include 
military regulations, administrative orders and other regulatory measures, administrative, 
disciplinary or judicial sanctions.582
More so, states are required to enact legislation necessary to provide “effective penal 
sanctions for persons committing, or ordering to be committed, grave breaches of the Geneva 
Conventions”.583 The Document also requires states to prosecute, extradite or surrender 
persons suspected of having committed other crimes such as torture, or hostage taking.584 
Contracting states will be responsible for violations of international law by PMSCs or their 
personnel.585 Finally, states are required to “provide reparations for violations of IHL and 
human rights law caused by wrongful conduct of the personnel of PMSCs when such conduct 
is attributable to the state in accordance with international law”.586
Part Two of the Montreux Document deals with the good practices that signatory states must 
observe when hiring the services of PMSCs.587 It requires states to consider a number of 
factors when determining which services to contract out. Firstly, states must consider whether 
a particular service could cause PMSC personnel to become involved in direct participation 
in hostilities”.588 States are also required to make an assessment about the “capacity of 
PMSCs to carry out its activities in conformity with international law, taking into 
consideration the inherent risk associated with the services to be performed”.589 In doing so,
580Montreux Document 11.
581Ibid.
582Montreux Document 11.
583Ibid.
584Montreux Document 12.
585Ibid.
586Ibid.
587These shall be discussed briefly below.
588Montreux Document 16. This is one of the main issue that will be dealt with later in this section.
589Montreux Document 17.
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states must “acquire information relating to the principal services the PMSC has provided in 
the past, obtain reference from clients for whom the PMSC has previously provided similar 
services, acquiring information relating to the PMSC and its superior personnel and its 
relationship with subcontractors, subsidiary corporations and ventures”.590 States are also 
required to ensure transparency and supervision in the selection and contracting of PMSCs.591
States are required to take into consideration good practice that would ensure the monitoring 
compliance and accountability of PMSCs contracted.592 Some of these good practices include 
providing criminal jurisdiction in their national legislation over crimes under international 
law and their national law committed by PMSCs and their personnel.593 In addition, states 
must consider establishing corporate criminal responsibility for crimes committed by the 
PMSC, criminal jurisdiction over serious crimes committed by PMSC personnel abroad.594 
Furthermore, states can adopt practices which provide for “non-criminal accountability 
mechanisms for improper or unlawful conduct of PMSCs and their personnel and these 
include contractual sanctions such as immediate or graduated termination of the contract, 
financial penalties, removal from consideration for future contracts and removal of individual 
wrongdoers from the performance of the contract among others”.595 Contracting states, 
Territorial States and Home States are also required to “cooperate with each other in matters 
of common concern regarding PMSCs”.596
3.7.1.1 Weaknesses of the Montreux Document
The question that needs to be answered is whether the Montreux Document can be relied 
upon to provide answers regarding the status, rights and responsibility of PMSC personnel 
under the principle of distinction. The Montreux Document has been hailed as a step in the
590Ibid.
591Motreux Document 17. Such mechanisms include “public disclosure of general information about specific 
contracts, publication of an overview o f incident reports of complaints, and sanctions taken where misconduct 
has been proven” and “oversight by parliamentary bodies, including through annual reports or notification of 
particular contracts to such bodies”.
592Montreux Document 19.
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right direction in ensuring that PMSCs can be held accountable, especially after the serious 
incidents of violation of law in Iraq. Percy argues that the neutral approach taken by states of 
not endorsing or condemning PMSCs and “treating them as regular actors on the battlefield” 
facilitated negotiation and agreement.597 Although the Document does not invent new norms, 
it has been argued that it reaffirms the existence of state obligations without creating new 
obligations for states that hire PMSCs.598 Percy also argues that the approach taken by the 
negotiators is a low-cost solution for states.599 It can also be argued that Part Two of the 
document can provide some guidelines for states that want to employ the services of PMSCs 
to prevent violation of IHL as well as holding PMSC personnel who violate the law 
accountable.
3.7.1.2 The Montreux Document does not create new legal regime to clarify the status of 
PMSCs
As already stated above, the Montreux Document does not create any new rules but instead 
seeks to clarify the application of existing rules to the practice of outsourcing of military 
services to PMSCs by states. Therefore, it is submitted that challenges that arise as from the 
practice of outsourcing of military functions to PMSCs by states are not resolved by the 
Document. The Document does not bring clarity on the status of PMSC personnel under the 
principle of distinction. For instance, the document regards PMSCs employees as civilians. It 
states that personnel of PMSCs “are protected as civilians under international humanitarian 
law”.600 Therefore, in terms of the Document, PMSCs are protected persons unless they take 
direct participation in hostilities. The only exception to this position is when PMSC personnel 
are incorporated into the regular armed forces of a State, are members of organized armed 
forces, groups or units under a command responsible to the State, or otherwise lose their 
protection as determined by international humanitarian law.601 Therefore, it can be submitted 
that the Montreux Document does not introduce anything new to the principle of distinction
597Percy 2012 International Review o f  the Red Cross 953-954.
598Percy 2012 International Review o f  the Red Cross 953-954.
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that is not dealt with in the Geneva Conventions and the Additional Protocols. For the 
purpose of clarity, some of the challenges shall be noted below.
The Montreux Document does not make a distinction between ordinary civilians and PMSC 
personnel. As already argued above, it is undesirable to equate all PMSCs employees with 
ordinary civilians since this endangers the protection that the principle of distinction seeks to 
offer for ordinary civilians.602 Therefore, it is submitted that the Montreux Document’s 
treatment of PMSCs as civilians endangers the protection of ordinary civilians as has been 
argued above.
3.7.1.3 The Montreux Document does not address the challenges raised by PMSC 
personnel’s direct participation in hostilities
The Montreux Document appears to circumvent the issues of PMSCs’ involvement in combat 
operations or the possibility thereof. The Document states that military and security services 
include “armed guarding and protection of persons and objects, maintenance and operation of 
weapons systems among other things”.603 Although the list is not exhaustive, the Document 
does not deal with activities that amount to combat functions or fall in the grey area. The only 
instance the Document appears to admit the possibility of PMSCs taking part in combat 
duties is when it deals with PMSCs incorporated in to the armed forces in which case they are 
combatants and when PMSCs personnel take direct part in hostilities in which case the 
consequences that apply to ordinary civilians who take direct participation in hostilities will 
apply. Therefore, despite the fact that some PMSCs can be hired to perform functions that 
exclusively amount to combat activities, the Document requires the concept of direct 
participation in hostilities to be applied in relation to these persons. As discussed above, the 
treatment of PMSCs who are hired to take direct participation in hostilities as civilians who 
can only be attacked when they are taking direct participation in hostilities puts a party 
fighting against an army of civilian contractors at a disadvantage since they become limited
602See discussion in section 3.5 at 37 above.
603Montreux Document 9.
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in their operations. This may in turn breed disrespect for the law, including the principle of 
distinction itself.
The Document does not take into account the fact that the definition of direct participation 
under Additional Protocol I does not make a distinction between defensive and offensive 
operations as both acts constitute direct participation in hostilities.604 Therefore, the 
Document does not address the problem of civilian contractors who may lose their protection 
as civilians for exercising self-defence during an armed conflict.605 More so, the Document 
does not address the challenges that may be raised by ‘revolving door’ when PMSCs are 
treated as civilians.606
In light of this discussion, it can be concluded that the Montreux Document is not capable of 
addressing the problems regarding outsourcing of military services to PMSCs. In other 
words, the document does not bring clarity regarding the status of PMSCs under the principle 
of distinction. More so, it does not invent any new rules that can be used to hold states and 
PMSCs accountable for the violation of the law during armed conflicts.
3.7.2 The International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service
After the adoption of the Montreux Document, a group of companies calling themselves 
Private Security Companies came together to draft the International Code of Conduct for 
Private Security Service (hereafter ICoC) which can be used by companies when they are 
hired by states to offer services.607 The drafters acknowledge that private contractors’ 
activities have “potentially positive and negative consequences for clients, the local 
population in the area of operation and the enjoyment of human rights and the rule of law”.608 
ICoC signatories endorse the Montreux Document and commit themselves to responsible 
provision of security services “so as to support the rule of law, respect the human rights of all
604See section 3.5 at 33 above.
605Ibid.
606Ibid.
607The International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service (signed in 2010).
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persons, and protect the interests of their clients”.609 The signatory companies also 
acknowledge their “responsibility to respect the human rights of, and fulfil humanitarian 
responsibilities toward, all those affected by their business activities”.610
The Code defines PSCs and Private Security Providers as “any company whose business 
activities include the provision of security services either on its own behalf or on behalf of 
another, irrespective of how such Company describes itself’.611 The signatory companies 
seek to develop an independent governance and oversight mechanism that will monitor the 
implementation of the ICoC and company activities in the field.612 The ICoC also claims to 
complement existing “control exercised by competent authorities and does not limit or alter 
applicable international law or relevant national law”.613 Article 14 provides that the Code 
does not create legal obligations or legal liabilities on the signatory companies beyond those 
which already exist under national or international law”.614 Other undertakings made by 
signatory companies include compliance with applicable law, which may include IHL as 
imposed by applicable national or international law.615 Other undertakings made by signatory 
companies include to “take all reasonable steps to avoid the use of force, and if force is to be 
used, it must be used in a manner consistent with applicable law”.616 Article 31 requires 
personnel of signatory companies not to use firearms against persons except in self-defence 
or defence of others against the imminent threat of death or serious injury or to prevent the 
perpetration of a particularly serious crime involving grave threat to life”. 617
Companies also make commitments concerning the management and governance of the 
companies. Article 45 provides that companies will exercise due diligence in the selection of 
its personnel.618 In Article 47, companies undertake to “assess and ensure that personnel are 
able to perform their duties in accordance with the ICoC while in Article 55, companies
609Ibid.
610ICoC 18
611ICoC 5
612ICoC 21.
613Article 14.
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615Article 21.
616Article 30.
617Article 31.
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undertake to ensure that personnel receive initial and recurrent professional training and are 
fully aware of the Code and all applicable international and national laws”.619 Companies also 
under take to “prepare incident reports documenting any incidents involving its personnel that 
involve the use of any weapon, under any circumstances or any escalation of force, damage 
to equipment or injury to persons” among other incidents.620
3.7.2.1 Weakness of the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service
The ICoC can be said to be a development towards the right direction. Percy argues that the 
Code it is “a significant accomplishment given the very slow pace of regulation and the 
problems of creating international regulation”.621 Percy further argues that the ICoC takes a 
tough stance on human rights questions and this demonstrates their willingness to obey the 
law.622
However, the issue is whether the ICoC provides answer regarding the status of PMSCs 
under the principle of distinction as well as the challenges that arise because of PMSCs’ 
participation in armed conflicts. The terminology used by drafters in the ICoC suggests that 
the drafters avoided reference to private companies that are employed to take direct part in 
armed conflicts. Whereas the Montreux Document used the term PMSC, the Code only refers 
to Private Security Companies and Private Service Providers. Through using this 
terminology, the ICoC suggests that it does not regulate private military companies. 
Furthermore, the nature of services providers covered by the ICoC as well as the obligations 
imposed on states appear to suggests that it deliberately avoided any reference to PMSCs or 
does not deal with PMSCs which get involved in combat activities. For example, the ICoC 
stance on the use of firearms appears to suggest that it only applies to companies that only 
use firearms in exceptional circumstances. The ICoC requires personnel to avoid the use of 
force except in self-defence.623 However, it has been demonstrated in this chapter that 
PMSCs are involved in many operations that involve the use of force, not only in self-defence 
but also in offensive operations. Thus, it can be concluded that the ICoC cannot be relied on
619Ibid.
620Article 63.
621Percy 2012 International Review o f  the Red Cross 954.
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to regulate the conduct of civilian contractors who provide military force. More so, the ICoC 
does not regulate the involvement of security companies in armed conflicts. Therefore, it 
does not provide guidance on the status of PMSCs.
Some scholars have raised scepticism over the effectiveness of the self-regulation system. 
Article 9 of the ICoC contemplates an independent governance and oversight mechanism. 
The concern is whether there will be proper regulation given that there will be no state 
involvement and companies will regulate themselves.624 Williams argues, “No other 
industries are allowed to regulate themselves entirely and the incentive structures run against 
a trade group acting as a strict enforcement and punishment agent for members of its own 
industry”.625 Percy notes that while the “industry currently has an interest in strong 
regulation, it may not always do so, and it may respond differently to new developments than 
would states or formal regulators”.626 It therefore remains to be seen whether self-regulation 
will work for the private security industry and if so, for how long. However, it can be 
submitted that the ICoC cannot be relied on to resolve the issues of status and accountability 
of PMSCs during armed conflicts.
3.8 Conclusion
This Chapter sought to demonstrate the challenges that the principle of distinction is facing as 
a result of changes that have taken place in modern armed conflicts. The key question was 
whether PMSCs’ involvement in armed conflicts fits in within the framework of the principle 
of distinction between combatants and civilians. It was argued that a bulk of PMSCs are 
contracted to perform functions that are at the heart of armed conflicts, which make their 
activities subject to IHL.
624Article 9 of ICoC
625O F Williams “The UN Global Compact: The Challenge and the Promise” in (2004)14 Business Ethics 
Quarterly 755.
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In light of the arguments made throughout this Chapter, it can be concluded that while some 
PMSCs qualify as combatants as defined under Additional Protocol I and the Geneva 
Conventions, the bulk of PMSCs do not meet the combatant status for various reasons. 
Furthermore, treating PMSCs as civilians is not a viable option as it breeds contempt of IHL 
by states and threatens the protective mandate IHL has on civilians. The gaps that are 
currently present in the law allow states to rely on PMSC services in armed conflicts without 
incurring any responsibilities that come with such participation in armed conflicts. This 
therefore creates impunity for PMSCs, companies and states. More so, the option of dealing 
with PMSCs activities under individual, superior and state responsibility does not seem to be 
available due to the complex relationship between PMSCs and states, the complicated 
manner in which PMSCs operate and the loopholes in the provisions which deal with 
individual, superior and state responsibilities. Furthermore, recent attempts that have been 
made to deal with PMSCs activities, namely Montreux Document and the ICoC do no resolve 
the challenges posed by the involvement of PMSCs in armed conflicts, as they do not invent 
any new rules to deal with challenges created by PMSCs. Therefore, it can be concluded that 
there is need for the adaptation of the principle of distinction for it to be applicable to the 
practice of outsourcing of military services to PMSCs during armed conflicts.
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Chapter 4: Other Developments That Challenge the Application of the Principle of 
Distinction in Modern Armed Conflicts
4.1 Introduction
Chapter 3 dealt with the challenges of applying the principle of distinction to PMSCs in 
armed conflicts. It has been demonstrated that the criteria of distinguishing combatants from 
civilians does not provide answers regarding the status of PMSCs under IHL. It was 
concluded that there is need for the adaptation of the principle of distinction in order to 
ensure that PMSC personnel’s status under the principle of distinction becomes clear. 
However, it is useful to note that PMSCs are not the only ones that challenge the application 
of the principle of distinction to modern armed conflicts. There are a number of other 
developments that have also resulted in the application of the principle of distinction being 
questioned. This chapter will discuss some of these developments. It should also be re­
emphasised that the developments that challenge the principle of distinction are so many and 
range from the involvement of certain persons or category of persons in armed conflicts; the 
weapons used and the methods of warfare used during armed conflicts. Not all the challenges 
envisaged here can be discussed in this study. However, I have singled out the use of 
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (hereafter UAV), also referred to as drones627 as well as the 
emergence of Computer Network Attacks, commonly referred to as cyber-warfare for 
discussion in this chapter, in order to illustrate the anomaly mentioned above.
Drones and cyber warfare have been selected for discussion because they offer a unique 
perspective to the discussion of the challenges the principle of distinction is facing. As 
pointed out by Crawford, “technology has shaped and changed the ways in which armed 
conflicts have been fought for decades, if not centuries”.628 At the heart of these technological 
developments are drone and cyber warfare. Firstly, drone and cyber warfares are relatively a 
new phenomenon that is not specifically dealt with under IHL. The rules regulating these 
methods of warfare are still developing and it becomes important to explore the kind of
627 The term ‘drones’ has been widely used in the media and scholarly articles. Therefore, the term drones shall 
be used more often in this study.
628E Crawford Identifying the Enemy: Civilian Participation in Armed Conflict (2015) 126.
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challenges these developments present for the principle of distinction. Furthermore, unlike 
the problems presented by PMSCs, which are only centred on whether PMSC personnel 
qualify as combatants, the challenges posed by drone and cyber warfare go beyond the status 
of the persons in charge of the operations. These methods of warfare are classified as remote 
warfare.629 Although they are operated by humans, they are not technically human since they 
are partly self-executing machines. Furthermore, unlike in conventional warfare where armed 
conflict takes place in a confined battlefield, drone and cyber war weapons are operated away 
from the geographical location where the armed conflict it taking place. As a result, the 
battlefield is not confined to a specific area. These factors present unique challenges to IHL 
when it comes to compliance with the principle of distinction as shall be elaborated. Since the 
laws of armed conflict, including the principle of distinction were drafted with traditional, 
kinetic warfare in mind, it is important to examine how drone and cyber warfare 
developments comply with these laws.
Secondly, a discussion of drone and cyber warfare allows me to deal with the second part of 
the principle of distinction, which is the requirement for distinction between civilian objects 
and military objectives. As started earlier in this study, armed conflicts are increasingly 
becoming civilianised such that is has become difficult to draw a line between what is 
civilian and what is military. Therefore, a discussion of drone and cyber warfare offers an 
opportunity to deal with the challenges modern armed conflict create for the principle of 
distinction between civilian objects and military objectives.
This chapter is divided into two sections. The first section will deal with drone warfare while 
the second section will deal with cyber warfare. This section will begin by discussing the rise 
of drones and their use in armed conflicts. It should be noted from the onset that this 
discussion is not concerned with the general arguments on the legality of use of drones during 
armed conflicts. The discussion is limited to the challenges of applying the principle of 
distinction to drone warfare. Moreover, this discussion is concerned with the use of drones in 
situations of armed conflicts. Thus, the discussion will not deal with the use of drones for 
targeted killings, spying or other civilian purposes outside armed conflict situations. The key
629Ibid.
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question is whether the manner in which drones are being used in armed conflicts comply 
with the principle of distinction.
4.2 Unmanned Aerial Vehicle/Drones and the Principle of Distinction
4.2.1 Origins of Drone Warfare
Drones appeared in the early 1990s when the United States of America used them for 
reconnaissance purposes in the Bosnia and Kosovo conflicts.630 Since then, other countries 
such as China, Russia, Italy, Turkey and France have developed drones whose use is 
currently limited to surveillance purposes.631 However, at the turn of the millennium, 
especially after the September 11 2001 attacks on United States of America, there were series 
of changes to the US drone program, which introduced the concept of drone warfare. Drones 
were now armed with laser guided missiles and could be used for combat operations, 
particularly targeting militants linked to al Qaeda and the Taliban.632 In 2002, combat drones 
began to carry AGM-114 Hellfire missiles.633 Pursuant to the Authorization for Use of 
Military Force (AUMF) passed by the Congress, the then President of the United States of 
America, George W Bush authorised the use of drones against al-Qaeda leaders.634 President 
Bush also signed a “secret Memorandum of Notification” which gave the Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA) the right to hunt down and kill members of al-Qaeda in anticipatory self- 
defence.635
630D Brunstetter and M Braun, “The Implications of Drones on the Just War Tradition” (2011) 25 Ethics & 
International Affairs 337 at 340.
631Ibid.
632Ibid.
633S Wuschka, “The Use of Combat Drones in Current Conflicts- A Legal Issue of a Political Problem” (2011) 3
Goettingen Journal o f  International Law 891 at 892.
634Brunstetter and Braun 2011 Ethics & International Affairs 340.
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4.2.2 Reasons for reliance on drones as weapons
A number of reasons have been put forward to explain the USA’s resort to use of drones. 
Brunstetter and Braun argue that the number of troops for the USA has waned, resulting in an 
increase in the number of drones being used for combat operations.636 Instead of committing 
personnel to fight the global war on terror, the USA has deployed drones to carry out strikes 
on persons perceived as enemies of the USA. Kreps and Kaags also argue that the United 
States resorted to the use of drones since they offer the advantage of penetrating more 
adversarial environments than piloted aircraft.637 This is because drones are unmanned and 
remote controlled, thus avoiding putting any personnel in danger. Therefore, it can be argued 
that one of the reasons why the United States of America resorted to the use of drones as 
weapons is to protect the lives of members of the armed forces as well as to cover up for the 
reduction in the size of their armed forces.
Lewis and Crawford argue that the development of drones was promoted by the principle of 
distinction.638 The authors argue that while the principle of distinction provides clear rights 
and obligations for combatants during armed conflicts, the non-state actors who take direct 
part in hostilities such as Taliban and al-Qaeda militants deliberately avoid complying with 
the principle of distinction.639 For example, while the principle of distinction requires parties 
to the conflict to distinguish themselves from civilians, militants deliberately disguise 
themselves as civilians in order to avoid easy identification and targeting. Furthermore, these 
non-state actors are known for using the civilian population as shields from attacks as well as 
keeping their weapons in civilian environment. While the principle of distinction prohibits 
such acts, Lewis and Crawford argue that “the obligations of irregular armed forces have not 
been interpreted nearly as rigorously as those that apply to state militaries”.640 For example, 
the authors argue that “determinations of whether irregular armed groups improperly
636Brunstetter and Braun 2011 Ethics & International Affairs 341.
637S Kreps, J Kaag “The Use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles in Contemporary Conflict: A Legal and Ethical 
Analysis” (2012) Northeastern Political Science Association
http://s3.amazonaws.com/academia.edu.documents/15484619/Polity.pdf?AWSAccessKeyId=AKIAJ56TQJRT 
W SMTNPEA&Expires=1471363806&Signature=9pcwZafSJ9GymmA7kTk7PFpQ%2Bn8%3D&response - 
content-disposition=inline%3B%20filename%3DEthics of Drones.pdf (accessed 27 March 2016).
638See Lewis and Crawford 2012-2013 Georgetown Journal o f  International Law 1127.
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intermingled themselves with the civilian population have mainly been centred on whether 
the irregular armed groups subjectively had an intention for the civilian population to act as a 
shield, not on their proximity to the civilian population when they initiated offensive 
operations”.641 The learned authors further argue that even though the use of civilians as 
shields by irregular armed groups is unlawful and punishable under IHL,642 this produces 
effective results since the unlawful conduct of irregular armed groups “does not release the 
attacker from his obligations with respect to the civilian population”.643 In other words, if 
irregular armed groups blend with civilians in order to prevent regular armed forces from 
attacking them, the regular armed forces are effectively barred from proceeding with the 
attack. More so, the regular armed forces cannot justify an attack which causes 
disproportionate civilian casualties if they knew that an irregular armed group they were 
attacking was using civilians as shields.644 Therefore, the widespread use of human shields by 
irregular armed groups has the effect of hindering military operations by regular armed 
forces. This practice swings the pendulum in favour of irregular armed forces since they can 
violate the law by using human shields in order to get protection from the rule that prohibits 
indiscriminate attacks.
States fighting asymmetric conflicts have reacted to the restrictions imposed by use of human 
shields in two ways.645 While some states have ignored the requirement of not attacking 
irregular armed groups that have blended with civilians (thus ignoring the principle of 
distinction), others have attempted to comply with the IHL restrictions by changing the 
weaponry and tactics used in armed conflicts.646 Use of drones is one of the measures.647 
According to the authors, drones offer two advantages to their users, particularly in relation to 
irregular armed forces who use human shields.648 Firstly, drones provide robust intelligence 
by flying above the enemy for long hours while “accurately identifying the individual targets
641Ibid.
642Use of human shields is prohibited under Article 51(7) of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions 
which provides that “the Parties to the conflict shall not direct the movement of the civilian population or 
individual civilians in order to attempt to shield military objectives from attacks or to shield military 
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643Lewis and Crawford 2012-2013 Georgetown Journal o f  International Law 1151.
644Ibid.
645Lewis and Crawford 2012-2013 Georgetown Journal o f  International Law 1152.
646Ibid.
647Ibid.
648Ibid.
115
as well as establishing their patterns of movement”.649 This would provide commanders with 
more information in determining whether to attack or not. Further, drones are equipped with 
missiles which provide armed forces with small weapons that can be used in a way that 
would target individuals without causing too many civilian casualties as compared to 
conventional weapons.650 Therefore, in terms of this theory, the development of drone 
weapons was encouraged by the principle of distinction’s failure to address the challenges 
raised by irregular armed groups in armed conflicts.
It is plausible that the above reasons could have led to the rise of drone warfare. The 
conduction of war using drones reduces the number of personnel that can be deployed by a 
party to the conflict as well as save the lives of personnel who could be deployed in hostile 
environment during armed conflicts. More so, with the increase in asymmetrical wars where 
irregular armed forces tend to violate the principle of distinction by conducting war in 
civilian environment or blending with the civilian population, it may be true that drones offer 
a more precise weapon that minimises the number of civilian casualties. Whatever the 
reasons behind the rise of drone warfare is, this method of warfare should comply with IHL, 
particularly the principle of distinction. While states have the right to introduce new weapons 
and means of warfare, this needs to be done within the bounds of IHL. Therefore, the 
question which this chapter will attempt to answer is whether drone warfare is capable of 
complying with the principle of distinction.
4.2.3 Expansion of the Drone Program
As the USA global war on terror expanded to countries such as Afghanistan and Iraq, reliance 
on the use of drones drastically increased. For example, Brunstetter and Braun argues that 
USA fleet of drones increased from 167 in 2001 to more than 5 500 in 2009.651 Additionally, 
while 33 drone strikes were reported in 2008 during President Bush’s administration, 118 
drone strikes were recorded in 2010 under President Obama’s administration and this
649Lewis and Crawford 2012-2013 Georgetown Journal o f  International Law 1153-1154.
650Ibid.
651Brunstetter and Braun 2011 Ethics & International Affairs 341.
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demonstrates an escalation in the use of drones in combat operations.652 The USA runs two 
parallel drone programs. One program is run by the United States Air Force under the 
Department of Defence while the other one is run by the CIA.653 Mayer points out that the 
military drone program is publicly acknowledged and operates in recognised war zones 
where it targets enemies of the USA troops while the CIA run program is aimed at terror 
suspects around the world, including in countries where USA troops are not based.654 The 
CIA run drone program has been the most popular and the one that has resulted in questions 
being raised regarding the drones’ compliance with the principle of distinction. It is therefore 
important to examine how the development and expansion of the drone as a weapon interact 
with the principle of distinction. Although several countries have developed drone 
technology, only the USA, Britain and Israel have armed drones that have been used for 
combat operations.655 However, this discussion shall mainly refer to the USA drone program 
as it is the one that has raised major concerns under IHL.
4.2.4 The United States Drone Program: An overview
As pointed out above, the United States of American runs two parallel drone programs. The 
U.S Air Force under the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) runs the Department of 
Defence drone program. 656 Drone operations have been targeting al-Qaeda and Taliban 
militants in several countries. The second drone program is run by the CIA. Although The 
United States government has been reluctant to acknowledge the existence of the program, it 
is now common knowledge that it exists. For example, former Secretary for Defence Donald 
Rumsfeld once stated that the “CIA played a role in armed drone attacks in Afghanistan”.657 
Leon Panetta, the former Director of CIA once stated that drones were “the only game in
652Ibid.
653J Mayer “The predator War: What are the risks of the CIA’S Covert Drone Program? The New Yorker
http://.newvorker.com/reporting.2009/10/26.091026fafactmaver Oct 26, 2009 (accessed 28 March 2016). See 
also M Sterio “The United States’ use of Drones in the War on Terror: The (Il) legality of Targeted Killings 
under International Law” (2012) 45 (1) Case Western Reserve Journal o f  International Law 198.
654J Mayer “The predator War: What are the risks of the CIA’S Covert Drone Program? The New Yorker 
http://.newvorker.com/reporting.2009/10/26.091026fafactmaver Oct 26, 2009 (accessed 28 March 2016). 
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town”, thus highlighting the importance as well as the involvement of the CIA in the drone 
activities.658 According to Burt and Wagner, the CIA authority derived from Title 50 of the 
United States Code allows it to “conduct covert international operations”.659 Covert means 
activities designed to “influence political, economic, or military conditions abroad, where it is 
intended that the role of the United States Government will not be apparent or acknowledged 
publicly”.660 The power to conduct such covert operations is derived from the Agency’s 
“Fifth Function” which permits the CIA to “perform such other functions and duties related 
to intelligence affecting the national security as the President or the Director of National 
Intelligence may direct”.661 Chesney argues that the phrase “other functions and duties” 
constitutes the legal basis upon which the CIA has used lethal force.662
The CIA has been conducting covert operations in armed conflicts for some time. For 
example, in the 1990s, the CIA was involved alongside the military in failed attacks directed 
at Osama bin Laden after the attacks on U.S embassies in Kenya and Tanzania.663 Therefore, 
their involvement in military-like operations is not a new phenomenon. According to Burt 
and Wagner, these operations were carried out only in self-defence. However, the USA’s 
position changed after it was attacked by terrorists on 11 September 2001. As mentioned 
above, the AUMF expanded the role of CIA in armed conflicts. The AUMF authorised the 
US President to “use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, 
or persons he determines planned, authorised, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that 
occurred on September 11, 2001, or harboured such organisations or persons, in order to 
prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the USA by such nations, 
organisations or persons”.664 According to Burt and Wagner, AUMF constitutes legal 
authorisation for CIA operations in the fight against al Qaeda”.665 The question that arises is 
whether the US drone programs comply with the principle of distinction. Since the principle
658Director's Remarks at the Pacific Council on International Policy 2009 https://www.cia.gov/news- 
information/speeches-testimony/directors-remarks-at-pacific-council.html (accessed 30 March 2016).
659Burt and Wagner 2012 Yale Journal o f  International Law Online 5.
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662R Chesney “Military-Intelligence Convergence and the Law of the Title 10/Title 50 Debate” (2012) 5 Journal 
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of distinction between combatants and civilians and between civilian objects and military 
objectives only applies in situations of armed conflict, the discussion shall focus on the use of 
drones for combat purposes in countries where the USA has been engaged in armed conflicts, 
namely Iraq and Afghanistan.666
4.3 Drones and the principle of distinction
The first issue that needs to be dealt with is whether drones, as weapons comply with the 
principle of distinction. This question requires one to consider the way in which drones 
operate and whether this complies with the principle of distinction. The principle of 
distinction requires parties to the conflict to ensure that civilian casualties “are avoided to the 
greatest extent possible”.667 Up to now, drones have been used in asymmetrical wars to target 
small groups of people. The question that arises relates to who constitutes the target of drone 
attacks given the tendency of irregular armed groups to reside in civilian environments or 
fuse with civilians in order to avoid being easily targeted. The main concern here is whether 
drone strikes are capable of distinguishing between civilians and combatants and between 
civilian objects and military objectives.
Some scholars have argued that drones are capable of complying with the principle of 
distinction.668 It has been argued that drones allow one to limit civilian casualties compared 
to situations where conventional warplanes are used.669 Furthermore, drones can conduct 
surveillance on the potential target for a long time as compared to warplanes thus allowing 
operators to ascertain threats as well as the amount of collateral damage that may be affected 
if the strike are carried out. More so, due to small weapons and the increased precision rate of 
drone strikes, drones have the capacity to attack on a “small scale compared to an aerial 
bombing campaign or invasion, thus reducing overall military impact on the ground”.670 
Prima facie, drones appear to be the ultimate weapons of choice in asymmetrical warfare 
since they appear to comply with the principle of distinction.
666Drones have also been used to attack fleeing Taliban militants and their leaders in Pakistan. It is not clear 
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668Lewis and Crawford 2012-2013 Georgetown Journal o f  International Law 1127.
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670Brunstetter and Braun 2011 Ethics & International Affairs 349.
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4.3.1 Drones and the Separation Factor
Despite the arguments in favour of the use of drones, counter-arguments can be made to 
demonstrate that drone strikes do not comply with the principle of distinction as has been 
claimed. Brunstetter and Braun argue that although drones help in reducing collateral 
damage, there is the problem of “separation factor”.671 The authors do not define separation 
factor. However, from their discussion of the concept, it can be deduced that separation factor 
relates to the fact that the personnel who control drones and conduct airstrikes are far 
removed from the battlefield where the drones will be carrying out airstrikes.672 The learned 
authors argue that while separation factor “increase control over decisions that ought to 
reduce errors, the removal of drone operators from combat zone may have psychological 
effects that magnify the challenges of adhering to the principle of discrimination”.673 Since 
drone operators operate in a safe environment, where he/she receives the information and 
make assessments, his/her ability’s ability to assess threats may be affected.674 The authors 
give an example of a drone operator in Nevada controlling a drone that is providing cover to 
United States troops. If the operator “sees a video feed of an oncoming truck, the principle of 
distinction does not require the operator to fire at the vehicle or give an order to the person in 
the field to fire unless it represents a threat to the soldiers in the area”.675 While the lack of 
risk to the operator should lead him/her to be more cautious in assessing the danger, the 
authors argue that this is not the case.676 Major Matthew Morrison of the US Air Force states 
that “when you’re on the radio with a guy on the ground, and he is out of breath and you can 
hear the weapons fire in the background, you are every bit as engaged as if you were actually 
there”.677 The authors further argue that drone operators may be affected by the “same 
psychological stress as their comrades in the battlefield”.678 Since the lives of the people on 
the ground depend on the decision of the operator and the operator is of the view that there is 
a danger, which troops in the battlefield are facing, the operator may be induced into erring
671Ibid.
672Ibid.
673Ibid.
674Ibid.
675Ibid.
676Ibid.
677 Associated Press, “Predator Pilots Suffer War Stress,” August 8, 2008
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on the side of protecting one’s troops thus striking the perceived danger without making 
thorough assessments.
The effect of the separation factor is that the psychological stress that drone operators suffer 
from will likely lead them to make mistakes resulting in drone strikes being directed on 
wrong targets. For example, it has been reported that 90 percent of the people that have been 
killed in drone strikes were not the intended targets.679 More so, cases of drone strikes 
targeting civilians going about their normal lives such as attending weddings, funerals or 
anything that involve gatherings have been frequent.680 Such incidents demonstrate the fact 
that drones as weapons are not always capable of distinguishing civilians from combatants as 
has been claimed. Instead, the absence of the operator in a battlefield where drone strikes are 
carried out appears to cause more collateral damage than previously thought thus violating 
the principle of distinction.
Another reason why the drone program may fail to comply with the principle of distinction is 
that the drone operator and those in charge of taking the decision whether to strike or not may 
not have an incentive to take all precautionary measures before striking their target. This is 
because in some instances, the party carrying out such attacks may not have its personnel in 
the battlefield.681 Brunstetter and Braun argue that the “the separation factor removes one of 
the biggest handicaps in carrying out aerial attacks that minimise civilian casualties which is 
the risk to one’s own soldiers”.682 When parties to the conflict use drones in areas where 
troops have not been deployed, there is no risk of mistakenly striking their own troops. More 
so, since drones are unmanned, there is no danger of any personnel being killed during the 
strikes as compared to manned warplanes.
679“Nearly 90 Percent Of People Killed In Recent Drone Strikes Were Not The Target” The Buffington Post 
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http://edition.cnn.com/2012/09/25/world/asia/pakistan-us-drone-strikes/ (accessed 22 July 2016).
681Brunstetter and Braun 2011 Ethics & International Affairs 350.
682Ibid.
121
Bellamy concurs that since the USA has not deployed enough ground troops in the combat 
zone, it is not making every effort to avoid civilian casualties.683 This point can be illustrated 
through the example of United States of America’s pursuit of Al Qaeda leader Ayman 
Zawahari. Attempts to kill Zawahari have been carried out unsuccessfully since 2006 and 
until now, seventy-six children and twenty-nine civilian adults, have been killed.684 
Furthermore, the USA’s attempt to kill Qari Hussain, deputy commander of the Taliban who 
was eventually killed in 2010 resulted in the death of 128 people who were not the intended 
targets.685 It is submitted that the USA could have taken more precaution in its drone strikes 
had its own personnel been involved in the battlefield where the strikes were carried out. The 
ability of drones to carry out strikes without own personnel being put on danger takes away 
the incentive to exercise precautionary measures from the drone operators. One can therefore 
conclude that the use of drones directly affects the requirement for belligerents to distinguish 
between combatants and civilians. Since there is no danger of accidentally bombing own 
personnel on the ground where the war is being fought, drone operators may be tempted to 
exercise less caution when carrying out air strikes, thus increasing the danger of targeting 
civilians.
4.3.2 Drone operators and the principle of distinction
The other important and perhaps more controversial issue surrounding US drone program as 
far as the principle of distinction is concerned relates to the status of drone operators. As 
mentioned earlier in this study, the principle of distinction recognises the existence of two 
distinct groups during an armed conflict, which are civilians and combatants. The USA has 
been running two parallel drone programs, with the first one being operated by the United 
States Air Force and the other one by CIA. Since the US Air Force is integral part of the 
United States of America Department of Defence, their involvement in drone operations does 
not raise problems since these are combatants and can legally take part in armed conflicts.
683A Bellamy “Is the War on Terror Just?” http://ire.sagepub.com/content/19/3/275.abstract (accessed 13 April 
2016).
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The problem arises when it comes to the CIA run drone program. The question is whether 
CIA drone operators can be classified as combatants under the principle of distinction. The 
USA previously insisted that the CIA drone strikes have only been carried out in Pakistan, 
Yemen and Somalia where the USA is not involved in armed conflict.686 However, Crawford 
argues that “recent reports confirms that the CIA has been integral in the “oversight and 
orchestration of the military drone programme involving the United States Air Force”.687 
Furthermore, the Assistant General Counsel at the CIA John Radsan has also confirmed that 
decisions to fire a missile from a drone are made by the CIA at their headquarters in 
Virginia.688 Therefore, despite the USA’s denial that the CIA has been taking direct 
participation in hostilities, there is ample evidence that CIA drone strikes have been carried 
out in aid of the ongoing armed conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. Consequently, the CIA 
drone operators were taking direct part in hostilities.
4.3.2.1 Status of CIA Personnel under the principle of distinction
It cannot be disputed that CIA personnel are not part of the US armed forces. As Wuschka 
argues, the CIA is a civilian agency and not a branch of the U.S Armed Forces.689 
Furthermore, it is difficult to argue that the CIA can be combatants through being militia or 
volunteer corps belonging to the United States since it is difficult for them to meet the 
requirements set out Article 4A of the Third Geneva Conventions or Article 43 of Additional 
Protocol I. CIA operatives do not wear fixed signs or uniforms. More so, they do not carry 
their weapons openly. Although the CIA has a hierarchy of command, it is difficult for 
anyone to ascertain whether the chain of command can enforce the law of armed conflicts. As 
Sterio argues, “no particular information regarding the specifics of the drone program has 
ever been publicly disclosed”.690 For example, since drones are remote controlled from CIA 
bases thousands of miles from the battlefield, the outside world will not know the individuals
686E Crawford Identifying the Enemy: Civilian Participation in Armed Conflict 129. In the case of Pakistan, it is 
difficult to determine whether drone strikes are being carried in aid of an armed conflict. This is because while 
the US troops are not officially waging a war in Pakistan’s territory, they pursue militants who escape into 
Pakistan from Afghanistan in execution of the so called global war on terror. This makes it difficult to determine 
whether the drone strikes carried out in Pakistan’s territory against militants who have escaped from 
Afghanistan ae carried out in the course of an armed the armed conflict or not.
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responsible for any violation of the law such as deliberate attack on civilians. The outside 
world may never know information regarding individuals behind a particular violation of 
international law. Therefore, even though the CIA has a chain of command, the lack of 
transparency in the organisation makes it very difficult to entrust them with enforcing IHL. 
Similarly, the secrecy under which the CIA operates makes it difficult for the outside world 
to determine whether the drone operators comply with the customs and laws of war when 
they carry out drone strikes.691 In light of this discussion, one can conclude that CIA drone 
operators do not qualify as combatants.
4.3.2.2 Legal Consequences of CIA’s direct participation in drone strikes
The fact that civilian personnel are authorised to conduct drone strikes in situations of armed 
conflict means that the principle of distinction is being continuously violated. As Crawford 
points out, even though the targets of drone strikes can be considered as taking direct 
participation in hostilities, the CIA operatives will equally be violating the principle of 
distinction since they are taking direct participation in hostilities too.692 However, unlike the 
militant groups that the US drone strikes attack, the USA has obligations to respect IHL rules 
including the principle of distinction.
It follows that in theory, the consequences that fall on civilians who take direct participation 
in hostilities will apply to CIA personnel. This means that CIA operatives can be targeted 
wherever they are found as long as they are taking direct participation in hostilities. Alston 
argues that intelligence personnel do not have prosecution immunity under domestic law for 
their conduct.693 This means that they can be punished for taking direct part in hostilities as 
well as for crimes committed during the course of direct participation. Alston further points 
out that the involvement of CIA personnel in armed conflicts may also render them liable to
691Ibid. Sterio also argues that because the drone program is operated covertly by the CIA, it has been 
impossible to determine the precise contours of the program, its legal and normative framework, and whether its 
operators have been lawfully implementing the program”.
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criminal prosecution under domestic laws.694 This means that the CIA personnel taking part 
in drone program are unlawful combatants, just like the Taliban and al-Qaeda militants they 
are targeting. Furthermore, the CIA personnel will not be entitled to PoW if captured by the 
party they are fighting. In short, all the consequences that apply to PMSC personnel as 
discussed in Chapter 3 will apply to CIA drone operators.
The question however is whether CIA personnel will ever be held accountable for their 
unlawful involvement in armed conflicts. This does not appear to be the case for various 
reasons. Firstly, the United States of America is less likely to prosecute CIA drone operators 
given that they act under State order and in pursuit of US interests, even though they can be 
indicted and prosecuted in foreign courts.695 Indictment in foreign courts also does not seem 
to be a possibility. Drone warfare, unlike traditional warfare does not involve physical 
deployment of personnel in the battlefield. Operations are carried out in the comfort of CIA 
headquarters away from the battlefield where strikes are being carried out. This makes it 
difficult to identify the exact person who is in charge of conducting airstrikes. Consequently, 
it is virtually impossible for countries that want to prosecute CIA personnel to come up with 
the exact identity of the person conducting the airstrikes. This is made difficult by the secrecy 
surrounding CIA operations. Therefore, CIA personnel taking direct part in hostilities are 
unlikely to face prosecution.
Furthermore, the involvement of CIA personnel in drone strikes means that they become 
legitimate objects of attack for as long as they continue to take direct part in hostilities. 
However, as stated above, remote warfare does not involve deployment of personnel in the 
battlefield. Crawford questions whether CIA drone operators can therefore be targeted in 
Langley, Virginia or even in their homes, thousands of miles away from the streets and 
countryside of Iraq and Afghanistan where their strikes target militants.696 This may not be 
possible in asymmetrical warfare because the targeted militants do not possess long-range 
weapons to attack positions that are far away. Therefore, it should be admitted that although 
theoretically CIA operatives become legitimate objects of target when they run lethal drone 
programs, their geographical location gives them an advantage such that they cannot be
694Ibid.
695Crawford Identifying the Enemy: Civilian Participation in Armed Conflict 133.
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attacked. However, one cannot rule out the possibility that in future, these civilian personnel 
will become liable to attack wherever they are found. Alston points out that around forty 
countries are in the process of developing armed drones and “the rules being set today are 
going to govern the conduct of many States tomorrow”.697 This highlights that drone warfare 
is likely to cause more challenges for IHL particularly the principle of distinction in the 
future. Furthermore, the continuous justification of the use of civilians as well as civilian 
facilities to launch drones to carry out lethal attacks is an open violation of the principle of 
distinction that needs to be addressed before the current bad precedent being set by the USA 
is accepted as a norm.
4.4 Conclusion
In conclusion, the application of the principle of distinction to drone warfare faces enormous 
challenges. As discussed above, the question whether drone strikes are capable of complying 
with the principle of distinction between civilians and combatants and between civilian 
objects and military objects is debatable. However, it has been demonstrated that drone 
strikes present challenges to the principle of distinction. Furthermore, the use of civilian 
personnel to conduct drone strikes further violates the principle of distinction. Since drone 
warfare is still a developing phenomenon and the rules surrounding the use of such weapons 
are still developing, it is concluded that IHL should respond by setting binding rules that 
regulate drone warfare in order to avoid bad precedent being adopted as accepted practice. It 
is therefore submitted that the principle of distinction needs to be adapted for it to regulate the 
challenges that arise from drone warfare.
4.5 Cyber Warfare
Computer Network Attacks (CNA), commonly referred to as cyber warfare is another 
development that pose challenges to the principle of distinction. This section will begin with 
a brief introduction to the concept of cyber warfare and how cyber-attacks are generally
697P Alston “The CIA and Targeted Killings Beyond Borders” (2011) 2 Harvard National Security Journal 441.
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carried out. This discussion will be general and limited, as I do not have the expertise in the 
field of computer science. The discussion is intended to set a foundation for discussing how 
cyber warfare relates to the principle of distinction. The chapter will then move on to discuss 
how cyber warfare interact with the laws of armed conflict, particularly the principle of 
distinction. Questions that need to be answered are firstly, whether IHL regulates cyber 
warfare at all, secondly, what constitutes an attack under cyber warfare, thirdly, the 
relationship between cyber-attacks and the concept of direct participation in hostilities. This 
discussion will pave way for the main discussion of the challenges of applying the principle 
of distinction to cyber warfare.
4.5.1 Cyber Warfare: Background
In the modern world, many everyday activities are performed using computer system and the 
internet. For example, computers control communications, power systems, sewage regulation, 
health care systems, economic activities such as banking among other things.698 Computers 
and the internet are also used for military purposes. As Antolin-Jenkins puts it, the internet 
“provides universal interconnectivity of computer networks without distinction between 
civilian and military uses”.699 Given the dual purpose that computers and the internet serve, 
there is need for harmonious use by civilians and the military and any attempt to disrupt the 
use of internet for one purpose will affect the other. This raises concerns regarding whether it 
is practically possible for cyber warfare to comply with the principle of distinction. Cyber 
warfare came into the limelight recently as a result of the “highly publicized cyber-attacks 
against Georgia, Estonia and Iran”.700 These developments raised questions regarding the 
application of international law. This section will explore the application of the principle of 
distinction to cyber warfare.701
698J T G Kelsey “Hacking into International Humanitarian Law: The Principles o f Distinction and Neutrality in 
the Age of Cyber Warfare” (2008) 106 (7) Michigan Law Review 1427 at 1432.
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4.5.2 The Concept of Cyber Attacks
Ottis defines cyber-attacks as “the malicious use of information systems in order to influence 
the information, systems, processes, actions or decisions of the target without their 
consent”.702 Cyber-attacks are divided into two groups, which are Computer Network Attacks 
(CNA) and Computer Network Exploitation (CNE). CNAs are “operations to disrupt, deny, 
degrade or destroy information resident in computer networks, or the computer and networks 
themselves”.703 On the other hand, CNE is the “ability to gain access to information hosted 
on information systems and the ability to make use of the system itself’.704 Cyber warfare has 
been classified as a subset of what is commonly known as information operations/warfare 
and this involves the “employment of information-related capabilities in concert with other 
lines of operation to influence, disrupt, corrupt or usurp the decision-making of adversaries 
and potential adversaries while protecting our own”.705
Cyber warfare covers a wide range of hostile techniques that cannot be fully discussed in this 
study.706 Several ‘weapons’ are used to execute cyber-attacks.707 These include denial of 
service (DoS), in which the target computer is flooded with a “large amount of legitimate 
traffic to the effect of rendering it inaccessible to other users”.708 These types of attacks result 
in disruption and inconveniences and have not caused known physical harm to persons or 
property.709 Where DoS attacks are conducted using numerous computer systems, “they are 
referred to as distributed denial of service attacks” (DDoS).710 DDoS were used in the 2007 
attacks on Estonia where pro-Russian messages encouraged readers to download software to 
allow their own computers to participate in the attacks against Estonian websites.711 DDoS 
were also used to bombard Georgian government websites during the brief Georgian-Russian
702R Ottis “On Definitions: Conflicts in Cyberspace”. 14 July http://conflictsincyberspace.blogspot.co.za/ 
(accessed 1 April 2016).
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Terms, 8 November 2010 (as amended to 15 January) see page 140.
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conflict in 2008.712 Other sophisticated weapons that can also be used in cyber-attacks are 
called logical weapons.713 These are used in conducting reconnaissance of vulnerable 
opponent networks and attacking the targets found.714 This will result in the information 
being retrieved from the targeted networks or “the targeted network being disrupted to render 
it inoperative or defective”.715 Logical weapons can also cause damage to systems and 
hardware dependent on the software being attacked.716 An example of a cyber-attack using 
logical weapons is the attack on Iranian nuclear facility at Natanz in 2010.717 In this incident, 
the “Stuxnet worm was inserted into the closed network of the nuclear facility with the 
intention of disrupting the network through malware”.718 The attack caused the “IR-1 
centrifuges used for enriching uranium to spin at higher or lower frequencies and 
consequently causing mechanical damage to some centrifuges and sub-optimal performance 
of other centrifuges”.719 Crawford points out that while weapons such as DoS are easily 
accessible, logical weapons are more complex and therefore are likely to be only available to 
states that can invest more time in the production of such weapons.720 However, the scope of 
cyber-attacks is “extensive and whichever definition is used, cyber-warfare encompasses a 
range of actions which are available to military planners”.721
4.6 Cyber Warfare and the Laws of Armed Conflict
One question that has been raised is whether the laws of armed conflict apply to cyber 
warfare. The Geneva Conventions and the Additional Protocols do not refer to cyber warfare 
and it appears as if drafters of the Conventions did not contemplate a situation where armed
712S Korns, J Kastenberg ‘Georgia’s Cyber Left Hook’ 2008/2009) 38 Parameters 60 at 60. 
http://search.proauest.com/openview/6e25e711ef5871bd77cd13635fc7ca1f/1?pq-origsite=gscholar (accessed 18 
July 2016).
713E Crawford Identifying the Enemy: Civilian Participation in Armed Conflict 141.
714Ibid.
715J Andress and S Winterfeld Cyber Warfare: Techniques, Tactics and Tools for Security Practitioners (2011)
83.
716Crawford Identifying the Enemy: Civilian Participation in Armed Conflict 141. 
lllIbid.
718Ibid.
719Ibid.
720Crawford Identifying the Enemy: Civilian Participation in Armed Conflict 142.
721E Kodar "Applying the law o f armed conflict to cyber-attacks: from the Martens clause to Additional Protocol 
I" (2012) The Law o f  Armed Conflict: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives, Tartu University Press: Tartu 
” http://www.ksk.edu.ee/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/KVUOA Toimetised 15 5 Kodar.pdf (accessed 7 April 
2016).
129
conflicts will be fought from computers in the comfort of offices. The United States of 
America has argued that the “current IHL framework can be applied to cyber warfare by 
analogy”.722 The White House in its International Strategy for Cyberspace point out that 
cyberspace can be regulated through existing law and that “there is no need for re-invention 
of customary international law to control state behaviour”.723 The White House further states 
that “international norms guiding state behaviour in times of peace and conflict also apply in 
cyberspace”.724 However, others have argued that IHL as it stands is inadequate to deal with 
cyber-warfare hence they have suggested a negotiation of convention to deal with cyber- 
warfare.725 For example, Brown has suggests that an international convention dealing with 
cyber warfare should be promulgated.726
Despite the arguments that the law of armed conflict is not applicable to cyber warfare, it is 
submitted that this position could be mediated. Although the Geneva Conventions and the 
Additional Protocols do not specifically refer to cyber-warfare, it should be remembered that 
the drafters of the Conventions and treaties that were negotiated before acknowledged that 
means and methods of warfare are not static and may develop beyond the regulation of the 
existing rules and principles. This is reflected in the Martens Clause, which was first included 
in the First Hague Conferences of 1899.727 The Martens Clause provides that in cases not 
dealt with in the Hague Regulations, belligerents and population remain under protection of 
the “principles of international law, as they result from the usages established between 
civilised nations, from the laws of humanity and the requirements of the public 
conscience”.728 The Martens Clause has been repeatedly re-affirmed in Conventions which 
succeeded the Hague Regulations and this confirms its relevance in providing guidance in 
dealing with challenges that arise from the emergence of new means and methods of warfare
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that are not dealt with under the existing legal principles. For instance when the International 
Court of Justice dealt with the nuclear weapons case, it relied on the Martens Clause in 
coming to its conclusion that IHL applies to nuclear weapons.729 Kodar argues that the 
“principle reaffirms that even without the explicit mention of cyber-attacks in modern treaties 
or customs, certain fundamental restrictions derived from law of armed conflict still 
apply”.730 It is submitted that the law of armed conflicts is applicable to cyber warfare by 
virtue of the Martens Clause.731
IHL scholars support the view that the current IHL rules apply to cyber warfare. For example, 
at the 60 Years of the Geneva Conventions and the Decades Ahead conference organised by 
the ICRC to discuss the new challenges faced by IHL, the “majority view was that the 
Geneva and Hague laws can give guidance on matters relating to cyber warfare”.732 
Furthermore, the Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare 
(Tallinn Manual), a product of 3 years of work by international law experts also affirms the 
position that IHL rules are applicable to cyber warfare.733 The Tallinn Manual lays down 95 
non- binding rules that the drafters think are applicable to cyber-warfare.734 Rule 20 of the 
Tallinn Manual provides that cyber operations executed in the context of an armed conflict 
are subject to the law of armed conflict”.735 However, it acknowledges that given the unique 
challenges that cyber warfare presents, this method of warfare may not be fully compatible 
with the old IHL rules.736 Legal scholars concur that it cannot be legitimately claimed that
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there is an absolute vacuum when it comes to regulation cyber-warfare.737 One can therefore 
be conclude that IHL rules as they stand generally apply to cyber warfare. The question this 
thesis is seeks to answer is whether cyber warfare complies with the requirement to 
distinguish between civilians and combatants one the hand and civilian objectives and 
military objectives on the other.
4.6.1 Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare
The Tallinn Manual provides guidance on how the law applies to cyber warfare both in 
peacetime and during armed conflicts.738 The Manual is not legally binding on states and it is 
a “product of a group of independent experts acting in their own personal capacity”.739 
Although the Tallinn Manual is non- binding on states, it is important to discuss the position 
adopted since it may set the tone for future attempts to regulate cyber warfare.740 It should be 
noted from the onset that the Tallinn Manual mainly deals with cyber-to-cyber operations and 
therefore cannot be relied on to regulate kinetic-to-cyber hostilities.741 Thus, the application 
of law in the latter situation remains to be explored. The discussion of the Tallinn Manual 
shall mainly focus on the application of the principle of the principle of distinction in cyber 
warfare. Since the principle of distinction only applies in situations of an armed conflict, it is 
also important to discuss how the Tallinn Manual defines cyber armed conflict.
131 See Kelsey 2008 Michigan Law Review 1427 and K Bennelier-Christakis, “Is the Principle of Distinction Still 
Relevant in Cyber Warfare?” in N Tsagourias, R Buchan Research Handbook on International Law and 
Cyberspace Research Handbooks in International Law series (2015).
738M N Schmitt (ed) “Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare” Prepared by the 
International Group of Experts at the Invitation of the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence 
http://www.peacepalacehbrary.nl/ebooks/files/356296245.pdf. (2013) 9 (accessed 7 May 2016). However, its 
reference to jus ad bellum is very limited as the focus in on jus in bello
739Tallinn Manual 29.
740Furthermore, the Manual is the only Document at the moment that has been produced by international experts 
that deals with cyber warfare.
741Tallinn Manual 18.
132
4.6.2 The definition of armed conflict under cyber warfare
Cyber operations carried out in “the context of an armed conflict are subject to the law of 
armed conflict”.742 Therefore, for IHL to be applicable to cyber warfare, there should be an 
existence of an armed conflict.743 The Tallinn Manual defines cyber armed conflict as “a 
situation involving hostilities, including those conducted using cyber means”.744 Therefore, 
cyber warfare may take place where there are cyber-to-cyber hostilities or in situation where 
there are ongoing kinetic hostilities. According to the Commentary that accompanies the 
Tallinn Manual, the phrase “in the context of an armed conflict” is intended to mean that 
there should be “a nexus between the cyber activity and the armed conflict for IHL to be 
applicable”.745 The Tallinn Manual further provides that “the law of armed conflict does not 
embrace activities of private individuals or entities that are unrelated to the armed 
conflict”.746 Thus, where an individual or groups of people attack a certain target and the 
attack is unrelated to the armed conflict, such a situation is not regulated by the law of armed 
conflict. This is an important inclusion since there is need to differentiate cyber-criminal 
activities from cyber armed conflict. Therefore, this discussion will not deal with cyber­
criminal activities that are not related to an armed conflict. For example, the study will not 
deal with cyber espionage that is not carried out within the context of an armed conflict.
The Tallinn Manual further provides that the law of armed conflict applies to both 
international and non-international armed conflicts.747 It is important to address one obstacle 
that may arise in relation to classification of armed conflict. The manual acknowledges that 
the application of the law of armed conflict to cyber operations is problematic due to the 
difficulties of identifying the “existence of a cyber-operations, its originator, intended object 
of attack, and its precise effects”.748 In the few cyber operations that have been experienced, 
not one state has taken responsibility for the attacks.749 This therefore makes it difficult to
742Tallinn Manual Rule 20.
743Tallinn Manual, Commentary to Rule 20 para 2.
744Ibid.
745Tallinn Manual, Commentary to rule 20 para 5.
746Commentary to Rule 20 para 7.
747Tallinn Manual, Rule 22 and 23.
748Commentary to Rule 20 para 9.
749For example, no state accepted responsibility for the cyber-attack on Estonia. Even though it was widely 
believed that Russia was being the attacks, no evidence was put forward to prove such claims. Furthermore, no
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ascertain the original source of the attack in order to classify the armed conflict. As Cavelty 
correctly puts it, in cyber warfare, “the nature and origin of the threat are oftentimes unknown 
and the enemy becomes a faceless and remote entity, a great unknown that is almost 
impossible to track”.750 This problem raises a danger of misattribution of an attack, resulting 
in an attacked state directing its counter-attacks against a wrong state. For example, in 1998, 
the United States Department of Defence suffered a series of cyber-attacks that were initially 
attributed to foreign powers, including Iraq.751 However, investigations later revealed that 
two teenagers were responsible for the attacks.752 Hollis concurs, “Anonymity in cyberspace 
not only leads to issues of attribution and doubts as to the nature of the attack, it also 
contributes to insecurity as to the appropriate legal framework”.753 Therefore, unless states 
begin to take responsibility for their cyber operations, the characterisation of an armed 
conflict shall remain problematic. Despite this problem, the Tallinn Manual provides that 
“these questions of fact do not prejudice the application of the law of armed conflict”.754 
Therefore, despite the challenges of applying the law to cyber warfare, it remains applicable 
in both international and non-international cyber armed conflicts.
4.6.3 Cyber warfare and the definition of ‘attacks’
Before examining how the principle of distinction applies to cyber warfare, one should deal 
with the preliminary question of whether distinction applies to cyber warfare at all. This is 
because the principle of distinction only applies when an act constitutes an attack as defined 
in Article 49(1) of Additional Protocol I. In other words, parties to an armed conflict are 
required to adhere to the principle of distinction when they are carrying out ‘attacks’ as 
defined in the Additional Protocols. This is highlighted in Rule 1 of Customary International 
Law Rules, which provides that “parties to the conflict must at all times distinguish between 
civilians and combatants and attacks may only be directed against combatants not
state accepted responsibility for the 2010 Stuxnet attack on Iran’s nuclear plant even though it also believed that 
the United States o f America was behind the cyber-attacks.
750See M D Cavelty “Unravelling the Stuxnet Effect: Of Much Persistence and Little Change in the Cyber 
Threats Debate” (2011) 3 Military and Strategic Affairs 11.
751“U.S. Studies a New Threat: Cyber Attack” Washington Post Sunday, May 24, 1998; Page A01 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/washtech/dailv/mav98/cvberattack052498.htm (accessed 9 May 2016).
152Ibid.
753D.B. Hollis, ‘An e-SOS for Cyberspace’ (2011) 52 (2) Harvard International Law Journal 374 at 378.
754Commentary on Rule 20 para 20, Tallinn Manual.
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civilians”.755 Therefore, in order for the principle of distinction to apply to cyber warfare, one 
needs to consider whether cyber operations amount to attacks.
Article 51(2) provides that “civilian population as well as individual civilians shall not be the 
object of attack,”756 while Article 52(1) states that “civilian objects shall not be the object of 
attack or reprisals”.757 From these provisions, it is clear that these provisions protect civilians 
and civilian objectives from ‘attacks’. Dormann argues that “the definition of the term 
‘attack’ is of decisive importance for the application of the various rules giving effect to the 
principle of distinction and for most of the rules providing special protection for certain 
objects”.758 It is only after ascertaining whether cyber operations constitutes attacks that one 
can determine whether parties to the conflict needs to observe the principle of distinction 
when conducting cyber operations.759 I will turn to examine whether cyber operations qualify 
as attacks.
Article 49(1) of Additional Protocol I defines attacks as “acts of violence against the 
adversary, whether in offence or in defence”.760 Article 49(2) provides that “the provisions of 
this Protocol with respect to attacks apply to all attacks in whatever territory conducted,”761 
while Article 49(3) provides that the provisions of Article 49 apply to “any land, air or sea 
warfare which may affect the civilian population, individual civilians or civilian objects on 
land”.762 Bothe et al, who were some of the drafters of the Additional Protocol point out that:
“The term ‘acts of violence’ denotes physical force. Thus, the concept of ‘attacks’ 
does not include dissemination of propaganda, embargoes, or other non-physical 
means of psychological or economic warfare.”763
755J M Henckaerts, L Doswald-Beck Customary International Humanitarian Law Vol 1: Rules ICRC (2005) 3.
756Additional Protocol I.
757Article 52(1) of Additional Protocol I.
758K Dormann “Applicability o f the Additional Protocols to Computer Network Attacks” 
https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/applicabilityofihltocna.pdf (accessed 20 April 2016).
759Ibid.
760Ibid.
761 Article 49(2) of Additional Protocol I.
762Article 49(3) of Additional Protocol I.
763M Bothe, K J Partsch, W A Solf, New Rules for Victims o f Armed Conflicts (1982) 289.
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Some cyber operations have the potential of inflicting violence and therefore constitute 
attacks under IHL. This means civilians should be protected from the effects of such 
violence. Examples of cyber operations that can inflict violence on civilians include an attack 
intended to cause malfunction of the civilian air traffic control system in order to cause a 
plane crash, deliberate attack on medical database resulting in “civilians or wounded soldiers 
to receiving transfusions of the incorrect blood type,”764 or a cyber operation directed at 
works or installations with the intention of causing the release of dangerous forces.765 Since 
these activities involve the use of force, one would conclude that they are undoubtedly 
subject to the provisions of Additional Protocol I including the principle of distinction.
However, a strict reliance on the word ‘violence’ to determine whether a cyber-operation 
constitutes an attack for the purpose of the principle of distinction may have catastrophic and 
consequences. Schmitt argues that “since Article 49 appears to require violent acts for 
qualification as an attack, by strict textual interpretation, non-kinetic operations, that is those 
operations which do not involve the use of physical force would be excluded”.766 This 
interpretation is problematic since it leaves civilians and civilian objects vulnerable to all 
forms of attacks that are not carried out in a violent manner. For example, Dinstein argues 
that “the acid test of an attack in the law of armed conflict frame of reference is that acts of 
violence are committed and when devoid of violence act however detrimental to the enemy 
does not count as attack”.767 Unlike conventional attacks, most cyber-attacks are carried out 
in a non-violent manner. For example, cyber-attacks may involve a non-violent infiltration of 
the targeted computer system. However, this does not imply that the attack will have non­
violent consequences. Cyber operations carried out in a non-violent manner may have 
detrimental consequences similar to those that result from the deployment of conventional 
kinetic weapons. As Bannelier- Christakis argues, “a definition of attack strictly focused on 
the act itself could exclude from the principle of distinction a wide range of cyber­
764Kelsey 2008 Michigan Law Review 1438.
765Article 56 of Additional Protocol I prohibits attacks directed at “works or installations containing dangerous 
forces” such as dams and nuclear electrical generating stations.
766M N Schmitt “Cyber Operations and the Jus in Bello: Key Issues,” Naval War College International Law 
Studies http://ssrn.com/abstract=1801176 (accessed 21 March 2016).
767Y Dinstein “The Principle of Distinction and Cyber War in International Armed Conflicts” (2012) 17 (2)
Journal o f  Conflict & Security Law 261 at 264.
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operations”.768 Adopting this position will render the principle of distinction inapplicable in 
most cases of cyber warfare.
In order to avoid this dilemma, scholars have argued that violence should not be the 
determinant factor in deciding whether the law of armed conflict is applicable or not. Schmitt 
is of the view that in order to avoid this dilemma, an interpretation method that will ensure 
that IHL offers maximum protection to civilians during cyber warfare in the same manner it 
does in conventional kinetic warfare should be adopted.769 He argues that although “treaties 
should be interpreted in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to their terms, 
such interpretations must be made in context and in light of their object and purpose”.770 
Schmitt further argues, “While Article 49 is framed in terms of the nature of the act 
amounting to an attack, the drafters must have been primarily concerned with its 
consequences for the civilian population”.771 As the learned author argues, “the central object 
and purpose of Additional Protocol I is the protection of the civilian population and violence 
constituted useful prescriptive shorthand for use in rules designed to shield the population 
from harmful effects”.772 Therefore, Schmitt suggests that purposive interpretation should be 
adopted in order to interpret the concept of ‘attack’ under IHL. One should not focus on 
whether a cyber-attack on civilians was carried out through violent means or not. Instead, one 
should be concerned with whether such an attack has the effect of violating the protection 
that IHL seeks to confer on civilian population. If a cyber-operation has the effect of 
endangering civilian protection, then it will be a violation of IHL and therefore prohibited. 
This approach is supported by Bannelier- Christakis who argues that the “identification of an 
attack should not be based on the nature of the act but rather its consequences”.773 Instead of 
focusing on violence as a determinant factor, Bannelier- Christakis argues that the Kinetic
768K Bannelier-Christakis “Is the Principle of Distinction Still Relevant in Cyber Warfare?” in N Tsagourias, 
Russell Buchan (ed$) Research Handbook on International Law and Cyberspace (2015) 7.
769M N Schmitt “Cyber Operations and the Jus in Bello: Key Issues,” Naval War College International Law 
Studies http://ssrn.com/abstract=1801176 (accessed 21 March 2016).
110Ibid.
771Ibid.
112Ibid.
113K Bannelier-Christakis “Is the Principle of Distinction Still Relevant in Cyber Warfare?” in N Tsagourias and 
R Buchan (ed$) Research Handbook on International Law and Cyberspace (2015) 3.
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Effects Equivalency Test should be used in order to determine whether a cyber-operation 
falls under the definition of attack.774
4.6.3.1 The Kinetic Effects Efficiency Test
According Kinetic Effects Efficiency Test (KEE test), “violence should be evaluated in terms 
of effects rather than of the means used”.775 This means that in order for one to determine 
whether cyber operations directed on civilians are prohibited under the principle of 
distinction, the effects of violence on the civilians should be the determining factor, rather 
than the manner in which the attack was carried out. Melzer points out that in terms of the 
KEE test, acts of violence will be acts that cause “death or injury of persons or the physical 
destruction of objects”.776 This approach ensures that cyber operations that are carried out 
through non-violent means but whose effects are violent qualify as attacks under IHL. This 
in turn ensures that civilians receive maximum protection from all forms of harmful attacks. 
For example, an infiltration of a computer system controlling a nuclear or chemical plant or 
electricity supply using a cyber worm that results in death or injury to people will be 
prohibited under the principle of distinction even though it is carried out in a non-violent 
manner.
4.6.3.2 The Tallinn Manual
The Tallinn Manual adopts a similar approach to the one discussed above. Section 2, which 
deals with attacks, provides that IHL principles of distinction, necessity and proportionality 
applies to cyber operations as they do to other means and methods of warfare.777 Rule 30 
state that a cyber-attack is a “cyber operation, whether offensive or defensive, that is 
reasonably expected to cause injury or death to persons, damage, or destruction to objects”.778 
The Tallinn KEE test. It provides that an act must be characterised in terms of the effects it
114Ibid.
115Ibid.
116N Melzer “Cyber warfare and International Law” http://unidir.ore/files/publications/pdfs/cyberwarfare-and- 
international-law-382.pdf (accessed 4 April 2016).
711Tallinn Manual 91.
778Rule 30.
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causes rather than the means employed.779 It further provides that “violence must be 
considered in the sense of violent consequences and not limited to violent acts”.780 
Furthermore, the Tallinn Manual states that IHL protect “loss of civilian life, injury to 
civilians, damage to civilian objects or a combination of these and that de minimis damage or 
destruction does not meet the threshold of harm required”.781 It also states that an act will 
constitute an attack if it causes serious illness and severe mental suffering that are tantamount 
to injury.782 The experts agree that the law of armed conflict does not characterise cyber 
operations that do not cause the type of damage discussed above as attacks. For example, 
cyber operations that cause large-scale inconveniences such as blocking e-mail 
communications will not meet the threshold of harm required in order to constitute an attack 
for the purpose IHL.783 The majority of experts were of the view that the law of armed 
conflict do not extend this far. In other words, the laws of armed conflicts do not apply to 
cyber operations that do not cause harm or injury. On the other hand, the minority argued that 
if armed conflict resulting in large-scale adverse effect that however do not amount to an 
attack breaks out, the international community would generally regard them as attacks.784 
Furthermore, if cyber operations do not cause harm to the targeted object but cause 
foreseeable collateral damage, it will amount to an attack”.785 The Tallinn Manual provides 
that “a cyber operation need not actually result in the intended destructive effect to qualify as 
an attack”.786 Instead, an act constitute an attack when its intended consequences meet the 
requisite threshold of harm.787 Therefore, it seems most scholars support the KEE test as the 
appropriate test for determining whether a cyber operation constitute an attack under IHL.
119Tallinn Manual, Commentary on Rule 30 para 3.
780Ibid.
181Tallinn Manual, Commentary on Rule 30 para 4.
182Tallinn Manual, Commentary to Rule 30 para 8. The drafters argue that this is in line with Article 51(2) of 
Additional Protocol I that prohibits “acts of threats of violence the primary purpose of which is to spread terror 
among the civilian populations”.
183Commentary to Rule 30 para 12.
784Ibid.
185Tallinn Manual, Commentary on Rule 30 para13.
186Tallinn Manual, Commentary on Rule 30 para 14.
787Ibid.
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4.6.3.3 Criticism of the KEE Test
The KEE test resolves some but not all of the problems. There are some issues regarding the 
protection offered to civilians and civilian objects from cyber-attacks under the principle of 
distinction that remain unresolved. The first problem relates to the fact that the KEE test only 
protects civilians from injury or death but not necessarily from other consequences that may 
result from cyber-attacks. Since cyber-operations’ compliance with the principle of 
distinction is judged from its effects, this means that civilians will have no protection from 
other operations that do not cause injury or death. For example, a cyber-operation that 
neutralises or interferes with the normal functioning of a civilian installation will not 
constitute an attack as long as it will not result in death or injury to persons.788 The drafters of 
the Tallinn Manual attempted to address this concern by stating that for an interference or 
neutralisation of an installation to qualify as an attack, the restoration of functionality of such 
an installation should require replacement of physical component.789 This means that an 
“operation resulting in the suspension of the normal activity of a plant will not constitute an 
attack unless the resumption of operation of the system requires the physical replacement of 
certain components”.790 This reasoning leads to a conclusion that the civilian population is 
not protected from discomfort or inconveniences that may be caused by cyber warfare. For 
example, if the large-scale cyber-attack on Estonia in 2007 had taken place in the context of 
an armed conflict and the principle of distinction was applicable, civilians would not have 
protected from all the disruption and inconveniences that arose from the shutdown of 
government websites, media, communication and banking services.
The position adopted by the Tallinn Manual leaves many civilians exposed to cyber-attacks 
intentionally directed at civilian population or civilian objects. In other words, states will be 
free to target civilians in the knowledge that such attacks will not attract condemnation as 
long as they do not result in death. Kelsey argues that these “potential non-lethal nature of 
cyber weapons may cloud the assessment of an attack’s legality, leading to more frequent
188K Bannelier-Christakis “Is the Principle of Distinction Still Relevant in Cyber Warfare?” in N Tsagourias, 
Russell Buchan (ed$) Research Handbook on International Law and Cyberspace (2015) 10.
789Tallinn Manual on the international Law applicable to Cyber warfare 108.
190K Bannelier-Christakis “Is the Principle of Distinction Still Relevant in Cyber Warfare?” in N Tsagourias and 
R Buchan (ed$) Research Handbook on International Law and Cyberspace (2015) 10.
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violations of the principle of distinction than in conventional warfare”.791 This point can be 
illustrated through the example of the cyber-attacks that were carried out on Georgia in 2008. 
The attack on Georgia resulted in the shutting down of government websites; domestic and 
foreign media; banks; and private internet servers and blogs among other things”.792 
According to Schmitt, if one relies on the interpretation of ‘attacks’ discussed above, 
especially the KEE test, the operations against Georgia do not constitute attacks and therefore 
are permissible since they did not cause physical harm of or injury”.793 One would need to 
imagine a situation where a party to the conflict constantly bombard civilians of the opposing 
party with cyber operations similar to those experienced in Georgia in order to harass and 
demoralise citizens. Although these operations may not be considered attacks since they do 
not result in harm or injury, one can argue that IHL should come to the rescue of such 
civilians by prohibiting such acts since this may amount to terrorising civilians, something 
that is prohibited under IHL. It is submitted that IHL would have failed its purpose if it fails 
to protect civilians in such cases. This may also open floodgates of cyber-attacks directed at 
civilians by parties to an armed conflict in the knowledge that they will not face 
condemnation for violating the principle of distinction.
The second problem that the KEE test cannot solve is that the effects of cyber-attacks are not 
as apparent as the test assumes. As discussed above, KEE test requires violence to be 
evaluated in terms of effect rather than means used. While some effects of cyber-attacks may 
be direct, others are likely indirect. For example, an attack on an electricity power station 
may not in itself kill or injure a person directly but it may affect a person who is on life 
support machine in hospital or affect patients undergoing operations in hospitals. Similarly, 
carrying out cyber operations directed at communication system of a country may appear to 
cause mere inconveniences that do not cause harm or damage but this may affect the 
provision of emergence services such as ambulance and fire- fighting services. It is not clear 
whether the KEE test takes into consideration these indirect violent effects when assessing 
the violent effects of an attack. Not all cyber-attacks have visible or tangible effects and it 
may be a very difficult task to assess the amount of damage caused by an attack. As
191Kelsey 2008 Michigan Law Review 1436.
192M N Schmitt “Cyber Operations and the Jus in Bello: Key Issues”
193M N Schmitt “Cyber Operations and the Jus in Bello: Key Issues,” Naval War College International Law 
Studies http://ssrn.com/abstract=1801176 (accessed 21 March 2016).
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Bannelier-Christakis rightly puts it, the proof of the existence and the precise extent of the 
damages caused by cyber operations could become a real probatio diabolica, which is 
difficult to prove.794 Therefore, if the KEE is relied on, any cyber operation will be justified 
under IHL in the absence of proof of harm or injury to civilian or damage or destruction of 
civilian objects. Once again, this renders civilians more vulnerable under cyber-attacks than 
under conventional kinetic attacks where the damage caused is visible, tangible and 
immediate.
The last difficulty that arises if one relies on the KEE test to determine whether civilians are 
protected from a specific cyber operation is that the test seems to rely on an ex post facto 
determination of the effects of attacks to determine whether it is permissible or not. In other 
words, if the effects of an attack are to determine whether an attack violates the principle of 
distinction or not, this will mean that one will have to wait for the attack to take place in order 
to determine whether it violated the law or not. This appears to expose civilians to attacks in 
cyber warfare than in conventional attacks where kinetic weapons are used. This is because 
determining whether an operation constitute an attack after the attack has been carried out 
leaves it open for states to launch cyber operations targeting civilians in the belief that the 
attack will not cause harm or injury. This approach will contradict the spirit of the principle 
of distinction. IHL seeks to lay down uniform rules, which all parties to the conflict must 
know with certainty and must educate their armed forces on in order for them to adhere to 
those rules during an armed conflict. However, if the legality of cyber-operations is to be 
determined based on its results, the will lack legal certainty and states will not have binding 
guidelines on how their armed forces should conduct themselves.
One way of avoiding reliance on ex post facto evidence to determine whether an attack is 
permissible is for states to agree on activities (other than those that prima facie constitutes 
attacks under IHL) that have the potential of inflicting harm, injury or death on civilian 
population and civilian objectives and therefore prohibit such acts. Thus, a list of prohibited 
acts will be drawn based on the potential harm they may cause on civilians. This however has 
its own problems. Firstly, the types of cyber operations that fall in the grey area between
194K Bannelier-Christakis “Is the Principle of Distinction Still Relevant in Cyber Warfare?” in N Tsagourias and 
R Buchan (ed$) Research Handbook on International Law and Cyberspace (2015) 8.
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those that cause injury, death or damage to civilian population or civilian objects and those 
that will not cause any harm do not always produce the same results. Turns uses the example 
of cyber-attacks on Georgia and Estonia to illustrate this point.795 In both incidents, there 
were widespread attacks on the computer network system including shutting down of internet 
servers.796 Turns argues that even though the two countries suffered a similar kind of attack, a 
more internet reliant Estonia is more likely to have suffered harm than Georgia, which is less 
reliant on computers.797 Bannelier-Christakis concurs that “the magnitude and seriousness of 
these injuries are extremely variable and depend on parameters as different as the dependence 
of a society toward certain system or the appropriateness of human responses to these 
events”.798 Thus, the question whether a cyber-attack will cause harm or injury largely 
depends on how the targeted state relies on computers.
4.6.3.4 Other approaches to defining Attacks
Dormann suggests a solution in order to address the failure by the KEE test to define 
operations that result in inconveniences as attacks.799 He notes that the definition of military 
objectives in Article 52(2) of Additional Protocol I does not only include objects whose total 
or partial destruction or capture offers military advantage.800 In terms of Article 52(2), 
military objectives also include objects whose neutralisation will offer military advantage.801 
Dormann argues that since the definition of military objectives includes those whose 
neutralisation offer military advantage, it is irrelevant whether an object is disabled through 
destruction or in any other way.802 This means that for him, the requirement for damage, 
destruction, death or injury is not relevant to qualify as an attack since neutralisation alone 
will be sufficient to make it an attack. This therefore means that cyber operations targeting
195D Turns “Cyber warfare and the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities” (2012) 17 (2) Journal o f  
Conflict and Security Law 279 at 287.
196Ibid.
197Ibid.
198K Bannelier-Christakis “Is the Principle of Distinction Still Relevant in Cyber Warfare?” in N Tsagourias and 
R Buchan (ed$) Research Handbook on International Law and Cyberspace (2015) 9.
199K “Dormann, “Applicability of the Additional Protocols to Computer Network Attacks ” Paper delivered at 
the International Expert Conference on Computer Network Attacks and the Applicability o f  International 
Humanitarian Law, Stockholm, Nov. 17-19, 2004)
https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/apphcabilityofihltocna.pdf (accessed 24 May 2016).
800Ibid.
801Ibid
802Ibid.
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civilian objects with the intention of neutralising them and does not offer military advantage 
constitute a violation of the principle of distinction.
However, Dormann’s approach has its own problems. While Dormann attempts to address 
the problem of under-inclusiveness of the KEE test, Schmitt argues that his approach “poses 
the opposite risk of over inclusivity”.803 He argues that Dormann’s approach “would 
encompass all denial of service attacks, including those in which mere inconvenience are 
caused, for example because of blocking a television broadcast or university website”.804 
Schmitt further argues that there is no state practice to demonstrate that IHL prohibits 
causation of inconveniences on civilians.805 Instead, Schmitt argues that inconveniences and 
interference with the daily lives of civilians are a frequent result of armed conflict and 
psychological operations directed against the civilian population are common”.806 Dormann’s 
approach therefore has the effect of prohibiting all forms of cyber activities no matter how 
minor inconveniences they will cause.
In light of the discussion above, one can conclude that besides the obvious cases where 
cyber-attacks are carried out through violent means or result in clear harm or injury, there is 
no consensus as to when cyber operations will constitute attack attacks under IHL. As 
discussed above, the principle of distinction only applies to acts that qualify as attacks. 
Therefore, in the absence of clarity regarding the criteria of determining whether a certain 
cyber operation is an attack or not, it will remain difficult for parties involved in cyber 
warfare to know the circumstances they are required to apply the principle of distinction 
when carrying out operations. IHL needs to find a balance between protecting civilian 
population and civilian objects on the one hand and ensuring that cyber military operations 
are not unreasonably limited on the other hand. There question of what operations qualify as 
attacks needs to be clarified in order for states to know what operations are permissible and 
what operations are not permissible under the law. In the absence of this clarity, it may be 
difficult to apply the principle of distinction to cyber warfare.
803M N Schmitt “Cyber Operations and the Jus in Bello: Key Issues,” Naval War College International Law 
Studies http://ssrn.com/abstract=1801176 (accessed 21 March 2016).
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4.7 Application of the principle of distinction in cyber warfare
Having discussed the definition of attacks in IHL, it can be argued that there are many cyber 
operations that fall under the definition of attacks as provided for in Additional Protocol I. 
Consequently, the principle of distinction is applicable to cyber warfare. I will move on to 
discuss the challenges of applying the principle of distinction to cyber warfare, which is the 
main objective of this section. This section will investigate application of the principle of 
distinction between civilians and combatants and between civilian objects and military 
objectives to cyber warfare.
4.7.1 Distinction between combatants and civilians in cyber warfare
Rule 31 of the Tallinn Manual is the main section that deals with the general principle of 
distinction. It provides that “the principle of distinction applies to cyber- attacks”.807 
According to the Tallinn Manual, a cyber operation is prohibited under the principle of 
distinction if it is directed against civilians or civilian objects and rises to the level of an 
attack.808 Further, the Tallinn Manual states that “certain operations against the civilian 
population such as psychological operations are lawful”.809 The protection of civilians is 
repeated in Rule 32, which provides that civilian population as well as individual civilians 
shall not be the object of attack.810 However, this protection is subject to the requirement that 
civilians do not take direct part in hostilities. Furthermore, where it is foreseeable that a 
cyber-attack directed against a military objective will cause incidental damage, destruction, 
death or injury of civilians or civilian objects, such civilians and civilian objects do not 
become objects of attack.811 In such instances, the attacker should apply the principle of 
proportionality in determining whether to launch an attack. Rule 33 deals with a situation
801Rule 31. The rule draws from Article 48 of Additional Protocol I, which provides that “Parties to the conflict 
shall at all times distinguish between the civilian population and combatants and between civilian objects and 
military objectives and accordingly shall direct their operations only against military objectives".
808Commentary of Rule 31 para 5.
809Ibid. An example of a cyber operation that would be lawful is transmitting email messages to the civilian 
population.
810Rule 32.
811Tallinn Manual, Commentary on Rule 32 para 6.
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where there is doubt regarding the status of persons. It provides that “In case of doubt as to 
whether a person is civilian, that person shall be considered to be a civilian”.812
4.7.1.1 Combatants
The Tallinn Manual adopts an approach almost similar to that of the Geneva Conventions and 
the Additional Protocol I regarding the principle of distinction. Rule 26 provides that there 
are two categories of combatants. These are the “armed forces of a party to the conflict as 
well as members of militia or volunteer corps forming part of such armed forces”.813 The 
second category consists of members of other militia and members of volunteer corps, 
including those of organised resistance movements, belonging to a Party to the conflict 
provided that they meet the requirements set out in Article 4A (2) of the Third Geneva 
Convention.814 The Tallinn Manual further provides that “every state organ meets the 
requirements to belong to a party to the conflict”.815 More so, it provides that a party to a 
conflict may incorporate a paramilitary or armed law enforcement agency into its armed 
forces but this provision does not extend to intelligence or other government agencies not 
entrusted with law enforcement.816 Therefore, the definition of combatants in the Manual is 
similar to the one in Additional Protocol I.
4.7.1.2 Civilians
Civilians are defined under Rule 29 of the Tallinn Manual. The negative definition in the 
Additional Protocol I that civilians are persons who are not members is adopted.817 However, 
the experts disagreed on the consequences of civilian participation in hostilities. While the 
majority were of the opinion that persons who take direct participation in hostilities do not
812 Tallinn Manual, Rule 33.
813Tallinn Manual, Rule 26 para 4.
814These are the requirements of being commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates, wearing a 
distinctive emblem or attire that is recognisable at a distance, carrying arms openly and conducting operations in 
accordance with the law o f armed conflict.
815Tallinn Manual, Rule 26 para 7.
816Tallinn Manual, Rule 26 para 15.
811Tallinn Manual, Rule 29.
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lose their protections, the minority view was that civilians who take direct participation in 
hostilities “qualify as neither combatants nor civilians and therefore do not benefit from the 
protections of the Geneva Conventions”.818 Therefore, the Manual does not change the 
position of the Additional Protocols regarding the definition of civilians.
4.7.1.3 Challenges of applying the principle of distinction to cyber warfare
The drafters of the Tallinn Manual tried to adhere to the traditional definition of civilians and 
combatants as provided for in the Additional Protocols. However, the first challenge is that 
the Tallinn Manual does not shift from the traditional principle distinction in that it does not 
deal with the use of private contractors hired by states to perform cyber operations on its 
behalf. This creates a major problem in cyber warfare where the probability of states 
contracting civilian experts to carry out cyber operations on its behalf is very high. In other 
words, just like in drone warfare, states are more likely to rely on civilian contractors or 
civilian intelligence personnel to carry out cyber operations on their behalf. For example, 
Kelsey points out that “a significant amount of both the operation and maintenance of 
military-owned network segments in the United States of America is currently handled by 
civilians on a contracted- out basis”.819 Bannelier-Christakis notes that militaries outsource 
the expertise of civilians to perform functions such as maintenance of networks to 
exploitation of weaknesses of computer system.820 This means that the involvement of 
persons who do not qualify as combatants may be greater in cyber warfare than in any other 
forms of warfare.
However, while states are using civilian contractors to perform military operations usually 
reserved for armed forces they may not be willing to incorporate these contractors into their 
armed forces in accordance with the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol I. These 
reasons may include the need to reduce costs of a large standing army and the general
818Commentary to Rule 29 para 3.
819Kelsey 2008 Michigan Law Review 1432.
820K Bannelier-Christakis “Is the Principle of Distinction Still Relevant in Cyber Warfare?” in N Tsagourias, 
Russell Buchan (eds) Research Handbook on International Law and Cyberspace (2015) 20.
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downsizing of the armed forces among other reasons.821 This means that the principle of 
distinction will face the similar challenges to those it faces when PMSCs or civilian drone 
operators are contracted by states to carry out attacks in armed conflicts on behalf of the state. 
Just as the Montreux Document that deals with PMSCs, the Tallinn Manual appears to go 
against the tide by failing to acknowledge the changing state practice whereby states rely on 
civilian contractors to perform essential military services that were traditionally provided by 
members of the armed forces. This situation will result in states deliberately ignoring the 
principle of distinction since it does not suit the emerging new practices in cyber warfare. Just 
like PMSCs and drone operators, these personnel do not meet the combatants test and 
therefore are civilians who are entitled to protection. This creates a problem for IHL since it 
amounts to violation of the principle of distinction. This raises the question of accountability 
or responsibilities of these personnel when they take part in armed conflicts. More so, the 
civilians hired to perform cyber operations are also left in a difficult position since they are 
not entitled to protection like their fellow members who are part of the armed forces even 
though they are acting on behalf of a state.
Besides the above challenges, there are certain challenges of applying the principle of 
distinction that are unique to cyber warfare and these shall be discussed below. Cyber 
warfare, by its nature has the potential of involving civilians in combat activities intentionally 
or unintentionally. The first challenge is that it is difficult to identify the identity of a person 
who is carrying out specific operation in cyber warfare. Under traditional kinetic warfare, it is 
easy to identify people involved in an armed conflict because they have to be involved 
physically in the battlefield. As Brenner and Clarke put it, the assumption that there is a 
segregation between war-space and civilian space in kinetic warfare does not exist in cyber 
warfare.822 The possibility of maintaining this segregation ensures that the laws of armed 
conflicts, including the principle of distinction are enforced and applicable. Under cyber 
warfare, there is no physical war-space or civilian space. The authors also argue that cyber 
warfare takes place in cyber-space, “which is a domain characterised by the use of electronics 
to store, modify and exchange data and is not a physical place but a virtual interactive
821See discussion in Chapter 3, section 3.4.1.
822S W Brenner and L Clarke “Civilians in Cyberwarfare: Conscripts” (2010) (43 (4) Vanderbilt Journal o f  
Transnational Law 1011 at 1027.
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experience accessible regardless of geographic location”.823 Since cyber warfare does not 
involve the deployment of humans in a physical battlefield, combatants in this kind of war are 
faceless. This makes it extremely difficult to ascertain the identity of the person responsible 
for attacks. The well-known cases of cyber-attacks on states can be used to illustrate this 
point. No state, group or individuals have admitted responsibility for the cyber- attacks on 
Estonia, Georgia and Iran, even though some states were accused of having carried out the 
attacks. Assuming that these attacks were carried in the course of an armed conflict and the 
principle of distinction is applicable, it is difficult to ascertain the identity of the attackers and 
consequently to determine whether the attackers meet the requirements of combatant status. 
Therefore, whilst one can insist that only combatants can participate in cyber operations, 
implementing this principle will be very difficult, given the unique nature of cyber warfare as 
discussed above. Anonymity in cyber warfare makes it difficult to ascertain whether states 
are complying with the principle of distinction or not.
4.7.2 Cyber Warfare and the Concept of Direct Participation in Hostilities
If one accepts that civilian contractors employed to perform cyber operations during an 
armed conflict do not meet combatant status, then the consequences that arise when civilians 
take direct part in hostilities apply.824 One of the consequence is that civilian contractors lose 
their protection as civilians and therefore become legitimate targets when they take direct 
participation in hostilities. However, one of the biggest challenges that cyber warfare presents 
relates how to apply direct participation in hostilities to this method of warfare.
Direct participation is an important aspect to the principle of distinction since it draws the 
line between when civilians are entitled to protection and when they lose the protection. 
Therefore, in order to ensure that only those civilians that have taken direct participation in 
hostilities lose protection from IHL, it is important to clarify what types of activities amount 
direct participation in hostilities under cyber warfare and at what point civilians lose their 
protection for taking direct participation in hostilities. These issues will be discussed below.
823Ibid.
824See discussion in Chapter 3, section 3.4.3.
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Rule 29 of the Tallinn Manual attempts to address the issue of direct participation in 
hostilities in cyber warfare. It states that civilians are not prohibited from directly 
participating in hostilities, but forfeit their protection from attacks for such time as they take 
direct part”.825 The Tallinn Manual defines a cyber-attack as a “cyber operation, whether 
offensive or defensive, that is reasonably expected to cause injury or death to persons or 
damage or destruction to objects”.826 This definition excludes cyber operations that are non­
violent, for example psychological cyber operations or cyber spying.827 Additionally, the 
Tallinn Manual provides that care should be taken when identifying the originator of an 
attack.828 The Tallinn Manual acknowledges that where a person unintentionally causes 
damage through cyber means such as forwarding an email containing a malicious software 
(malware) that causes harm to the recipient of such an email, that person is not taking direct 
part in hostilities since there is no intent in their actions.829
Given the definition of direct participation in hostilities, it is evident that there will be some 
cases where it is not debatable whether a person is taking direct participation in hostilities or 
not. For instance, civilian contractors employed by the armed forces to conduct cyber-attacks 
will be taking direct part in hostilities. However, there are certain situations when it will be 
difficult to determine whether civilians are taking direct participation in hostilities. For 
example, when civilians are contracted by states to provide services as a cyber expert, they 
may perform wide-ranging activities. The questions that arise relates to the point at which 
will these civilians be considered to be taking direct part in hostilities.
The Tallinn Manual does not outline any particular test for the threshold for direct 
participation.830 Crawford argues that civilians employed to maintain computer networks for 
example, will not likely be considered as taking direct part in hostilities, while those 
employed to conduct cyber-attacks will be taking direct part in hostilities.831 However, the 
activities that lie in the grey area will present problems. The ICRC Guidance of the notion of
825Tallinn Manual.
826 Rule 30, Tallinn Manual.
827Tallinn Manual, Commentary to Rule 30, Tallinn Manual.
828Ibid.
829Ibid.
830Crawford Identifying the Enemy: Civilian Participation in Armed Conflict 143.
831Crawford Identifying the Enemy: Civilian Participation in Armed Conflict 147.
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Direct Participation in Hostilities mainly focuses on direct causation as a determining factor 
and rules out indirect effects as amounting to direct participation in hostilities.832 More so, the 
harm that arise from a person’s involvement in an armed conflict must be objectively 
foreseeable in order for the act to constitute direct participation in hostilities.833 As Owen et 
al argue, cyber-attacks are dependent on chains of causality and there is high likelihood of 
intervening effects between initial cause and ultimate effect.834 For example, a civilian who 
writes a malware programme and gives it to the armed forces or party to the conflict but does 
not execute the malware him/herself will not be taking direct participation in hostilities 
because there is absence of causal proximity”.835 The effect of this position is that “many 
cyber activities performed by civilians will fall outside the direct participation in 
hostilities”.836 This means many civilians will remain protected despite the fact that they play 
a pivotal role in the execution of cyber operations. Turns argues that this will result in 
“civilians engaging in cyber warfare with impunity”.837 The impunity of civilian contractors 
may further encourage states to rely more on civilian contractors to conduct cyber warfare 
since this will enable them to circumvent their responsibilities under international law. This 
further undermines the principle of distinction. This therefore calls for IHL to come up with 
rules that explains the application of direct participation in hostilities in cyber warfare since 
this also impacts on the principle of distinction.
More so, the principle of distinction states that civilians may lose their protection for such 
time they take direct part in hostilities.838 When civilians cease to take direct part in 
hostilities, they re-gain their protection. The phrase ‘for such time’ creates a very difficult 
challenge in cyber warfare.839 For instance, it is not clear whether civilians can only be 
targeted when they press a button to release the attack or whether they can be targeted as long
832N Melzer Interpretive Guidance on the Notion o f  Direct Participation in Hostilities under International 
Humanitarian Law International Committee of the Red Cross at 1017 
https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/icrc-002-0990.pdf (accessed 9 March 2016).
833Ibid.
834W Owens, K Dam, H Lin (ed) “Technology, Policy, Law, and Ethics Regarding US Acquisition and Use of 
Cyberattack Capabilities” (National Academics Press, 2009) http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php7record id=12651 
(accessed 19 July 2016).
835Crawford Identifying the Enemy: Civilian Participation in Armed Conflict 148.
836Ibid.
831D Turns “Cyber warfare and the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities” (2012) 17 (2) Journal o f  
Conflict and Security Law 288.
838For more discussion on this, See Chapter 3, section 3.4.3 above.
839K Bannelier-Christakis “Is the Principle of Distinction Still Relevant in Cyber Warfare?” in N Tsagourias and 
R Buchan (ed$) Research Handbook on International Law and Cyberspace 22.
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as the attacks are still ongoing.840 Schmitt notes that “cyber operations last only a few 
minutes and if the targeted state is only allowed to attack the civilians launching the attack, it 
extinguish the right to strike at direct participants”.841 This is because the nature of the 
operations involve a belligerent sitting in an office thousands of miles away from the targeted 
party the targeted party may not anticipate the attack until the effects of such an attack 
manifest themselves in a malfunction or damage to their own computer system. Therefore, 
such an approach will result in civilians who take part in cyber warfare becoming immune 
from attacks since it is practically impossible for the attacked part to respond and strike at the 
civilian attacker.
Adopting the approach that the phrase ‘for such time’ means the entire period during which a 
participant is engaging in repeated cyber operations may render civilians permanent targets 
even if they have stopped taking part in hostilities.842 Bannelier-Christakis notes that if one 
adopts the approach that civilians who took direct part in cyber-attacks can be attacked as 
long as the effects of attack exists , “a replication of a worm may also constitute a repeated 
cyber operation thus rendering the civilian who launched the initial cyber operation a 
legitimate target thus making the concept of direct participation unlimited”.843 Therefore, 
treating civilian cyber operators as civilians who can only be targeted when they take direct 
part in hostilities can further threaten protection that IHL provides during armed conflicts.
The suggestion in the Tallinn Manual that a person should have intention to cause harm for 
him/her to be regarded as having have taken direct participation in hostilities is problematic. 
It creates the problem of establishing with certainty whether a person or party that forwarded 
a harmful malware actually had the intention to cause harm. For example, during cyber­
attacks on Georgia, Russian websites and blogs “posted instructions on how to set up 
computers to run distributed denial of service attacks (DDoS) while some offered 
downloadable DDoS programs which would then be directed towards Georgia’s
840Ibid.
841841M N Schmitt “Cyber Operations and the Jus in Bello: Key Issues,” Naval War College International Law 
Studies http://ssrn.com/abstract=1801176 (accessed 21 March 2016).
842Ibid.
843K Bannelier-Christakis “Is the Principle of Distinction Still Relevant in Cyber Warfare?” in N Tsagourias, 
Russell Buchan (ed$) Research Handbook on International Law and Cyberspace 22-23.
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computers”.844 *This meant that individual civilians became involved in cyber-attacks against 
Georgia resulting in Georgian computers being flooded with traffic, which in turn made them 
inaccessible to other users. The question then is, if Georgia was to retaliate, how does it 
determine whether a particular internet user intentionally took part in the DDoS attacks or 
not7 While some people may have directed DDoS to Georgian servers willingly and 
intentionally, it is probable that other people could have unwittingly and innocently 
participated in the attacks. The priority of the party that is being attacked will be to defend 
itself and possibly retaliate in order to stop the attacks. In such a situation, it may not be 
practical in, to ascertain the intention of every person who took part in the attacks before 
retaliating. Therefore, it can be argued that even though the requirement of intention helps to 
ensure that only civilians who deliberately take direct participation in cyber-attacks lose 
protection, it is very difficult, if not impossible to apply and adhere to the requirement in 
practice. This makes the application of direct participation in hostilities very difficult in cyber 
warfare. Consequently, this makes all civilians who are caught between cyber-attacks 
potential targets regardless of the extent and motive of their involvement. These 
complications discourage compliance with the principle of distinction at all.
In conclusion applying the principle of distinction between civilians and combatants in cyber 
warfare is not an easy exercise. Due to the high likelihood of civilian involvement in cyber 
conflicts, applying the principle of distinction to cyber warfare as it is traditionally 
understood may exacerbate the problems that IHL seeks to eliminate. From the above 
discussion, if one applies the principle of distinction as it stands, most personnel in charge of 
conducting cyber operations will not qualify as combatants and therefore should be treated as 
civilians. However, this will have far reaching implications since the rights and 
responsibilities of such personnel is not clear. This therefore calls for the principle of 
distinction to be revisited and adapted so that it becomes applicable to cyber warfare.
844E Morozov “An Army o f Ones and Zeroes: How I Became a Soldier in the Georgia-Russia Cyber Warfare”
http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/technology/2008/08/an army of ones and zeroes.html (accessed 15
July 2016).
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4.8 Distinction between Civilian Objects and Military Objectives under Cyber Warfare
Perhaps the most difficult challenge that cyber warfare pose to the principle of distinction 
relates to the requirement for distinction between civilian objects and military objectives. 
Computers and the internet are used for both military and civilian purposes. Droege states 
that in cyber space, the entire cyber infrastructure, which include computers, routers, cables, 
and satellites, is used for both civilian and military communications.845 For example, it has 
been argued that in the United States of America, the internet provides nearly universal 
interconnectivity of computer networks without distinction between civilian and military uses 
and that approximately ninety-five percent of the telecommunications of the Department of 
Defence travel through the Public Switched Network.846 More so, military owned segments 
of the telecommunications are operated and maintained by civilians on a contractual basis.847 
The principle of distinction requires attacks to be limited to military objectives.848 The 
question is whether it is possible to make a distinction between civilian objects and military 
objectives in cyber warfare, given the reality that both civilians and the military use cyber 
space. Brenner and Clarke argue that the principle of distinction is mainly based on the 
assumption that there is a geographical separation between battle-space and civilian-space 
and secondly, that there is a separation between the role played by combatants and the role 
played by civilians.849 However, these assumptions only applied in traditional conventional 
warfare and does not exist in cyber warfare.850 As argued above, cyber operations do not have 
a confined battlefield. This makes it difficult for a party to the conflict to determine whether a 
target is a military objective or civilian object or whether a network belongs to the military or 
to civilians. Thus, all computers may be rendered legitimate targets since the 
interconnectedness of the cyber-space makes it “difficult if not impossible to maintain the 
combatant and non-combatant distinction”.851 Thus, one can conclude civilians and civilian
845C Droege “Get off my cloud: cyber warfare, international humanitarian law, and the protection of civilians” 
(2012) 94 (886) International Review o f  the Red Cross 533 at 541.
846Kelsey 2008 Michigan Law Review 1432.
841Droege 2012 International Review o f  the Red 541.
848 As discussed above, military objectives are objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an 
effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the 
circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage
849S W Brenner and L L Clarke “Civilians in Cyberwarfare: Conscripts” (2010) (43 (4) Vanderbilt Journal o f  
Transnational Law 1036.
850Ibid.
851Ibid.
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objects face more threats and less protection under cyber warfare hence the need for more 
clear rules on how to make the principle of distinction more applicable to the cyber warfare.
The second challenge that arises when applying the principle of distinction between civilian 
objects and military objectives in cyber warfare relates to the issue of dual use objects. Dual­
use objects refer to “objects that are used for both civilian and military purposes”.852 As 
already alluded to, cyber-space is used for both military and civilian purposes. For example, 
although power plants and electricity grids are used for civilian purposes, they can also be 
used for military purposes. More so, some military networks travel through civilian 
infrastructure. This means there is high likelihood that most infrastructure may become dual 
use objects during cyber warfare. The question therefore is whether these objects become 
legitimate objects of attack or not. There is no IHL rule that specifically deals with the 
problem of dual-use objects. Furthermore, an object under the principle of distinction must 
either be a civilian or military objective but it cannot be both.853 The dominant view is that 
the moment an object is used for military purpose, it becomes a military objective in its 
entirety.854 Droege argues that it is generally accepted that “the object becomes a military 
objective even if its military use is only marginal compared to its civilian use”.855 The 
ICRC’s position in relation to dual-use objects is that the “nature of any object must be 
assessed under the definition of military objectives provided for in Additional Protocol I”.856 
This means that “even a secondary military use may turn such an object into a military 
objective as long as the attack complies with the principle of proportionality”.857 One can 
therefore conclude that the presence of many dual-use objects in cyber warfare makes it 
difficult to distinguish civilian objects from military objectives. As a result, many objects that 
are traditionally regarded as civilians are likely to be rendered permanent targets during cyber 
warfare.
852Droege 2012 International Review o f  the Red Cross 562.
853See generally Brenner and Clarke 2010 Vanderbilt Journal o f Transnational Law.
854The Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations, Department of the Navy/Department of 
Homeland Security, USA, July 2007, para. 8.3; Tallinn Manual, above note 27, Commentary on Rule 39, 
para 1.
855Droege 2012 International Review o f  the Red Cross 563.
856International Humanitarian Law and The Challenges of Contemporary Armed Conflicts Report prepared by
The International Committee o f  the Red Cross 28th International Conference o f  the Red Cross and Red 
Crescent Geneva, December 2003 International
https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/ihlcontemp armedconflicts final ang.pdf (accessed 13 July 2015)
851Ibid.
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It can be submitted that given the increased reliance on computer networks in the modern 
world to run and control infrastructure, communication, economy and even trade, there is 
high likelihood that civilians and civilian objects will become more vulnerable to attacks than 
before. Unless a part conducting an attack is able to direct its attacks against a specific part of 
the network that is used for military purposes, all civilian infrastructure and networks become 
vulnerable. IHL therefore needs to respond to these challenges by adapting the principle of 
distinction in order to deal with these challenges.
4.9 Cyber warfare and prohibition of indiscriminate attacks
The last challenge that will be dealt with, which arises when applying the principle of 
distinction to cyber warfare relates to indiscriminate attacks. IHL requires parties to the 
conflict to take all necessary precautionary measures to avoid indiscriminate attacks that may 
result in the violation of the principle of distinction. Indiscriminate attacks are “those attacks 
that are not directed at a specific military objective,858 and those “which employ a method or 
means of combat, which cannot be directed at a specific military objective”.859 Indiscriminate 
attacks also include attacks that “employ a method or means of combat the effects of which 
cannot be limited as required by the Additional Protocol I and consequently, are of a nature to 
strike military objectives and civilians or civilian objects without distinction”.860 
Indiscriminate attacks are prohibited during armed conflicts.861
Due to a number of reasons, the prohibition of indiscriminate attacks is difficult to adhere to 
under cyber warfare. Firstly, as discussed above, civilians and the military share the same 
infrastructure in cyber space. Secondly, some objects, even though they may be 
predominantly civilian in nature, they can also be used for military purposes thus rendering 
them dual-use of objects. Thirdly, unlike in conventional warfare where the battlefield is 
limited in terms of the geographical location, cyber warfare can take place anywhere without 
geographical constraints. This means the battlefield in cyber warfare is unlimited as all
858Article 51(4) (a) of Additional Protocol I.
859Article 51(4) (b).
860Article 51(4) (c).
861Article 51(4) of Additional Protocol I.
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computer networks that are connected to the targeted network can be affected. This can be 
illustrated through the example of the cyber-attacks at Iran’s nuclear plant in 2010. Although 
the Stuxnet worm was only targeted Iran’s nuclear facilities at Natanz, the worm infected 
over 60 000 computers both inside Iran and in other countries such as Indonesia, China, 
Finland, Germany and Azerbaijan among other countries.862 This is a clear demonstration that 
even though cyber-attacks are capable of being directed against specific objects, there is high 
likelihood of the attacks becoming indiscriminate since there could be unintended and 
unforeseen collateral damage. Dinstein concurs that “the desire to avoid an indiscriminate 
effect of the CNA, with a view to confining the ensuing harm to military objectives, may be 
stymied by the common phenomenon of the interconnectivity of computers”.863 In light of 
this discussion, it can be argued that except in few circumstances where cyber-attacks can be 
directed specifically against a military objective, indiscrimination is an inherent weakness of 
cyber warfare in that it is difficult to confine the cyber-attacks to specific objects. Therefore, 
one can conclude that most cyber operations are likely to be considered indiscriminate and 
therefore a violation of the principle of distinction.
4.10 Conclusion
The evolution of war has resulted in the introduction of new means, methods of warfare that 
did not come to the imagination of the drafters of the legal instruments regulating the conduct 
of hostilities. Although IHL rules are couched in such a way that they can cater for both old 
and new situations, it must be admitted that the elasticity of the rules is not limitless. It has 
been admitted that IHL principles and legal instruments are applicable to cyber warfare. 
However, as has been demonstrated, the law has not been able to cope with all the 
developments that have taken place. Applying the existing laws to the emerging situations 
leaves some gaps that can result in IHL failing to fulfil its objectives. In this chapter, it has 
been demonstrated that drone and cyber warfare have blurred the traditional distinction 
between civilians and combatants, and between civilian objects and civilian objectives. The 
changing nature of armed conflicts has resulted in many states relying on civilians for
862JP Farwell and R Rohoziski (2011) Stuxnet and the Future of Cyber War, Survival 
https://www.cs.duke.edu/courses/common/compsci092/papers/cyberwar/stuxnet2.pdf (accessed 10 July 2016)
863Dinstein 2012 Journal o f  Conflict & Security Law 267.
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military related services. This challenges one of the core principles of IHL. One can therefore 
conclude that there is need to adapt IHL rules and principles to accommodate or regulate new 
developments in armed conflicts if IHL is to remain relevant and applicable to conflict 
situations.
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Chapter 5: Conclusion and Recommendations
5.1 Summary of the Study
This study sought to investigate the challenges that arise when applying the principle of 
distinction to modern armed conflicts. It challenged the assumption that the principle of 
distinction, which is the cornerstone of IHL, is well adapted to regulate all forms, means and 
methods warfare. Chapter 1 set out a general introduction to the study by broadly analysing 
the challenges that the principle of distinction is facing in modern armed conflicts. It was 
highlighted that although the principle of distinction remains relevant and applicable to 
modern armed conflicts, the challenges it faces undermines its application and effectiveness.
Chapter 2 traced the history of the principle of distinction. It began by noting that the 
principle existed since time immemorial even though it was not in codified form. The chapter 
then explored the development of the laws of armed conflict with particular attention to the 
principle of distinction. It was argued that even though the principle of distinction was not 
specifically referred to in early international treaties and conventions regulating conduct of 
warfare, the rules such as prohibition of aerial bombardment and undefended towns were 
made in recognition that there was a limit to what can be done to obtain victory in an armed 
conflict. In addition, the rules demanded that civilian population and objects should be spared 
from violence during armed conflicts. However, the development of the principle of 
distinction was stifled by the states’ desire to give more priority to military necessity at the 
expense of humanitarian concerns. This was particularly the case during the First and Second 
World Wars where states openly violated the principle of distinction in the name of military 
necessity.864
The Chapter then discussed the development of the laws of armed conflict after the Second 
World War, particularly the adoption of the Geneva Conventions in of 1949 and the 
Additional Protocol I, which, for the first time referred unequivocally to the principle of
864See Chapter 2, section 2.3.9 and 2.3.11.
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distinction. Thereafter the Chapter discussed how the principle of distinction has developed 
to become part of customary IHL, thus making it binding on states that are not signatories to 
the Additional Protocol I. The rest of the Chapter discussed the criteria used in distinguishing 
combatants from civilians as well as civilian objects from military objectives.
Chapter 3 sought to substantiate the claim that the principle of distinction is facing challenges 
in modern armed conflicts through the example of PMSCs. The Chapter traced the history of 
the rise of PMSCs and the reasons why they have become states’ preferred choice when 
engaging in armed conflicts. It was noted that their involvement in combat operations has 
increased at an alarming rate and this challenges the application of principle of distinction, 
which prohibits the hiring of civilians to conduct combat activities unless they are 
incorporated in to the armed forces of a party to the conflict. The chapter considered the 
question whether PMSCs that are contracted to take direct part in hostilities qualify as 
combatants under the principle of distinction. It was concluded that although it is possible to 
classify some PMSCs as either combatants or civilians, there are some companies in the grey 
area, which do not qualify under either category. It was also argued that although it is 
possible for PMSCs contracted by states to meet the combatant status, states are reluctant to 
incorporate these personnel into their armed forces for various reasons.865 The chapter then 
explored the consequences that arise because of PMSCs’ failure not to comply with the 
principle of distinction. It was argued that one of the consequence is the lack of individual 
and state accountability for violations international law as witnessed by the events in Iraq and 
Afghanistan.866 It was further demonstrated that even though there are mechanisms outside 
IHL to hold PMSC personnel accountable for violations of IHL committed during armed 
conflicts, the manner in which the companies operate render these mechanisms ineffective.867 
The chapter then dealt with the development of soft law as an attempt to regulate private 
military and security companies’ activities. The Montreux Document was singled out in this 
regard. However, its shortcomings were noted.868 In addition, the negotiation of the 
International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers by actors in the private
865See Chapter 3, section 3.4.1.
866See Chapter 3, section 3.5.1.
867See Chapter 3, section 3.6.1, 3.6.2 and 3.6.3. For example, it was argued in Chapter 3 that provisions of 
Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts do not apply to all PMSCs due to the 
obscure relationship between states and PMSCs who hire them. See discussion on individual and state 
responsibility of PMSCs in Chapter 3.
868See Chapter 3, section 3.7.1.
160
military and security industry was noted as a welcome development as it demonstrates that 
companies are willing to be regulated. However, the Code also has its shortcomings since it 
does not provide any answers concerning the status of private military and security personnel 
under the principle of distinction. It was concluded that the current law does not provide 
answers regarding the status of PMSCs as regards the principle of distinction.
Chapter 4 expanded the discussion in Chapter 3 by interrogating other forms of warfare that 
challenge the application of the principle of distinction to modern armed conflicts. New 
methods of warfare such as drone and cyber warfare also create challenges to the application 
of the principle of distinction during armed conflicts. The chapter discussed the rise of drone 
warfare and their use in the war on terror. It also discussed the application of the principle of 
distinction to drone warfare and concluded that drone warfare violates principle of distinction 
in two ways. Firstly, drone strikes are not as accurate as has been claimed by states currently 
using them. As a result, they do not distinguish civilian targets from military targets. 
Secondly, contracting civilians such as CIA personnel to take part in drone strikes violates 
the principle of distinction because these individuals do not meet the combatant status. As 
with PMSC personnel, CIA personnel do not have clearly defined rights and responsibilities 
under IHL.
It was further argued that cyber warfare also challenges the application of the principle of 
distinction to modern armed conflicts. The discussion traced the origins of cyber warfare and 
how it is carried out. The Chapter also dealt with the question whether cyber operations are 
capable of complying with the principle of distinction. It was argued that currently, it is very 
difficult to apply the principle of distinction to cyber warfare hence the need for the 
adaptation of the principle.
5.2 Lessons
In light of the investigation done in this study, the following lessons can be drawn regarding 
the application of the principle of distinction to modern warfare.
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5.2.1 Generally, the principle of distinction is applicable to all forms of armed conflict in 
modern warfare
The first valuable lesson is that the principle of distinction is applicable to all forms of 
conflict, at least in principle. Although new means and methods of warfare continue to 
emerge, international humanitarian law is flexible enough to apply to new methods of 
warfare. As Swanson argues, IHL rules currently in place can address the “ever-changing 
nature of warfare”.869 Therefore, despite the changes that have taken place in the nature of 
armed conflicts, the principle of distinction is flexible enough to apply to all forms of armed 
conflict. This is a reassuring finding since it means that states do not need to invent new rules 
to regulate each development that takes place in armed conflicts.
However, the principle of distinction needs some adaptation for it to be applicable to new 
forms of warfare and the developments that have taken place in armed conflicts. As 
highlighted in this study, the emergence of new means and methods of war such as drone and 
cyber warfare as well as the involvement of new participants in armed conflicts such as 
private military and security contractors and intelligence personnel raise challenges to the 
application of the principle of distinction to modern armed conflicts. Therefore, while the 
framework of the principle of distinction cannot be faulted, the criteria of distinguishing 
civilians from combatants and civilian objects from military objectives needs to be adapted in 
order to ensure that the law caters for the new developments that have taken place as shall be 
argued below.
5.2.2 States are increasingly outsourcing military functions to civilian personnel instead 
of relying on their armed forces
The second lesson that can be drawn from the study is that states are increasingly relying on 
civilian contractors to perform functions that were previously performed by armed forces.
869L Swanson “The Era of Cyber Warfare: Applying International Humanitarian Law to the 2008 Russian- 
Georgian Cyber Conflict” (2010) 32 Loyola of Los Angeles International and Comparative Law Review 303 at
332.
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This means that the practice of outsourcing military services is on the increase. Since the turn 
of the millennium, the number of civilian personnel hired to perform military functions on 
behalf of states has been staggering.870 Reasons for this development include the downsizing 
of standing armies, desire to reduce budget directed towards maintaining a standing army 
among other reasons.871 The changing methods of warfare have also demanded the increased 
hiring of civilian experts to take part in these forms of warfare.872 Since these experts are not 
in armed forces, states have resorted to outsourcing the services.
As a result of the increased involvement of civilians in the theatre of war, the application of 
the principle of distinction to modern armed conflicts has become very challenging. Chapters 
3 and 4 demonstrated how the phenomenon makes it possible for persons whose status is not 
clearly defined to take direct part in hostilities. These persons do not have clearly defined 
rights and responsibilities under IHL since it is not clear whether they are combatants or not. 
The problem that arises here is exacerbated by the fact that some states outsource military 
services to civilian contractors to escape liability for violations of law. As argued in Chapters 
3 and 4, states remain unaccountable and escape responsibility for violations of the law by 
persons performing military functions on their behalf. Moreover, it is difficult for these 
contractors to be held individually accountable given that there is no clarity regarding how 
they operate. For instances, no information can be obtained in order to prosecute individuals 
in the absence of cooperation from states hiring them.873 This is worsened by lack of uniform 
international norms regulating civilian contractors hired to perform military activities. More 
so states have adopted contradicting approaches towards civilian contractors such as
PMSCs.874
870See Chapter 3, section 3.2.1.
811Ibid.
872See generally Chapter 4.
873For example, even though South Africa has legislation which it could be used to prosecute thousands of its 
citizens who were hired by PMSCs in Iraq, this was not possible given the refusal by the companies as well as 
the United States o f America and Iraq governments to cooperate.
874This has resulted in difficulties on how to hold civilian contractors accountable. For example, South Africa 
has been strict with PMSCs and has the Regulation of Foreign Military Assistance Act 15 of 1998 that purports 
to ban these companies. However, PMSCs have reacted by migrating to countries where the laws are favourable 
to PMSCs.
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It is submitted that the principle of distinction is not flexible enough to accommodate the 
practise of outsourcing. As argued above, the principle of distinction between combatants and 
civilians does not extend to situations where states outsource military functions to civilian 
contractors. Consequently, states violate the principle of distinction when they hire civilians 
to participate in armed conflicts. This requires the principle of distinction to respond to this 
development either by banning the practice or by adapting the principle of distinction to 
accommodate situations of outsourcing. As Crawford notes, “it seems unlikely that States 
will willingly give up using PMSCs in combat situations given the increase in the downsizing 
of armies”.875 This observation can be applied in relation to outsourcing of military services 
in general. States are coming up with mechanisms that are meant to ensure regulation of 
civilian contractors and this suggests that the practice of outsourcing is there to stay.876 In 
other words, states are inclined towards recognising outsourcing than abstaining from the 
practice. Given the reality that outsourcing is here to stay, it is submitted that the principle of 
distinction needs to be adapted in order to accommodate the practice of outsourcing of 
military services as shall be argued below.
5.2.3 New methods of warfare and increased civilian participation in armed conflicts 
have blurred the lines between civilian objects and military objectives
Another lesson that can be drawn from the study is that the developments that have taken 
place in armed conflicts have blurred the distinction between civilian objects and military 
objectives. In other words, there is no longer a clear line that separates military objectives and 
civilian objects. This is a result of several factors. Firstly, the hiring of civilian contractors to 
perform military functions does not only create problem to the principle of distinction
875E Crawford Identifying the Enemy: Civilian Participation in Armed Conflict 170
876For example, the Montreux Document seeks to provide non-binding guidelines for the use of PMSCs while 
the International Code of Conduct provides rules for self-regulation by PMSCs. As o f November 2015, 54 
countries, including the major customers of PMSCs had become participating states of the Montreux Document. 
This demonstrates that states are increasingly tolerating the idea of the use of PMSCs. The United Kingdom 
government came up with a Green Paper in 2002 that was intended at ensuring regulation of PMSCs. In relation 
to the CIA drone operators, the United States Congress blocked attempts by the Obama administration to 
transfer the drone program from the CIA to the Department of Defence. See Participating States of the 
Montreux Document Federal Department of Foreign Affairs https ://www. eda. admin. ch/eda/en/fdfa/foreign- 
policy/international-law/international-humanitarian-law/private-military-security-companies/participating- 
states.html (accessed 28 July 2016), E L Gaston “2008 Harvard International Law Journal and Congress Block 
Plan to Transfer Drone Control from CIA to Pentagon” Wired 16 January 2014 
https://www.wired.com/2014/01/drone-strikes-likely-stay-cia/ (accessed 22 July 2016).
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between persons but also creates problems for distinction between civilian objects and 
military objectives. For example, the use of civilian objects by civilian contractors creates 
problems concerning whether these objects remain civilian objects or not.877 This is made 
worse by the proliferation of civilian contractors in the same conflict zones where different 
types of security and military companies operate in the same environment but performing 
different types of activities. In such situations, it becomes difficult to determine what objects 
are civilian and what objects are military.
The second reason why the line between civilian objects and military objectives has become 
blurred is the change in the means and methods of warfare. Kelsey argues that while the 
principle of distinction was based on the principle “that the aim of a conflict is to prevail 
politically and acts of violence were aimed at overcoming the military forces of the 
enemy”,878 this has drastically changed. In modern conflicts, “overcoming the military forces 
of the enemy is no longer the sole object when military’s capabilities are largely dependent 
on the private sector, and where a well-placed psychological blow can topple an opposing 
regime”.879 This situation has resulted in many objects that are traditionally regarded as 
civilian becoming crucial military targets thus blurring the distinction between military and 
civilian objects.
The introduction of new methods of warfare has also made the application of the principle of 
distinction between civilian objects and military objectives. For example, it has been argued 
that cyber warfare, by its nature makes it difficult to distinguish civilian objects from military 
objectives because of the dual-use nature of computers and the internet, which are the 
weapons as well as the targets of cyber-attacks. This means that any civilian object may 
become legitimate military target. Furthermore, despite the claims that drone strikes are more 
accurate and selective as compared to conventional weapons, it has been demonstrated that 
this argument is far from true.880 The use of drones as weapons makes it difficult for the 
operators to distinguish civilian objects from military objectives.
877See Chapter 3, section 3.5.1.
878Kelsey 2008 Michigan Law Review 1447.
819Ibid.
880See Chapter 4, section 4.3.
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The overall effect of these developments is that distinguishing civilian objects from military 
objectives has become difficult in modern armed conflicts. The methods of warfare that are 
now being used and the new objectives of war have made civilian population an integral part 
of armed conflicts thus making them constant targets. It is submitted that the criteria of 
distinguishing civilian objects from military objectives is not well adapted to apply to the new 
methods of warfare. In the absence of clear rules on how states should conduct themselves 
using these new methods of warfare, protection of civilian objects remains compromised. 
This calls for the development of the principle of distinction in order to accommodate these 
changes. Suggestions of possible ways in which the principle of distinction can be developed 
shall be made below.
5.2.4 Direct participation in hostilities is of limited use in determining status under the 
principle of distinction
Another valuable lesson that can be drawn from this study is that the concept of direct 
participation is of limited use in determining the status of civilians in armed conflicts. As 
pointed out in Chapter 3, the US Department of Defence’s refusal to prosecute contractors 
who committed crimes in Iraq and Afghanistan was mainly because they regarded them as 
civilians.881 If the USA’s position is accepted as correct, civilian contracted by states will be 
treated as civilians who can only lose protections when they take direct participation in 
hostilities. This means that, direct participation in hostilities becomes a key factor in 
determining the rights and responsibilities of civilian contractors. This entails that until these 
contractors take party in activities that amount to direct participation in hostilities, they 
remain protected as civilians despite that they are employed to perform combat related 
activities. Bosch concurs that if United States of America’s position is accepted as correct, 
civilian contractors would most likely be “categorised as civilians and their degree of 
participation in hostilities will determine whether they retain their civilian status or are 
considered to be unlawful belligerents”.882 While relying on direct participation in hostilities 
to determine rights and obligations under international humanitarian law is the standard
881Chapter 3, section 3.4.1.
882S Bosch “Private security contractors and international humanitarian law -  a skirmish for recognition in 
international armed conflicts” African Security Review, 16:4, 34-52,
https://www.issafrica.ore/uploads/16NO4BOSCH.PDF (accessed 25 July 2016).
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procedure in relation to ordinary civilians, it is submitted that the same approach cannot be 
used in relation to civilian contractors that are hired by states to provide military services for 
the reasons discussed below.
The first reason why direct participation in hostilities has limited application in these 
situations is that is has the effect of making the principle of distinction redundant. The 
principle of distinction is the only determinant in deciding whether a person has combatant 
privileges under IHL.883 It is only when a person qualifies as a combatant that they have 
combatant privilege. Traditionally the combatant status is reserved for members of the armed 
forces or persons affiliated to a party to the conflict, provided they meet certain 
requirements.884 The requirement for persons acting on behalf of states to comply with the 
combatant status under the principle of distinction is to ensure that states can remain 
responsible for the actions of its armed forces as well as to ensure discipline and compliance 
with laws of armed conflict. Once this position is accepted as true, then it is clear that states 
have an obligation to use persons who meet the combatant status during armed conflicts. The 
concept of direct participation in hostilities does not produce the same effects as the principle 
of distinction if used to determine status of civilian hired by states to fight in armed 
conflicts.885 If direct participation in hostilities is relied upon to determine status of state 
actors, states can easily escape their responsibilities under IHL. Moreover, the concept of 
direct participation in hostilities does not apply to people carrying out military operations on 
behalf of state on regular basis because these are, by virtue of their status liable to attack 
anytime and anywhere during the course of the armed conflict. Therefore, it is submitted that 
states cannot side step their obligations under the principle of distinction and hire civilians 
who are not under the direct control of the state to carry out military functions on their behalf.
As stated above, the concept of direct participation is meant to determine when a person is a 
civilian, and anyone who does not have combat status loses his/her protection during armed 
conflicts. This only happens when directly participating in hostilities. Allowing states to rely
883Article 43(2) of Additional Protocol I.
884Article 4A (4).
885For example, direct participation does not ensure that states will only use persons it has control over. More 
over direct participation does not create obligations for people comply with the law of armed conflict or to have 
a chain of command that enforces discipline.
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on direct participation in hostilities to determine whether civilian contractors hired to perform 
military services can be attacked will create an anomaly where a party to the conflict is 
prohibited from targeting their enemy belligerents until it is satisfied that the civilian 
contractors are taking direct participation in hostilities. This position will have the effect of 
encouraging states to hire civilian contractors in the knowledge that they will only be 
attacked when they take direct part in hostilities. By so doing, the party relying on civilian 
contractors will limit the opposing forces’ ability to wage war. This also has the effect of 
frustrating the opposing forces who will have to go through a thorough assessment in order to 
determine whether civilian contractors belonging to the enemy are directly participating in 
hostilities. This may in turn result in states ignoring the principle of distinction completely.
Another reason why direct participation in hostilities cannot be relied upon to determine 
whether civilian contractors hired to provide combat functions is that the meaning of concept 
of direct participation in hostilities is difficult to define precisely. The definition of what 
constitutes direct participation in hostilities and the activities that amount to direct 
participation in hostilities is controversial and subject to debate.886 There is no clear state 
practice that provides guidance regarding what acts constitute direct participation in 
hostilities. This lack of certainty makes it difficult to ascertain when civilian contractors can 
be subject to attack since each party may use its subjective understanding of the concept. 
Therefore, if direct participation in hostilities is used to determine whether civilians hired by 
states to fight in armed conflicts on its behalf can be attacked, it may result in civilians who 
perform genuinely non-combat duties risking being attacked since it is not clear which 
activities amount to direct participation in hostilities. More so, such a reliance on direct 
participation in hostilities will cause uncertainties in humanitarian law.
In addition, when states hire civilian contractors to operate in the same conflict zone, the 
battlefield becomes swarmed with persons who look similar and their status is considered the 
same yet they perform different functions.887 The proliferation of people whose status is not 
clear in a conflict zone makes it difficult to identify one group of civilian contractors from the 
other. As Schmitt notes, “allowing protected status in grey areas will jeopardise the absolute
886See Chapter 3, section 3.7.1.
887For example, in the Iraq War, several civilian contractors were present in the conflict zone. These ranged 
from those who were hired by states to provide services that amount to DPH to those who were genuine 
civilians employed as security guards by big co-operations.
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protection status afforded to civilians and not discourage participation by civilians”.888 
Schmitt further argues that if civilian status is still granted to civilian armed forces, “the 
concepts of distinction and direct participation are going to come under fire”.889 Therefore, in 
order to ensure protection of genuine civilian as well as ensuring the effectiveness of the 
principle of distinction, direct participation in hostilities should not be used to determine the 
status of civilian contractors hired to carry out combat activities on behalf of states.
In light of the above arguments, it can be concluded that that the status of persons hired to 
assist in combat operations should never be determined through the concept of direct 
participation in hostilities as this will result in IHL losing the protective mandate it has in 
armed conflicts. More so, this will render the principle of distinction irrelevant thus opening 
up floodgates for everyone to take direct part in armed conflicts. It is thus submitted that the 
principle of distinction should remain the determining factor in deciding whether civilians 
hired by states to provide take part in combat related activities are combatants or not.
5.3 Specific Conclusions
From the investigations made in this study, the following specific conclusions are made:
1. The principle of distinction between civilians and combatants and between civilian 
objects and military objectives, in principle remain relevant in modern armed conflicts. 
However, the principle of distinction is not well adapted to apply to the developments 
that have taken place in armed conflicts. Consequently, the framework of the principle 
of distinction must be used to adapt the law to the new challenges facing international 
humanitarian law.
2. Practices have emerged in armed conflicts that do not strictly fall under the regulation 
of the principle of distinction. These norms include the outsourcing of military 
functions traditionally performed by state armed forces to civilian contractors. These
888S Bosch “Private security contractors and international humanitarian law -  a skirmish for recognition in 
international armed conflicts”. See Generally Schmitt 2004 Chicago Journal o f  International Law 511.
889Ibid.
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new developments challenge the application of the principle of distinction between 
combatants and civilians
3. The practice of outsourcing and the use of new methods of warfare such as drone and 
cyber warfare have resulted in the distinction between civilian objects and military 
objectives being blurred thus threatening the protection that IHL traditionally offers 
during armed conflicts.
4. The practice of outsourcing is slowly establishing itself into a state practice and states 
have begun to react in order to establish rules and measures in order to regulate the 
practice. Consequently, IHL needs to respond in a manner that complements state 
practice in order to align the principle of distinction to the developments that have 
taken place in modern armed conflicts.
5. Direct participation in hostilities is of limited use in determining status under the 
principle of distinction. Therefore, states cannot rely on the concept of direct 
participation to circumvent their obligations under the principle of distinction.
5.4 Recommendations
In light of the discussion made in this study and the conclusions reached, the following 
recommendations are made:
5.4.1 Expanding the definition of combatants to accommodate outsourcing
It is submitted that the principle of distinction between civilians and combatants must be 
adapted in order to recognise situations where states outsource military services to civilian 
contractors. This means the definition of combatants should be expanded to include situations 
where states hire civilian contractors such as PMSCs or intelligence personnel to carry out 
military operations on their behalf. It should be recalled that as the law stands, civilian 
contractors could qualify for combatant status if they are incorporated into the armed forces 
of a party to the conflict or if they constitute a militia belonging to a part to the conflict.890 
However, state practice on outsourcing so far indicates that states are reluctant to incorporate
890See discussion in Chapter 3.
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civilian contractors they hire into their armed forces and this could be because of the same 
reasons why they resort to outsourcing in the first place.891 Expansion of the definition of 
combatants will be in recognition of the right of states to determine who can act on their 
behalf when engaging in armed conflicts.
Instead of requiring states to incorporate private contractors into their armed forces, the 
principle of distinction can recognise persons who have been contracted by a state to provide 
military services as combatants on ad hoc basis. This means that civilian contractors involved 
in combat operations are recognised as combatants for the duration of the armed conflict in 
which they participate. In order to meet the combatant status, it is submitted that civilian 
contractors will have to satisfy the requirements in Article 4A (2) of the Third Geneva 
Convention.892 These requirements will help to ensure that civilian contractors hired by states 
operate in an organised way and are capable of maintaining discipline and conducting 
themselves in terms of international law. For instance, the requirements of wearing fixed 
distinctive sign and carrying arms openly will assist in distinguishing civilian contractors 
hired by states to provide military services from other contractors who will be performing 
genuine civilian duties in the conflict zone.893
States that choose to hire civilian contractors to fight in a specific armed conflict should be 
required to notify the other parties to the conflict. This notification can be similar to the one 
that must be made when a party to the conflict incorporates paramilitary or law enforcement 
agencies into its armed forces in terms of Article 43(3) of Additional Protocol I. The 
notification will serve several purposes. Firstly, it will ensure that the opposing forces are 
aware of the fact the party that it is fighting is making use of civilian contractors. Once a 
notification has been made, there will be no confusion on the other party to the conflict as 
they will be aware of the nature of the enemy they will be facing. This will help to eliminate
891See Chapter 3, section 3.6.1
892The requirements are that of “being commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates; having a fixed 
distinctive sign recognizable at a distance; carrying arms openly and conducting their operations in accordance 
with the laws and customs of war.
893 These requirements will also ensure transparency and accountability on the part of civilian contractors. The 
requirements will apply in the same way they apply to militias or law enforcement agencies that are 
incorporated in the armed forces of a part to the conflict. The only exception will be that the management of the 
company together with the supervisors who accompany the personnel into the armed forces will be responsible 
for the conduct of their personnel. Alternatively, the issue of command of the civilian contractors can be left to 
be decided by contracting state as an internal arrangement. Where the latter option is chosen, the notification 
discussed below will have to specify the arrangement regarding the control of civilian contractors.
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incidences where civilian contractors present in the conflict zone to perform purely civilian 
purpose are attacked. Consequently, the notification will bring some certainty which helps to 
protect civilians since there will be a clear distinction between civilians and combatants.
Furthermore, a notification will also serve as a party to the conflict’s express acceptance of 
responsibility for the conduct of civilian contractors it has hired during the course of the 
conflict, including responsibility to punish contractors for violation of international law.894 In 
other words, a notification by a party to the conflict will serve to confirm that they have 
delegated military functions to civilian contractors who will carry out military functions on 
behalf of a state. Therefore, the effect of recognition of civilian contractors hired by states as 
combatants, together with the notification will ensure that states will not escape liability for 
any violation of international law during the course of the war. For example, a party to a 
conflict that hires civilian contractors in terms of the recommendation will assume 
responsibility under Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts. In 
other words, recognition of civilian contractors as combatants will make it possible for the 
Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts to apply to situations 
where states hire civilian contractors to perform military functions on its behalf.895 For 
instance, the expansion of the definition of combatants to civilian contractors will make states 
responsible for the wrongful conduct of civilian contractors they hire under Article 4(1) or 
Article 5 of Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts.896 
Therefore, international legal instruments such as Articles of Responsibility of States for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts will serve to reinforce a provision recognising civilian 
contractors as combatants. Gaston concurs that creating a principle permitting states to use 
civilian contractors under IHL may trigger full state responsibility for the actions of 
PMSCs.897 In light of this discussion, it is submitted that recognition of outsourcing under the
894Since most problems relating to the use of civilian contractors have been a result lack of accountability, this 
move will ensure that state will not deny responsibility for the actions of the personnel it hired.
895It should be recalled that discussion in Chapter 3 concluded that currently, the provisions of Articles on 
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts do not apply to all situations where states hire civilian 
contractors to perform military functions mainly because the provisions of the Articles currently do not cover 
the practise of outsourcing of military services. See Chapter 3, section 3.6.1.
896Article 4(1) hold state responsible for conduct the conduct of any state organ which exercises” legislative, 
executive, judicial or any other functions”. Since the recommendation proposes the recognition o f civilian 
contractors as combatants, states that rely on civilian contractors will be held responsible under this provision. 
Alternatively, states can be held responsible under Article 5, which deals with the conduct of “entities 
empowered by internal law to exercise governmental functions”.
897Gaston 2008 Harvard International Law Journal 241.
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principle of distinction will help to ensure that states retain responsibility for the conduct of 
civilian contractors they hire.
In addition to the general IHL principle that recognises civilian contractors as combatants, 
states can be encouraged to enact domestic legislation that will be used to regulate the 
civilian contractors. For example, domestic regulation can be used to regulate registration of 
civilian companies that offer military related services, accountability and reporting 
mechanisms that must be followed by the companies. This may also include disciplinary 
codes that the companies will follow in case of violation of IHL.898 These internal regulatory 
mechanisms can be modelled along the lines of the Montreux Document and the International 
Code of Conduct, which provide seemingly adequate regulatory mechanisms to states that 
hire civilian contractors.899 These mechanisms will help to ensure tight regulation of civilian 
contractors’ activities, hence ensuring accountability.
This approach has several advantages. Firstly, it resolves the problem of the status of civilian 
contractors hired by states to take part in hostilities since they will now be regarded as 
combatants. Once the issue of status is resolved, the rights and responsibilities of civilian 
contractors will be clear, as they will be treated in the same way as traditional combatants. 
Although this approach may sound radical, it takes into consideration the growing 
international practice where states outsource security services to civilian contractors instead 
of relying on their own armed forces. This approach strikes a balance between ensuring that 
IHL principles are upheld on the one hand and that the rules and principles are flexible 
enough to accommodate state practice on the other. More so, the recommendation will also 
restore the effectiveness of the principle of distinction by ensuring that states will only rely 
on persons who are legally recognised at combatants under IHL.
Secondly, the recognition of outsourced civilian personnel as combatants under the principle 
of distinction is likely to have political support from states. This is because the move to
898As already pointed out in this study, states have begun to put in place legislative measures to ensure 
regulation of military service providers.
899See Chapter 3, section 3.7.1 and 3.7.2.
173
recognise civilian military contractors as combatants does not create an entirely new norm 
that requires fresh negotiations between states. For example, while some states traditionally 
regarded PMSCs as mercenaries, the attitude of states towards PMSCs has shifted in recent 
years. As mentioned above, fifty-four countries have already endorsed the Montreux 
Document, a non-binding document that seeks to provide guidance on the use of PMSCs and 
this includes South Africa, which previously had attempted to outlaw the practice.900 This is 
an indication that states are more likely to embrace a humanitarian law principle recognising 
outsourcing. It can therefore be concluded that the move to recognise outsourcing of military 
services is likely to receive support from states who will now have flexibility on who they 
can entrust with performing military activities on their behalf.
Thirdly, recognition of outsourcing under the principle of distinction is likely to create 
uniform norms regarding the rights and responsibilities of both civilian contractors as well as 
states that rely on their services. This will ensure that states take responsibility for the acts 
committed by the persons who are acting on their behalf. Currently, there is no international 
standard of dealing with outsourcing. States are resorting to practices that are convenient to 
them. For examples, in relations to PMSCs, while the United States of America and Britain 
have been trying to regulate PMSCs, countries like South Africa have been trying to ban the 
activities of PMSCs.901 This problem has resulted in both civilian contractors and the states 
hiring them failing to be held responsible for violations of the law. For example, while South 
Africa passed legislation banning citizens from taking part in what it termed mercenary 
activities and enacted strict licensing restrictions for foreign military assistance, thousands of 
South Africans worked for PMSCs in Iraq.902 Although South Africa has legislation which 
could theoretically be used to prosecute its citizens who went to work for PMSCs in Iraq and 
elsewhere, such prosecutions were not possible due to the lack of cooperation from the 
United States of America and Iraq who were the making using of the PMSCs services.903 
Therefore, in the absence of an international norm regulating civilian contractors, national 
legislation will not be sufficient to regulate the activities of PMSCs since effectives of such
900Gaston 2008 Harvard International Law Journal 241. South Africa enacted the Regulation of Foreign 
Military Assistance Act 15 of 1998 in order to ban its citizens from engaging in mercenary as well as to place 
restrictions on other forms of foreign military assistance by its citizens.
901Gaston 2008 Harvard International Law Journal 241.
902Ibid. Furthermore, South Africa had not promulgated requisite regulations under the Act which would have 
enabled it prosecute cases of violations of the law.
903Ibid.
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of regulation will depend on cooperation from other states that may have conflicting laws. 
Therefore, it is submitted that the creation of a norm recognising outsourcing under the 
principle of distinction will go a long way to ensure that states practice towards civilian 
contractors is harmonious.
In conclusion, it is submitted that this recommendation will help to restore the distinction 
between combatants and civilians thus ensuring protection of civilians during armed 
conflicts. This will also help to ensure that those who take part in armed conflicts are held 
accountable for violations of international law that may take place.
5.4.2 Expanding the definition of military objectives to include some civilian objects
It was concluded above that the difficulty of distinguishing civilian objects from military 
objectives has been caused two main developments. The first development is the use of 
civilian contractors by states in armed conflicts, which then raises questions whether the 
infrastructure and equipment they use become military objectives. The second development is 
that the emergence of new methods of warfare, has changed the objectives of military 
operations to include targeting non-military infrastructure, thus making distinction difficult. It 
is submitted that these problems can be resolved in two ways
Firstly, the expansion of the definition of combatants to civilian contractors hired by states to 
perform combat functions as recommended above automatically makes their infrastructure 
and equipment military objectives that can be legitimately targeted. In other words, 
recognising civilian contractors as combatants will also mean that any objects belonging to 
them becomes military objectives. For example, the vehicles and installations used by 
PMSCs, their bases during armed conflict, buildings owned by civilian drone operators or 
civilians hired to conduct cyber operations will become military objectives that can be 
attacked during an armed conflict. Therefore, the general rules that apply to targeting of 
military objectives such as necessity and proportionality become applicable to these 
objectives. This solves the difficulties caused by the involvement of civilian contractors in 
armed conflicts, of distinguishing civilian objectives from military objectives.
175
This approach will have an advantage of ensuring certainty regarding what constitutes 
military objectives especially in conflict zones such as Iraq where different types of security 
and military companies operate in the same conflict zone. This recommendation will go a 
long way in restoring the distinction between civilian objects and military objectives, thus 
strengthening civilian protection. This approach will also ensure that offices and installations 
used to launch cyber-attacks and drone attacks will become legitimate attacks wherever they 
are. For drone operators, this will mean that the CIA headquarters as well as the several 
airbases where drones are based will become military targets subject to other IHL rules as 
already mentioned.904
Secondly, as noted earlier in this Chapter, changes in the methods of warfare have also 
resulted in the main objectives of war changing. For example, the introduction of potentially 
non-lethal methods of warfare such as cyber warfare has resulted shift in a shift in the 
objectives of war from killing opposing enemy belligerents to causing inconveniences in the 
economic, social political and economic lives of the opposing state.905 These have resulted in 
civilian objects becoming important military targets. Although cyber warfare seems to be at 
its infancy, it is foreseeable that it may become a preferred method of warfare in future. 
Given this probability, it is submitted that IHL should seek a balance between allowing states 
to use methods of warfare that are convenient to them as well as ensuring respect for the 
principle of distinction.
It is recommended that the definition of military objectives under cyber warfare or any 
potentially non-lethal method of warfare should be expanded to include some civilian objects. 
In other words, IHL should recognise the reality that civilians and civilian objects are an
904This means that civilian contractors will have to comply with all the other rules that make it easy to identify 
military objectives from civilian objects. For example, civilian contractors will be prohibited from disguising 
their infrastructure as civilian objects.
905Although it has been argued in this study that methods of warfare such as drone and warfare have created 
challenges to the principle of distinction between civilian objects and military objectives, it is submitted that the 
principle of distinction is capable of dealing with all kinetic attacks such as drone strikes. States should be 
encouraged to do more to adhere to the principle of distinction when conducting drone strikes. The 
recommendation made at 5.3.2.2 will therefore apply to non-kinetic and non-lethal attacks forms of attacks 
whose targets include those facilities that are traditionally regarded as civilian objects. Since cyber warfare is the 
most common and perhaps the only method of warfare, which has the above mention characteristics, the 
recommendation will constantly refer to cyber warfare as an example. However, the recommendation will apply 
to future methods of warfare that will have the same effects as cyber warfare.
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indispensable part of cyber-warfare and as such are bound to be inconvenienced during the 
war. This recommendation does not advocate for a return to indiscriminate attacks but instead 
seeks to ensure that there are some guidelines that can balance states’ choice to resort to 
cyber warfare and IHL’s obligation, particularly the obligation to protect civilian population 
from injury or death are put in place. It is recommended that for the purpose of potentially 
non-lethal cyber-attacks, the definition of military objectives could be extended to include 
power stations, economic infrastructure banking and communication systems. However, this 
extension should remain subject to the principle of proportionality and necessity in order to 
avoid unnecessary loss or injury to civilians.
This recommendation has a number of advantages. Firstly, it seeks to create a regulatory 
mechanism in terms of which the principle of distinction can be applied to cyber warfare. 
Currently there are uncertainties on how the principle of distinction is to be applied in cyber 
warfare. An attempt to apply the principle of distinction as it stands to cyber warfare in the 
same way it applies to conventional warfare will result in the majority of cyber operations 
being prohibited. This will make it almost impossible for states to engage in cyber warfare. 
The effectiveness of international law rules depends on good will of states to comply with it. 
When the law is completely out of touch with state practice, states may be inclined to ignore 
it. Therefore, if states find cyber warfare to be a convenient and useful method of warfare, 
which however is prohibited under IHL, they may be inclined to ignore the rules completely. 
Such a situation will mark a return to indiscriminate attacks. This recommendation therefore 
attempts to make it possible for states to engage in cyber warfare while at the same time 
ensuring that this can be done within the confines of the law.
Another advantage that the recommendation has is that attacks under cyber warfare, unlike 
kinetic attacks, are mostly non-lethal. Several cyber-attacks can only cause inconveniences 
without causing injury or death.906 The non-lethal potential of cyber warfare makes it a safer 
method of warfare as compared to conventional warfare. Therefore, states should be 
encouraged to pursue this method of warfare by making the rules of IHL such as the principle
906See Generally Kelsey 2008 Michigan Law Review 1427.
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of distinction flexible to accommodate cyber warfare.907 One way of relaxing the principle of 
distinction to accommodate cyber warfare is to expand the definition of military objectives to 
objects that “provides effective war-sustaining capabilities or indirectly contributes to 
military action”.908 This adaptation of the law may result in states moving away from the 
costly and destructive conventional warfare to cyber warfare. This does not however suggest 
that death or injury will not result from cyber operations. It t is submitted that the application 
of the principle of distinction, together with necessity and proportionality will deal with cases 
of lethal cyber-attacks and still be able to reduce the number of casualties in armed conflicts.
5.4.3 State Practice and Soft Law is essential in the development of the principle of 
distinction
It has been stressed throughout the study that some methods of warfare such as drone and 
cyber warfare are recent phenomenon and there is no well-established state practice regarding 
the rules applicable to these methods of warfare. It is submitted that development of IHL 
principle of distinction should take into account state practice. For example, it can be argued 
that it is now easier for states to negotiate rules that will recognise civilian contractors such as 
PMSCs as combatants under the principle of distinction because of the fair amount of state 
practice that can guide states during negotiations.909 State practice ensures that states will take 
a realistic approach based on their experience when negotiating the law. However, the same 
cannot be said about cyber warfare. States have not yet begun to openly acknowledge their 
involvement in cyber warfare hence there is no sufficient state practice that can be used for 
guidance during negotiations.
907Kelsey argues that “IHL should offer greater flexibility in deploying cyber weapons rather than regulating 
cyber warfare with the same restrictive rules that apply to conventional weapons. See Kelsey 2008 Michigan 
Law Review 1448.
908Ibid.
909For example, state practice and soft law has developed which can be used to give some guidance on how 
states should contact themselves. These can be used to guide the adaptation of the principle of distinction. This 
will help to ensure that states do not engage in negotiations forever. More so, states will also be deliberating on 
something that they have seen in practise. As a result, international law rules will not be negotiated in vacuum 
since there will be state practice to guide the negotiations
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Soft law can be very useful in the development of the principle of distinction in order to 
regulate the developments that have taken place in armed conflicts. For example in relation to 
PMSCs, states have negotiated the Montreux Document, which provides useful guidance on 
states that want to use PMSCS.910 Firstly, soft law will provide some guidance to states on the 
possible options they have when developing the law. Secondly, if soft law is developed with 
the involvement of states, the negotiation on the development of the law may be less 
contentious and less time consuming than in situations where states have to engage on the 
issues for the first time. Therefore, while I still maintain that the recommendations made 
above are capable of resolving the challenges that the principle of distinction is facing in 
modern armed conflicts, it is submitted that state practice and soft law should be considered 
when adapting the principle of distinction to modern armed conflicts.
5.5 Concluding Remarks
The nature of armed conflicts has drastically changed. New means and methods of warfare 
that stretch the laws of armed conflict to their limits have emerged. Although the framework 
that makes international humanitarian rules, including the principle of distinction remain 
relevant and applicable modern conflicts, it has been demonstrated that the law is not adapted 
enough to apply to these developments. International law, including IHL’s effectiveness 
relies on states’ goodwill to abide by the law. As a result, law should adapt to the changes in 
state practice in order for it to remain effective. In conclusion, the principle of distinction 
between combatants and civilians and between civilian objects and military objectives need 
to adapt to the changes that have taken place in modern armed conflict in order for it to 
remain relevant and for it to maintain its purpose of ensuring that the rights and duties of all 
persons are protected during armed conflicts.
910Although the Tallinn Manual can be used for guidance in relation to cyber warfare, its negotiation did not 
involve participation of states hence states may be reluctant to have their practice guided by it. However, it may 
be used to further develop soft law where states get involved
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